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Efficient ports are essential for efficient national, regional and international logistics 
and business more generally. However, efficient port performance depends on a 
number of factors, including adequate and efficient facilities and technology for 
cargo handling, accessibility and connectivity (both seaside and landside), port 
location in relation to trade routes and hinterland, skills and labour, as well as 
appropriate managerial technologies. While some of these factors may be in the 
control of port management, others may be beyond their immediate control. 
This study focuses on port performance in developing economies, with specific 
reference to Libya. Libyan ports occupy a strategic location close to the Asia-Europe 
international trade route, and between Africa and Europe. Therefore, they have the 
potential to play an important role in regional economies, acting as critical nodes in 
international logistics and supply chains. However, the persistently poor 
performance of ports across the country undermines this potential. Poor performance 
at the ports has, for example, pushed big carriers to bypass Libyan ports for the ports 
of neighbouring countries. Additionally, many traders in the region transport cargo 
through ports other than Libya’s. 
This study was developed to examine the factors that undermine the performance of 
Libya’s ports, using the perspective of Libyan port stakeholders. It examines how the 
various factors interact to create a situation of poor performance. To achieve this, the 
study was developed in two phases. The first phase used an online questionnaire that 
included factors related to port performance extracted from the literature. The data 
obtained from this questionnaire were analysed using descriptive analysis and one-
way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA). The second phase was used confirm 
the findings of the first phase, using data envelopment analysis (DEA). Secondary 
data related to 25 ports, including seven Libyan ports, were used for this purpose. 
The study finds that the poor performance of Libyan ports is caused by poor port 
infrastructure, superstructure and land transport infrastructure. However, a deeper 
analysis shows that the problem is much bigger than just port precinct-related 
xiii 
limitations. The study has also found that external factors play a major role in this 
situation, including political, economic and social factors. It suggests that a 
prevailing environment of bad politics and poor economic governance and 
management systems are responsible for the performance limitations at the ports. 
Apart from the internal political turmoil that has characterised Libya over many 
years, Libya has also been involved in many major conflicts with surrounding 
countries, a fact that undermines the position of its ports to facilitate trade in the 
wider regional hinterland. Internal political instability has also created a bureaucracy 
characterised by corruption, political patronage, ineptitude and general economic 
mismanagement. Thus, Libya has failed to adopt an effective local framework to 
drive effective investment and proper management of the ports and ensure efficient 
performance. 
It is envisaged that the findings of this study will be useful in the formulation and 
implementation of appropriate policy, both within the ports and more broadly, to 
achieve enhanced operational efficiency. While there are important questions for 
port and terminal operators regarding internal operations efficiency, there are even 
bigger ones for government regarding establishing an enabling economic 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis discusses port performance and efficiency. It focuses more on developing 
African ports, particularly in Libya. The argument in this thesis is that Libyan ports 
could benefit greatly from their strategic location on the Asia-Europe international 
trade route and their expansive hinterland. They could become important facilitators 
of regional and international trade logistics chains, connecting the region’s trade to 
global supply chains. However, this has not been the case. Therefore, the purpose of 
this research is to understand the causes of port underperformance and to recommend 
ways of addressing them, to enhance ports’ capacity for efficient performance. 
Ports form the key facilitating nodes in international trade making them crucial for 
national and regional economic prosperity (UNCTAD, 2007). Maritime transport is 
the dominant transport of international trade; it is the most cost-effective means of 
cargo transportation (UNCTAD, 2007). Additionally, the demand for container-
based trade continues to grow. This is due to its advantages, including cost and time 
efficiency (Kozan, 2000, Wong, 2008b, Huang, 2004, Tierney et al., 2014). This 
escalating demand has influenced the size of container ships and consequently, ports’ 
roles and specifications. 
This study will argue that ports whose operations contribute most substantially to 
overall transportation cost reductions are most likely to be preferred by shipping 
companies (Huybrechts et al., 2002). This is achievable by enhancing port 
performance and efficiency. Enhancing port performance and efficiency can be 
achieved by increasing port capacity, taking advantage of location (Perez-Labajos 
and Blanco, 2004), improving sea and landside port accessibility (Gekara and 
Chhetri, 2013, Lee and Jin, 2013), and incorporating information and 
communication technology (ICT) (Gekara and Fairbrother, 2013, Kia et al., 2000). 
Previous studies on the African continent have shown that a developing economy 
can benefit from greater connectivity to global markets, improved trade and reduced 
transport costs, by improving port facilities (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). Therefore, 
Libyan ports can be potentially important nodes for international trade between 
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regional land-locked countries and the rest of the world. Further, they can become 
important trade hubs in the region, due to their strategic locations. 
As such, the context of this research is the Libyan ports industry. Libya is a spacious 
developing country that occupies a strategic location at the centre of the south coast 
of the Mediterranean Sea, along the key Asia-Europe international trade route. Its 
coastline is about 1,970 kilometres in length. Libya is surrounded by six countries: 
Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia. Two of these countries (Chad and 
Niger) are land-locked and depend entirely on transit countries such as Libya, 
Nigeria and Benin for sea transportation access. 
In total, the Libyan ports industry comprises 20 ports. Seven of these ports are 
general cargo ports, which handle containers, bulk cargo, roll on/ roll off (RO/RO) 
and dry bulk. These include Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata ‘Qasr Ahmed port’, Khoms, 
Tobruk, Derna and Zuwarah. They are all state owned and operated by two public 
companies under the authority of the Libyan Marine Transport and Ports Authority 
(LMTPA). The other 11 ports are oil and petrochemical ports, which handle all the 
oil trade, the main driver of Libya’s economy. Another port, called Misurata Steel 
port, handles steel trade through the Misurata Steel Complex. 
Ninety per cent of Libya’s international trade, which mainly comprises imports, is 
processed by its ports (Choi, 2003). Despite the dramatic increase in demand for 
containerisation (Beškovnik, 2009), the maximum container throughput of all Libyan 
ports has not exceeded one million TEUs per year since being built. This indicates 
that Libyan ports are underperforming. 
To achieve efficient performance, container ports—including Libyan ports—have to 
improve their capacities by adopting strategies such as new port designs, 
sophisticated infrastructure, long term planning, more effective cargo-handling 
equipment, larger storage yards, advanced information technology and software 
programming (Chang et al., 2008, Asteris et al., 2012, Beškovnik, 2008, Blonigen 
and Wilson, 2008). However, despite the increase of trade volume in the region 
(ITC, 2015), the small capacity of Libyan ports has limited the throughput of Libyan 
ports, compared to other ports in the region,  
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Table 1.1: Regional Trade Value Statistics in US Million Dollars 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Chad 
Imports 386 418 635 779 904 1,333 767 822 1,080 
Exports 2,172 2,513 2,515 3,924 2,301 3,101 3,859 3,276 3,105 
Niger 
Imports 736 860 956 1,208 1,627 2,290 1,917 1,685 1,714 
Exports 486 470 470 1,026 628 484 1,081 1,307 1,337 
Libya 
Imports 5,033 6,196 6,749 9,116 12,859 17,674 7,114 19,719 24,417 
Exports 30,948 31,632 32,503 44,696 27,256 36,440 18,734 58,267 42,221 
Tunisia 
Imports 13,174 15,007 19,099 24,638 19,096 22,215 23,952 24,471 24,266 
Exports 10,494 11,694 15,165 19,320 14,445 16,427 17,847 17,007 17,060 
Algeria 
Imports 20,357 21,456 27,631 39,475 39,258 41,000 47,220 50,369 54,910 
Exports 46,002 54,613 60,163 79,298 45,194 57,051 73,436 71,866 65,998 
Italy 
Imports 384,836 442,565 511,823 560,960 414,784 486,984 558,832 489,104 476,414 
Exports 372,957 417,153 500,203 541,786 406,479 446,840 523,256 501,529 513,717 
Turkey 
Imports 116,774 139,576 170,063 201,961 140,869 185,541 240,839 236,544 251,651 
Exports 73,476 85,535 107,272 132,002 102,139 113,979 134,915 152,537 151,796 
Spain 
Imports 289,611 329,976 391,237 418,728 287,502 315,547 362,835 325,835 332,267 
Exports 192,798 214,061 253,754 279,231 223,132 246,265 298,171 285,936 310,964 
France 
Imports 475,857 529,902 611,364 695,004 540,502 599,172 700,852 663,269 668,658 
Exports 434,354 434,354 539,731 594,505 464,113 511,651 581,542 556,576 566,879 
Malta 
Imports 3,865 4,396 4,947 5,141 4,034 5,732 7,396 7,896 7,525 
Exports 2,431 2,847 3,158 3,029 2,280 3,717 5,279 5,646 5,206 
Egypt 
Imports 19,812 20,594 27,031 52,751 44,912 53,003 62,282 69,866 66,666 
Exports 10,366,216 11,985,054 13,823,121 15,971,873 12,310,033 15,050,924 18,055,465 18,003,055 17,974,395 
Source: ITC (2015) and UNCTAD (2011c). 
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including Italian, Maltese, Egyptian and Tunisian ports. As a result, no Libyan 
commercial ports are ranked in the top one hundred ports list, in terms of the volume 
of cargo handled or container traffic (Aquaviários, 2012, AAPA, 2012, AAPA, 
2008a, AAPA, 2009). 
There is strong evidence that regional trade has been on the increase, as 
demonstrated in Table 1.1. For example, the trade volume trends of the countries in 
the region, such as Italy, Malta, France, Spain and Turkey, which are close to Libya, 
clearly show an increase similar to that in the countries that share a border with 
Libya, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. In addition, even the land-locked 
countries that share a border with Libya have experienced increasing trends in trade 
volume. However, despite Libyan ports being the most appropriate for handling this 
trade, not much of it passes through Libyan ports. This shows that the 
underperformance of Libyan ports is not because of the volume of trade in the 
region. 
A number of challenges have prevented Libyan ports from taking optimal advantage 
of location opportunities. The literature specifically notes that these challenges have 
undermined Libyan ports from efficiently facilitating regional trade movement, 
particularly to the land-locked countries south of Libya (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 
2010). For instance, only about 8.86 per cent of Chad’s imports and 8.33 per cent of 
its exports are handled through Libya (Ministry of Infrastructure and Facilities, 
2011). Similarly, Niger uses the Nigerian and Benin ports for its international trade 
movement (Global trade, 2013). Moreover, these challenges have undermined 
Libyan ports from becoming trading hubs to facilitate the transhipment of 
international trade cargo, like the Maltese Marsaxlokk terminals. Thus, Libyan ports 
are ranked poorly internationally, significantly contributing to the consistently poor 
rating of the country in terms of its trade logistics performance in the World Bank’s 
logistics performance index (LPI) (see Table1.2). In these rankings, the World Bank 
uses six key dimensions to benchmark countries’ performance, including: 
 The efficiency of the clearing process 
 The quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure, such as ports, roads, 
rails and information technology 
 The ease of arranging competitively priced shipments 
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 The competence and quality of logistics services 
 The ability to track and trace consignments 
 The timeliness of shipments in reaching destinations within the 
scheduled/expected delivery time. 
In 2010, Libya was ranked 132 out of 155 countries (Bank, 2015). At that time, all 
the country’s organisations were working under the Gaddafi regime. Libya was 
ranked below all the regional countries, including the two land-locked countries. 
After the uprising of 2011, despite the insecurity, the overall LPI of Libya increased 
to 84 and 85 for 2012 and 2014, respectively (Bank, 2015). This was because of 
improvements in logistics quality and competency, the implementation of IT services 
for tracking and tracing consignments, and an increased reliability of delivery times. 
Additionally, the clearing process was faster, due to the lack of implementation of 
laws. However, during the same period, nothing changed regarding infrastructure; 
therefore, the rank of the quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure did not 
change (Bank, 2015). 














France 17 17 14 28 12 14 9 
Italy 22 23 20 37 18 21 24 
Spain 25 22 25 48 24 16 21 
Lebanon 33 29 41 69 19 49 29 
Turkey 39 46 39 44 37 56 31 
Tunisia 61 73 65 22 109 102 58 
Malta 64 55 48 64 52 104 117 
Egypt 92 122 106 110 54 101 81 
Niger 106 132 97 102 98 115 83 
Chad 115 96 126 91 145 96 102 
Algeria 130 141 122 98 129 138 136 
Libya 132 116 107 140 121 143 124 
Source: The World Bank (2015). 
All these failures seem to be due to deficiencies in the capacity of Libyan logistics-
related institutions, including ports. The conclusion is that they are caused, directly 
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or indirectly, by persistent political and economic mismanagement. In this regard, 
much blame can be laid on the constant conflicts between Libya and its neighbouring 
countries during Gaddafi’s regime. All of these political issues led to Libya’s 
isolation from the international community, along with a lack of economic 
cooperation between Libya and the international community in general, and 
neighbouring countries in particular. Examples include Libya’s failure to establish 
effective trade corridors with its land-locked neighbours because of political 
conflicts between Libya and its southern neighbours—no railways or roads. 
Likewise, there is very little hinterland connection infrastructure with any of the 
neighbouring countries. This is mostly because of political instability in the region. 
During Gaddafi’s regime, this was largely due to Libya’s interference in the affairs 
of its neighbours in pursuit of regional dominance. In addition, sanctions 
implemented by the international community between 1992 and 2003, because of the 
internationally condemned behaviour of the regime, affected all aspects of the 
economy and starved the country of essential capital investment in key 
infrastructure, thus greatly undermining Libya’s international trade capacity 
(Fraenzel, 2009). The capacity of its ports to grow and perform optimally was 
consequently also undermined. 
Secondly, considering that all ports in Libya are state owned and operated, political 
and economic mismanagement has resulted in a failure to invest in vital economic 
infrastructure, especially ports. The desire to retain power and control of all aspects 
of the country meant that the state, particularly the Gaddafi regime, refused to allow 
private sector participation in port development and management. This has had an 
influence on decisions regarding port resourcing and management. In addition, in the 
1970s and 1980s, Libya formed a number of laws and regulations to discourage 
private sector participation. Further, there were no secure investment laws to 
encourage foreign or local investors to establish businesses in Libya, especially after 
the nationalisation of private companies. The absence of a private sector minimised 
competition between ports, and this is reflected in the inability of Libya’s ports to 
perform to a high standard. 
Regarding economic factors, Libya focuses on oil exportation, which is the main 
driver of its economy. This has prompted the LMTPA to emphasise oil ports over 
7 
general cargo and container ports. Additionally, nationalising the industrial and 
agricultural sectors, excluding the private sector, and controlling and monitoring 
foreign exchange measures have undermined trade productivity and made Libya 
reliant on imports for all of its needs. These actions have also minimised the cargo 
volumes handled by Libyan ports, which discouraged the Libyan government from 
investing in these ports, deploying costly equipment and developing infrastructure. 
A limited port capacity influences port performance in both developed and 
developing economies. Evidence of this is that new generation container ships are 
served by a small number of container ports. These include developed ports, such as 
Rotterdam and Hamburg and developing ports, such as Shanghai. Although the 
literature contains a number of studies conducted on the factors that influence 
container port performance in developed economies, few have focused on African 
ports. Further, the literature shows that very few of these studies have focused on 
Libyan ports. Therefore, there is a need for an enhanced, empirically driven 
understanding of the impediments to African port performance. This study plays an 
important role in creating this understanding. Additionally, the results of this 
research contribute to performance and efficiency theories by offering an empirical 
model that can be used as a decision support tool for port performance optimisation. 
1.2 Aims and Research Questions 
As noted and explained earlier, Libyan ports could play a vital role in the 
international trade of the North African and Mediterranean Sea regions. They could 
also be important access nodes for southern land-locked and Mediterranean 
countries. However, the performance of Libyan ports has been persistently poor 
compared to other ports located on the north coast of the Mediterranean. Taking the 
closest Maltese terminals of Marsaxlokk port as an example, they handled 2.37 
million TEUs and served 1,862 ships in 2010 (Freeport, 2012), compared to 61,4041 
TEUs and 3,961 ships handled by all Libyan ports (SPC, 2012, Libyan Maritime 
Admisnistration, 2013, Misurata Free Zone, 2013). The large number of ship calls 
and the small volume of TEUs handled by Libyan ports shows that the larger ships 
owned by major carriers do not call at Libyan ports. As the Marsaxlokk and Libyan 
ports are located close to each other, this means there are some performance-related 
problems forcing international carriers to bypass Libyan ports and use neighbouring 
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countries’ ports instead. This is reflected in the total throughput of Libyan ports. 
Hence, they are not ranked among the top one hundred ports in terms of container 
traffic and volume of handled cargo (AAPA, 2008b, AAPA, 2009, AAPA, 2012, 
Aquaviários, 2012). 
Apart from the lack of literature about Libyan ports, investigating the problem of 
Libyan ports’ performance is important because they do not live up to their potential 
role in developing the regional and global economy. Additionally, because of this 
poor performance, the cost of doing business through the ports is prohibitively high. 
The factors of underperformance are not identified in the literature. Therefore, the 
aim of this research is to investigate and highlight the factors that undermine 
container and general cargo port performance and efficiency in Libya, against the 
background of global trade transport connectivity. The ultimate objective is to 
investigate the performance and efficiency of container ports, to develop an 
empirical model for container port evaluation, and to develop criteria for improving 
container port performance and efficiency. Weaknesses in the Libyan container ports 
industry are detected, leading to suggestions for improvement. Policy 
recommendations are developed to assist government and businesses, particularly the 
ports, to establish an enabling environment and structures for improved performance. 
To address these objectives, the study was developed in two phases. The first phase 
examined and highlighted the factors undermining the performance of four Libyan 
container and general cargo ports against the background of global trade transport 
connectivity. This was investigated from the perspective of local Libyan port 
stakeholders. These four main Libyan ports are Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata and 
Khoms. The factors considered in this phase, which were derived from the literature, 
included cost, time, safety of cargo at port, port accessibility, port reliability, service 
flexibility, online services and productivity on the ship side and terminal side. The 
cost factor included the cost of cargo handling, customs clearance and land transport. 
The time factor consisted of the total cargo-handling time and free dwell time. The 
cargo safety factor included cargo damage, cargo loss and the labour competency. 
The factor of port accessibility included seaside accessibility and landside 
accessibility. Port reliability encompassed the reliability of ships’ scheduling, cargo-
handling facilities and the customs clearance process. The service flexibility factor 
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consisted of the flexibility to provide berthing on arrival and the ability to provide a 
variety of handling services. The online factor discussed online services provided by 
Libyan ports. These included online monitoring of ship movements and cargo 
tracing, online customs services and online transactions. Shipside productivity 
included the capacity of quay cranes (QCs) and the efficiency of cargo loading and 
off-loading operations to and from the ship. Terminal side productivity included the 
capacity of storage yards, cargo-transport equipment and stacking equipment. To 
examine these factors against stakeholders’ experiences and perceptions, an online 
questionnaire was developed and administered to around 200 different stakeholders. 
Descriptive analysis was used to analyse the data. Due to the different interests of 
port stakeholders, it was expected that every stakeholder group would have a 
different perspective regarding the variables used. Therefore, one-way analysis of 
variance (one-way ANOVA) was also used to determine whether there were 
significant differences among the total means of the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
The second phase of the study evaluated the efficiency of seven Libyan ports against 
18 container ports and terminals related to Libya’s trading partners. This phase 
examined Libyan port performance in comparison to other international competitors. 
According to the findings of the first phase, variables related to port infrastructure 
and superstructure had the greatest influence on port performance. Therefore, 
secondary data related to these variables were used for this comparison. Data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) was employed to analyse this secondary data. The 
second phase included only those variables that had an influence on Libyan port 
performance and that were under the control of port management. In terms of port 
infrastructure, these variables included water depth, berth length and storage yard 
area. In terms of superstructure, these variables included seaside cranes, cargo 
transport equipment and stacking equipment. Land transport infrastructure was 
excluded, as it is not under port management. 
Despite Libya being in a strategic location, and despite the generally accepted 
argument that ports are key elements to regional development, Libyan ports have not 
taken the opportunity available to them. The region is definitely growing in terms of 
trade, but this trade is facilitated by other ports in the region, such as the Maltese 
Marsaxlokk terminals. In contrast, Libyan ports are avoided because of their poor 
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performance. To find out why this is the case, this thesis has answered the key 
research question: What are the main factors that undermine Libyan ports from 
attaining optimum performance in the facilitation of regional and international trade? 
To answer this question, the following key questions are examined: 
1. What are the criteria of measuring port performance? Port performance is 
multi-dimenssional. Each port stakeholder assesses port performance from 
different angles, based on the stakeholder’s interests and the nature of their 
business. For instance, carriers’ concerns about seaside accessibility and the 
efficiency of loading and off-loading operations, which depends on the 
efficiency of QC. That is because the efficiency of loading and off-loading 
operations influences a ship’s turnaround time and the reliability of a ship’s 
schedules. In contrast, freight forwarders have concerns about the reliability 
and efficiency of cargo clearance processes, rather than seaside accessibility. 
Therefore, to have comprehensive measurement criteria, this thesis has 
incorporated the literature of port performance and efficiency intensively, and 
has developed a comprehensive multi-dimensional imperial model for 
measuring port performance, as shown in Chapter 3. These criteria were 
tested against local stakeholder expectations and experiences. The main 
factors of this model are seaside productivity, terminal side productivity, 
cargo safety, port accessibility, port reliability, service flexibility, online 
service, time and cost. 
2. In what ways does the state of existing infrastructure undermine the 
performance of Libyan container ports? All of the above measurement 
criteria depend mainly on the existing infrastructure and port superstructure. 
Infrastructure consists of port water depth, berth length and the area of port 
storage yard. These factors control the size of container ships that can be 
served by a port and the volume of containers on board that ship needing to 
be stored in a port. It also consists of road and rail networks. While these two 
factors are not under the control of the port, they do influence the efficiency 
of container flow between a port and its hinterland. Through this question, 
the study critically examines the ability of Libyan ports to handle the new 
generations of mega container ships and absorb the larger volumes of cargo 
that are carried by these ships. 
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3. To what extent does the capacity of Libyan container ports’ superstructure 
affect performance? In answering this question, the study investigates the 
efficiency and reliability of the cargo-handling equipment used at Libyan 
ports. It also investigates the flexibility of the service provided by a port and 
the ability of its equipment to handle customer needs and attract more 
shipping lines. Port superstructure includes all container-handling equipment, 
such as QCs, transport and stacking equipment. The literature illustrates that 
efficient container ports use sophisticated and advanced container-handling 
equipment. Employing such equipment depends on a number of factors, 
including the volume of container traffic, port capital and the port area. 
However, each type of handling equipment has different throughput and, 
therefore, a different performance. 
4. How has the prevailing political situation in Libya contributed to the 
underperformance of the ports? Through this question, the study highlights 
the disadvantages of performance-related politics in taking corrective action 
aimed at enhancing port performance. Port performance is influenced by a 
number of local and global political factors. Locally, port governance 
structure, local trading laws, investment and finance, as well as the 
transformation from capitalism to socialism, have influenced port 
performance. In addition, Libya is politically unstable. Despite Libya’s 
alliance with some countries, it has experienced conflict with other countries, 
including neighbouring ones. These conflicts have prevented Libya from 
establishing strategic plans to link its ports with the wide hinterland. These 
conflicts have also undermined the volume of trade between Libya and these 
countries, which is the core of port activities. 
By answering these research questions, this thesis will contribute to the body of 
knowledge on port performance. It is expected to bridge the gap in the present 
literature in the area of container ports’ performance and efficiency in developing 
countries, particularly in Africa. To answer these questions and give 
recommendations for enhancing performance and efficiency, the study has used a 
purely quantitative approach, divided into two phases. The first phase highlights the 
most influential factors on port performance through an online questionnaire sent to 
around 200 local stakeholders of Libyan ports. The primary data obtained from local 
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stakeholders were analysed using two statistical techniques: descriptive analysis and 
one-way ANOVA. 
The most influential factors on performance were then used in the second phase to 
evaluate the efficiency of seven Libyan container ports, alongside those of 18 
international trading partner container ports. Secondary data were used for this 
purpose, analysed by DEA. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters (see Figure 1.1). The second chapter 
provides a background on Libya. This includes demographic information and a brief 
historical account of Libya’s politics and economy during the era of the former 
regime and post-revolution. It then illustrates how Libya’s politics have affected its 
economy, as well as port connectivity and performance. It also provides some 
information about Libya’s international trade, trading partners and the main imports 
and exports. Additionally, this chapter discusses the transportation industry in 
general and emphasises Libyan ports and maritime transport. 
Chapter 3 critically reviews the literature of port performance and efficiency. It 
focuses on the operations of seaside, terminal side and landside, which sets the 
platform for discussions in the following chapters. It also highlights the common 
methodologies and methods used to assess port performance and evaluate efficiency. 
From this critical review, a conceptual model was developed and the key factors of 
port performance were highlighted. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology and outlines the methods used in this study. It 
highlights the methodological paradigm and justifies the use of the selected 
approach. It also discusses the relevant variables, data collection method and the 
most appropriate analytical techniques that serve the purpose of this study. 
The analysis of this study was split into two chapters. Chapter 5 includes the 
descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA, and Chapter 6 includes the DEA. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical data analysis and results of the primary data 
collected via the quantitative online questionnaire. This chapter critically considers  
13 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis 
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the factors that influence port performance and examines their effect on performance 
from the perspective of local stakeholders. 
In contrast, Chapter 6 considers the factors that have emerged as being most 
influential on port performance, and uses them as input variables to evaluate the 
efficiency of seven Libyan ports against 18 container ports and terminals belonging 
to Libya’s trading partners. It also examines the effects of the existing infrastructure 
and superstructure on Libyan ports’ efficiency using the two basic DEA models. The 
first applied model is DEA-CCR, under input-oriented, variable returns-to-scale, to 
measure the global technical efficiency. The second applied model is DEA=BCC, 
under input-oriented, constant return-to-scale, to measure the local pure technical 
efficiency.  
Chapter 7 provides an extensive discussion of the main findings of both the 
descriptive and DEA analysis. It provides a comprehensive explanation for why 
Libyan ports have not acquired efficient performance, by bringing together the main 
themes in the empirical chapters to address the research questions. It also considers 
the different types of influences such as political, economic and social factors, as 
well as the way Libyan ports are operated and owned. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to the study. It summarises the thesis and 
highlights its theoretical and empirical contributions. It also makes some 
recommendations to improve the performance of Libyan ports, and suggests some 
further research to fill the gap in the literature about port performance. Finally, it lists 







Chapter 2: Libya 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the contextual background to the research. 
It examines the political, social and economic landscape in Libya and the direct and 
indirect influence this has had on the nation’s economic performance, with specific 
reference to the port industry. To do this, this chapter is organised as discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
The first section highlights the geographic, social and demographic features of the 
country. To identify the reasons for underperformance, the second section looks at 
Libya’s international and local politics, tracing the history of Libya’s politics from 
independence and therefore, the impact of Libya’s politics on its economy. 
The third section looks at Libya’s economy since independence until the post-
revolution period in February 2011, and illustrates the main driver of Libya’s 
economy. It also briefly highlights the laws that control trade productivity. This is 
followed by a discussion about the main imports and exports, as well as the trading 
partner countries. All of the above are reviewed because international trade is a key 
determinant of port activity, which depends on economic performance, formed and 
controlled by politics. The last section discusses the Libyan transportation industry 
and emphasises Libyan ports and maritime transport, to determine how politics and 
economic underperformance are linked to Libyan ports. 
2.2 Libya’s Geography and Port Hinterland 
Libya is a spacious developing country located at the centre of the south coast of the 
Mediterranean Sea, with a total land area of 1,759,540 square kilometres (world, 
2012, CIA, 2012). It is surrounded by six countries: Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, 
Algeria and Tunisia. Chad and Niger are land locked (see Figure 2.1). Sudan does 
not have a coast on the Mediterranean Sea. Libya (in the seventeenth position) is one 
of the largest nations in the world and is recognised as the fourth largest country of  
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Source: Google (2012). 
Figure 2.1: Libya’s Geographical Location 
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the African continent (world, 2012, CIA, 2012). It has 4,348 kilometres of land 
boundaries: in the south, it shares a border of 1,055 kilometres with Chad, 354 
kilometres with Niger and 383 kilometres with Sudan. In the east, it shares a border 
of 1,115 kilometres with Egypt and 982 kilometres with Algeria; and with Tunisia in 















Source: (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010). 
Figure 2.2: International Trade Routes, Gateway Ports and Hubs in the 
Mediterranean Sea 
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Libya has 20 ports distributed along a coastline of about 1,770 kilometres in length. 
The main commercial ports are Tripoli, Khoms and Misurata in the west, and the 
port of Benghazi in the east. These ports are considered the main supply points for 
Libyan cities (including the inner cities), as they handle the majority of Libya’s 
international trade. However, none of Libya’s ports is a hub port. 
Libyan ports therefore have a potentially large hinterland, which extends to include 
landlocked neighbouring countries. Furthermore, it is strategically located close to 
the Asia-Europe international trade route (see Figure 2.2), which passes through the 
Mediterranean Sea (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010), as well as between Europe and 
Africa. All indications therefore suggest that Libyan ports have great potential to 
perform a key role as logistical nodes within the region.  
2.3 Libyan Politics 
Libya has a long history of political instability, which has negatively affected its 
socio-economic performance (Indexmundi, 2012). For more than four decades the 
country lived under a dictatorship. Globally, the aggressive political behaviour of the 
former Libyan leader isolated Libya from the international community (Mateos, 
2005). In addition to faulty local systems of governance, this isolation has affected 
Libyans socially, politically and economically.  
2.3.1 Global Politics 
During the era of the former regime, Libya had unsustainable alliances with a 
number of countries and organisations. These included alliances with some western 
counties. However, most of these alliances were demolished due to the conflicting 
political decisions of the Gaddafi regime. Increasingly therefore Libyan political 
activity focused more on the region. The regime built alliances with Arabic 
countries, the African Union and western Arabic countries, including Libya, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. Libya has been a member of the Arab League 
since 28 March 1945 (League of ArabStates, 2015). The Arab League is a forum for 
the coordination of member states’ political positions and trading coordination. It 
discusses matters of common concern, as well settling some Arab disputes and 
limiting conflicts (League of Arab States, 2015). Aside from being a member of the 
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Arab League, Libya’s first alliances were with Egypt, Sudan and Syria. However, 
when the Egyptian regime realigned with the United States of America (USA) and 
recognised Israel, the Libyan regime turned south to Yemen and Ethiopia (Mateos, 
2005). During the Gaddafi regime, Libya had chronic conflicts with a number of 
Arabic countries, including Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan (Noonpost, 2015, Zaki, 2014). 
In addition, in 1979, Gaddafi sent his troops to support the Ugandan army in its war 
against Tanzania. In the same year, it attacked Tunisia (Noonpost, 2015). Libya was 
also involved in the wars of Vietnam and Cambodia against American occupation, 
and it played a significant role in the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. Libya 
benefitted little from these wars, only gaining notoriety, and lost a great deal of its 
wealth and people. Furthermore, Libya has chronic conflicts with some of the 
western countries (Davis, 1987). These conflicts led to implementing international 
sanctions on Libya and air strike on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, which widened to 
include a total ban on direct export and import trade, commercial contact and travel-
related activities with Libya (Oakes, 2011).  
The invasion of Iraq by western countries, which ended in the execution of the 
former president Saddam Hussein, was a clear message to the Libyan former 
president to change his key policies with the west. At that time, western countries 
threatened Libya and Iran with invasions similar to Iraq, on the basis that they were 
sources of terrorism. Consequently, Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects for 
trial in 1999, which culminated in the settlement of the Lockerbie case in 2003. On 
19 December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to abandon its weapons of 
mass destruction programme and allow international inspections (Jentleson and 
Whytock, 2006). 
To strengthen his regional political position, Gaddafi pursued more cooperation and 
engaged in less subversion, reconciling with Egypt, establishing and being a member 
of the Arab Maghreb Union, signing a peace agreement with Chad and concluding 
integration pacts with Sudan (Jentleson and Whytock, 2006). Due to the differing 
views of the Libyan former leader and other Arab leaders, Libya turned to western 
Arab countries and established the Arab Maghreb Union. The announcement of this 
union was on 17 February 1989 and included Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and 
Mauritania (Jentleson and Whytock, 2006). 
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In a bid to be recognised as Africa’s ‘Elder Statesman’, in 1998 former president 
Gaddafi shifted his orientation from the Arabic world to Africa. He signed a number 
of treaties to support African countries using Libyan oil revenue. For instance, on 4 
February 1998, Libya and three other African countries—Mali, Chad and Niger—
established the Sahel Sahra organisation. Later, the members of this organisation 
increased to 23 African countries. The budget of this organisation was mostly 
provided by Libya (Moqatel, 2000). On 9 September 1999, Gaddafi and some other 
African leaders established the African Union, 40 per cent of the budget of which 
was provided by the Libyan government.  
Apart from the 1999 sanctions, during the uprising of 17 February 2011, the 
international community imposed sanctions on Gaddafi’s regime in response to the 
aggressive repression of demonstrations. The torrent of sanctions began with the 
USA, just 10 days after the uprising. This was followed quickly by sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the United 
Kingdom (UK) and other countries (Mewawalla and Cheney, 2011). The UN-
imposed sanctions included an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban on 
Gaddafi, certain of his family members and other individuals (Mewawalla and 
Cheney, 2011). The EU’s sanctions included, among others, an assets freeze on a 
number of individuals; a ban on trade with Libya in equipment that might be used for 
repression; and a ban on the satisfaction of any claims in connection with any 
contract or transaction, the performance of which was affected by UN and EU 
sanctions on Libya. Additionally, the UK took action to implement the UN financial 
sanctions without waiting for the EU to implement them. All of these sanctions were 
implemented quickly, due to knowledge of the aggressive, extreme and 
unpredictable reactions of Gaddafi, based on his history and considering the potential 
interests of these countries (Mewawalla and Cheney, 2011). 
During the revolution, the Libyan transitional council succeeded in gaining 
recognition from many countries, which helped the Libyans to win the war against 
Gaddafi’s regime (Black, 2011). However, after the 2011 revolution, Libya 
experienced a radical transformation of its political system. For around two-and-a-
half years, the elected General National Congress (GNC) failed to work with the 
three elected governments, due to conflicts of interest, corruption, identities and 
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loyalties. Consequently, the national security forces have very little legitimacy and 
reach, and have been replaced by an array of diverse revolutionaries, such as 
factional militias, unregulated armed groups and jihadist groups (Combaz, 2014). All 
of these groups are supported by different members of the GNC. This has affected 
Libya’s security, making the country of great concern to the international community 
in terms of terrorism and economic matters. An example of a security breach is the 
attack on the American Embassy in Benghazi, which led to the killing of the 
American ambassador and three of his companions (Kirkpatrick and Myers, 2012). 
Still other examples include the attack on the UK ambassador in 2012 (BBC, 2012), 
the kidnapping of the Jordanian ambassador (Aljazeera, 2014a) and the Tunisian 
embassy cultural attaché in Tripoli (ABC, 2015), not to mention the daily killings, 
kidnappings and missing civilians and army officers. 
It is clear that Libya has had a long history of political instability. It has been 
involved in many wars and has supported many conflicts, creating enemies both 
abroad and in the surrounding countries. Consequently, Libya is isolated from the 
international community, which has affected it politically, economically and socially. 
However, despite attempting to restore its political position by abandoning some of 
the former president’s beliefs and joining other unions, these actions have not served 
Libya economically. This is because most of these activities were funded and 
supported by Libya, particularly those with the African nations. 
2.3.2 Local Politics and the Economy 
Libya’s political history has not only been internationally chaotic but also locally 
messy. Socio-economic governance over the past forty years has been directed by 
the Green Book, which bears great similarity to the Communist Manifesto and was 
introduced by Gadaffi towards the end of the 1980s (Pack, 2013). The Green Book is 
divided into three parts. The first part, which was published in 1975, discusses the 
problems of democracy. Part two was published in early 1978 and discusses the 
‘Solution of the Economic Problem: “Socialism”’, with a brief examination of the 
relationship between workers (producers) and employers (owners). The application 
of part two on ownership began a few months after this part was published. The third 
part was published in 1980 and discusses ‘The Social Basis of the Third Universal 
Theory’ (al-Qaddafi, 1975). The book was a blueprint for Libya’s economic, social 
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and political policies. Perhaps the greatest of this document is its restriction on 
private property and business ownership, which gives great power to the state to 
control the business environment. 
The combined effect of bad politics and poor economic management has been 
economic underperformance and social uncertainty and insecurity (Combaz, 2014; 
Khan and Mezran, 2013; Nkala, 2015). The socio-economic and political landscape 
has, for many years been characterised by dictatorship, oppression, corruption and 
economic mismanagement, leading to the internal conflicts leading to the removal of 
the regime and execution of Gadaffi in 2011 (Mejia, 2012; Stephen, 2013). Even 
after the 2011 revolution, which promised positive transformation all round and a 
relief from dictatorial oppression and economic mismanagement, the situation has 
further deteriorated into civil war and heightened insecurity. The old vices of 
oppression, corruption and nepotism persist. As a result of the deteriorating political 
environment, many countries have withdrawn their ambassadors and reduced their 
diplomatic missions due to the proliferation of attacks on the same (HRW, 2015).  
2.4 Economic Landscape 
When Libya became independent in 1951, it was classified by the UN as one of the 
world’s poorest countries and depended on international aid programmes (Butler, 
2012). Discovering oil in 1959 changed the economic situation completely (Husien, 
2007), and moved Libya into the forefront of global economies (Butler, 2012). 
However, the Gaddafi regime transformed the economy from a capitalist-oriented to 
a socialist-oriented economy in 1969 (Alafi, 2010) through the implementation of the 
Green Book, leading to economic stagnation. Because the Green Book discourages 
any form of private business investment ownership and personal savings, most 
Libyans rely entirely on paid work (Alam et al., 2009). This has greatly undermined 
living standards for the majority of Libyans, apart from those associated with the 
ruling elite.  
Furthermore, During Gaddafi’s era, over-reliance on oil has undermined economic 
diversification (Combaz, 2014). Oil and gas contribute to around 95 per cent of 
export earnings (Emporiki Bank, 2012, CIA, 2012), 80 per cent of government 
revenue and 65 per cent of GDP (Indexmundi, 2012). Other sector which 
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significantly contribute to the economy include the construction and service sectors, 
which account for around 20 per cent of GDP, and have only recently expanded 
significantly(CIA, 2012). 
However, even with the economic underperformance largely caused by political 
patronage and general mismanagement, the potential of the economy is evident. The 
statistics for example show a positive GDP trend during the sanctions period 
(UNCTAD, 2011a) (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2011a). 
Figure 2.3: Libyan Total Gross GDP from 1980–2010 
For background, Libya has experienced three eras of economic change. The first era 
was between 1970 and 1977, when the regime increased the state’s role in the 
national economy and international trade. During that period, all insurance, trade, 
automotive and automotive spare parts and commercial agency activities were 
nationalised. However, the private sector remained active in some instances 
(Mustafa, 2007). 
Between 1978 and 1988 the government formed a number of laws and resolutions 
that discouraged the private sector in economic activities, including international 
trade (Mustafa, 2007). An example of these resolutions that discouraged 
international trade is resolution number 1315 of 1981. This resolution prohibits 86 
types of goods, sharply reducing imports. Another resolution for the same purpose is 
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resolution number 1339, also instituted in 1981. This resolution requires a licence in 
advance to import goods. However, not all importers can obtain such licences. This 
resolution had a significant effect on the volume of imports and the importers 
themselves (Bayan Economy, 2000). Therefore, importers have tended to find illegal 
ways to import particular goods required by the local market. In the meantime, these 
resolutions (in addition to the low productivity of the public sector) affected the 
performance of Libyan ports by decreasing the volume of international trade. 
Due to increased restrictions on the private sector, some capital owners quit the 
country and invested their money overseas. From 1973 until 1993, the government 
established some measures to control and monitor foreign exchange, to protect the 
value of the local currency and to prevent the migration of capital. These measures 
included linking the Libyan Dinar (LD) to the American dollar (US$) at a fixed 
exchange rate, which is 1US$ = 0.29679 LD. This was done in February 1973 (U.S. 
Department of state, 2011). This procedure made the LD sustainable against other 
currencies until 1986. On 13 March 1986, the Libyan government made every one 
LD = 2.8 US$ to give the exchange rate more flexibility (as the government 
claimed). Suddenly and surprisingly, the government issued a resolution on 14 
February 1999 and made the exchange rate 1 US$ = 3.25 LD for the public, despite 
the official rate being 1 US$ = 0.50 LD for officials and loyalists (Obaidi, 2014). 
These policies significantly affected Libyans who required medical treatment 
overseas, and private traders. In contrast, it affected the productivity of national 
economic units and the productivity of individuals negatively, especially in the 
service sector (Alrubaie, 2004). It also led to fiasco-led investments, corruption and 
increased national expenses (Obaidi, 2014). 
Another example of these measures is the government restricting international trade 
exchange, banning some imports totally, and other imports partially, to protect local 
production. During this period, the so-called ‘currency black market’ emerged, 
corruption increased (Combaz, 2014), with the country experiencing a severe lack of 
durables, automobiles and some types of imported food. However, due to these 
polices, Libya experienced a sharp reduction in international trade exchange and an 
economic recession. Additionally, due to the implemented laws, which affected the 
manner of marketing channels and the sourcing and methods of providing 
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commodities in the 1980s, the Libyan economy experienced a shortage of 
commodities, leading to an emerging black market (Husien, 2007). Apart from the 
negative impact on the performance of the national economy, all of these combined 
factors had a negative effect on Libya’s port industry, due to the drop in international 
trade transported by sea. The combination of falling world oil prices, international 
economic sanctions and Gaddafi’s economic mismanagement took a heavy toll on 
Libya’s economy. These were more than just economic statistics, as economic 
discontent began to fuel political instability (Jentleson and Whytock, 2006). 
Due to the absence of private sector competition and the restrictions on many 
imports, production efficiency and product quality declined (Alrubaie, 2004). In 
addition, tax and customs income also declined, which led to a continuing deficit in 
the public budget and increased the amount of public debt. 
These changes (in the exchange rate of the LD, banning some imports and getting 
importing licences in advance) have increased corruption in the country. Therefore, 
the trade volume handled by the Libyan ports has declined. Additionally, because of 
these procedures, Libya is counted among the most world’s most corrupt countries 
(Economist, 2013, UN, 2004). This includes corruption within the Libyan ports 
themselves. Corruption has a series of socio-economic effects, which directly impede 
economic development, because it raises transaction costs and uncertainty in the 
economy. It also skews the process of policy making, undermines state legitimacy 
and the rule of law (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). It leads to wider income disparities 
and lays a larger burden on medium and small businesses, who need to set aside a 
larger share of their income and time to deal with corruption.(Otman and Karlberg, 
2007). 
When these new laws and resolutions failed, in 1989 the regime changed its 
approach, trying to find alternatives for oil, and encouraging privatisation. However, 
there has been no progress in formulating a strategy to stimulate the non-oil 
economy and establish the building blocks for sustainable, diversified, private sector-
led economic growth (bank, 2014). The uncertain environment and delayed public 
capital projects have undermined and stalled investment as a private sector activity 
(bank, 2014). In addition, only small foreign businesses, other than oil-related 
initiatives, have been set up, due to the lack of trust and secure investment laws. 
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These policies, in addition to the drop in real GDP, reduced the amount of imported 
goods in the local market (see Figure 2.4). It placed great strain on government 
spending, and increased Libya’s debt replacement problems, which all negatively 





















Source: (UNCTAD, 2011c). 
Figure 2.4: Total Export and Import Value From 1980–2012 (Million $US) 
This drop in exporting and importing reached its lowest level in 1995 (see Figure 
2.4) and then increased sharply for the next 13 years (UNCTAD, 2011c). During this 
period, the demand for imported consuming goods was strong; despite the majority 
of consumer needs being imported under the former regime, many western products 
were not easy to access in the country (EUROMONITOR, 2011). 
Despite Libya having large reserves of oil, natural gas and gold, it has a low 
development base to offer strong economic growth (EUROMONITOR, 2011). In 
2003, Libya reintegrated globally. It has since witnessed significant development and 
growth in recent years due to attracting greater foreign investment, especially in the 
oil sector (Fraenzel, 2009). This has had a positive impact on Libyan port activities, 
due to the increase in imported commodities. 
The decline of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow and outflow for Libya is clear 
in Figure 2.5. After accepting responsibility for terrorist activities, and undertaking 
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procedures such as ensuring and securing local and foreigner investors’ rights, 
inflows increased in 2006. However, outflows decreased to a quarter of the value of 
inflows. In 2007, both flows increased to be almost the same. In 2008 and 2009, the 
inflows decreased slightly compared to 2007. In contrast, the outflows maintained 
their increase, to reach a peak in 2008, before dropping sharply in 2009.  
In 2010, the former regime established law number nine, regarding encouraging 
local and foreign investors to invest in Libya (U.S. Department of state, 2011). This 
law gave a package of exemptions to investors. For instance, all the equipment and 
technologies used for a project are tax-free. It also gave an exception to equipment 
used for projects—such as spare parts, transport means, furniture, raw materials and 
advertising materials—from any taxes for five years from the start date of the 
project. The exemptions also covered income tax, production tax, exporting products 
and some other taxes. This law also provided some investment security clauses, to 
encourage foreign investors (bank, 2014). However, despite all of these measures, in 
2010 the inflow FDI decreased to nearly 50 per cent, whereas the outflow doubled 
(see Figure 2.5). 
In 2011, the inflows dropped to zero and the outflows reached their minimum value because 
of the uprising. Moreover, the recent Libyan and Egyptian revolutions resulted in the decline 



















Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2012). 
Figure 2.5: FDIs in Libya 2006–2011 
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During the uprising in 2011, the Libyan economy collapsed, due to the decline in all 
economic activities, including oil-based ones. In 2012, oil production witnessed 
some recovery. In 2013, the economy had only just got back to where it was prior to 
the uprising (Khan and Mezran, 2013). However, the government has largely paid 
only lip service to economic policies. This is due to conflicts between the parties, 
tribes and groups, extensive patronage, intermediation and corruption. It is also 
because of insecurity, high state autonomy, low levels of regulation and the 
fragmentation of society, which raises problems of trust, personal initiative-taking 
and legitimacy (Combaz, 2014). In addition to the weakness of the GNC and the 
transitional governments, the new Libyan political economy is fraught with difficulty 
and uncertainty. 
As mentioned above, oil is the main driver of the Libyan economy. Therefore, 
closing the oilfields and ports for about nine months, as well as exploding some oil 
pipes in Libya’s east, had a significant effect on the Libyan economy. High spending 
trends, in addition to the undiversified economy, high unemployment, weak 
economic guidance, the lack of private sector and foreign participation, and the weak 
banking system, have severely eroded the country’s wealth (Combaz, 2014). 
Due to destruction caused by the war, Libya has needed a huge amount of different 
materials to rebuild affected cities, promote infrastructure and establish new 
factories. Therefore, LD 19.3 billion was dedicated from the 2013 budget to 
development and rebuilding projects. However, no major projects have been seen on 
the ground since the revolution. Additionally, rebuilding the country requires 
professional foreign and local companies. However, insecurity concerns are the main 
deterrent to foreign investors (EUROMONITOR, 2011, Dabrowska, 2012). The 
demand for using Libyan ports has increased. This is reflected in the bigger volume 
of cargo handled by Libyan ports in 2012 and 2013 (Libyan ports company, 2013). 
Import and Export with Libya’s Trading Partners 
As the Libyan economy depends strongly on oil, Libya is considered one of the least 
diversified markets in the world in terms of exports (Dabrowska, 2012). The export 
basket is not varied at all, with the oil industry representing 95 per cent of all exports 
(Emporiki Bank, 2012, UNCTAD, 2011a), and only four per cent comprising 
industrial supply (see Table 2.1) (CETMO, 2010). Meanwhile, Libya is largely 
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reliant on imports for manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment 
(CETMO, 2010, UNCTAD, 2011a). 






































































































































1995 7 244 0.2 0.2 92.0 0.0 7.4 4.1 0.1 3.2 
2005 30 948 0.1 0.0 95.0 0.6 3.9 2.7 0.1 1.1 





1995 5 033 21.6 0.9 4.4 2.0 69.6 8.9 31.1 29.7 
2005 11 188 15.8 0.6 9.7 3.1 67.3 6.0 35.6 25.7 
2010 24 647 16.9 0.7 9.3 3.0 68.9 5.7 36.6 26.6 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook Statistics (2011). 
Manufactured goods dominated the imports basket during the period 2005 to 2010, 
with an average of 68.1 per cent, followed by machinery and transport equipment, 
with an average of 36 per cent (UNCTAD, 2011a) (see Table 2.1). 75 per cent of 
food consumed in Libya is imported (Emporiki Bank, 2012).  
The majority of Libyan international trade has been with developed economies. In 
2010, the principal export trading partner of Libya was the EU (see Figure 2.6) 
(CETMO, 2010). The total volume of trade with developed economies was about 
72.6 per cent of Libya’s total international trade in 1995. This percentage decreased 
by about 11 per cent in 2005, and reached less than 50 per cent in 2010 (UNCTAD, 
2011c). The EU, which was the dominant partner, represented 67.4 per cent of the 
total imports and exports in 1995 (UNCTAD, 2011a). Due to the political conflicts 
with European countries, this percentage declined again to 57.8 per cent in 2005, and 
continued decreasing to 42.5 per cent in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011c). More specifically 
regarding the EU, as the principal export trading partner of Libya, Italy is Libya’s 
dominant export trading partner. It receives almost 50 per cent of exports from Libya 
and provides 30 per cent of Libya’s imports (CETMO, 2010). This is followed by 
Germany, with 12.8 per cent, France with 7.9 per cent and Spain with 7.3 per cent. 
Other destinations received 31.6 per cent of Libyan exports (Fraenzel, 2009). 
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Source: CAPA Centre for Aviation (2012). 
Figure 2.6: The Percentage of Libya’s Trade Partners in 2010 in Ranking 
Order 
Libya also has trading partners from developing economies, including in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia (UNCTAD, 2011c). During the period 1995 to 2010, while 
the trade between Libya and the developed economies declined, the volume of trade 
between Libya and the developing economies nearly doubled. For instance, the total 
volume of trade with the eastern, southern and south-eastern Asian economies, 
which are the principal trading partners among the developing economies, increased 
from 9.3 per cent in 1995 to 20.9 per cent in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011c). Trade volume 
with Africa also increased slightly, from 8.9 per cent in 1995 to 11 per cent in 2010; 
trade with western Asia recorded an increase from 7.3 to 12.7 per cent; and trade 
with the Latin American developing economies increased from 1.9 to 3.1 per cent 
(UNCTAD, 2011c). Conversely, international trade with neighbouring land-locked 
countries is minimal (Ministry of Infrastructure and Facilities, 2011, Global trade, 
2013), due to the lack of hinterland connectivity caused by chronic conflicts with 
Chad.  
Libya’s dependency on oil is reflected in the fact that 11 specialised oil and gas ports 
and terminals handle hydrocarbon cargo. Conversely, manufactured goods, food, 
31 
machinery and transport equipment, which are the main imports for domestic use, 
are handled by seven Libyan commercial ports: Tripoli, Misurata, Khoms, Benghazi, 
Tobruk, Derna and Zuwarah. None of these ports is a hub port, used for re-
transhipping international trade. This is shown by Libyan port statistics regarding 
loaded and off-loaded cargo. The above implies that the Libyan commercial ports are 
connected globally with a number of international ports related to some developed 
and developing trading partners, to import the required commodities (see Figure 2.6). 
This study incorporates investigation of a number of these ports to measure and 
compare the performance of Libyan ports. The statistics also show only minor trade 
between Libya and its neighbouring land-locked countries, which implies that the 
Libyan ports are not used efficiently to support the regional economy. The next 
section provides some information about the Libyan transport system. 
2.5 The Transport Industry 
Transport in Libya comprises three main modes: land, air and maritime. All of these 
are provided by the Libyan Ministry of Transport. Land transport is mainly by road, 
due to the absence of rail networks in Libya (outlook, 2012, RABA, 2013, RABA, 
2012). Air transport is mainly used for passenger transport, whereas only a small 
proportion of international trade is transported by air. Maritime transport dominates 
international freight to and from Libya (Libyan Maritime Administration, 2013), due 
to its cost efficiency and the ability to transport large volumes of freight using free 
natural passages (UNCTAD, 2007). 
2.5.1 Road Transport 
It is argued that a port with a strategic location close to the main world trade lanes, 
with good landside connections, provides the basic requirements for port users to 
assess their port selection options (Tongzon and Heng, 2005). In addition, 
infrastructure stands out as the main driver of logistical performance indicator of 
progress for middle- and low-income countries (Arvis et al., 2012). 
Until 1986, Libya had a paved road network of about 34, 000 kilometres to connect 
its ports, cities and agricultural areas (RABA, 2012). Further, surfaced roads existed 
between the north and the southern oases of Al Kufrah, Sabha and Marzuq. These 
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roads have done much to end the isolation of these remote settlements (Butler, 
2012). However, due to the international sanctions on Libya, all aspects of its 
infrastructure have been left underdeveloped, including roads (Fraenzel, 2009). Not 
signing any new contracts to extend the road network, from 1986 up to 2003, made 
the situation worse (RABA, 2012). However since 2008, the authority in charge of 
roads, bridge and land transport commenced the maintenance of old roads and paved 
some other new roads. 
Regionally, a major project concerns the freeway that connects the Tunisian boarder 
with the Egyptian border, with a length of 1,700 kilometres (RABA, 2013). 
However, the Libyan ports are still disconnected from Chad and Niger. For instance, 
the distance between Qasr Ahmed port and Abeche in Chad is around 2,865 
kilometres. Due to the lack of proper road networks, the average speed in Libyan is 
50 kilometres a day and in Chad, 150 kilometres a day; about 16 days is required to 
transport freight between these two countries (Comtois et al., 2012). In addition, 
most of the direct routes through the Aozou strip are not accessible, due to mines 
placed there during the war between Libya and Chad (Comtois et al., 
2012).Similarly, due to the lack of proper roads, it takes 19 days to cross the 3,500 
kilometres between Misurata and Agades in Niger (Comtois et al., 2012). This 
makes transport costs extremely high, which disconnects Libyan ports from the land-
locked countries. 
Regarding land freight transport, there are no state owned companies for freight 
transport in Libya. Therefore, land transport services are provided by small private 
companies, which transport 80 per cent of goods. The remaining 20 per cent is 
transported by the freight owners themselves (CETMO, 2010). In 2009, the number 
of vehicles dedicated to goods transport was 77,624 trucks. Fifty-eight per cent were 
non-articulated trucks and 42 per cent were articulated (CETMO, 2010). However, 
land transport is costly and the delivery time is long, due to the absence of rail 
transport and the extreme road congestion caused by the absence of public transport, 
especially in the big cities. The congestion and lack of rail has also had a negative 
impact on the efficiency of cargo flow from and to Libyan ports. 
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2.5.2 Rail Transport 
Rail transport is the most efficient transport means on land (Transystems, 2011, 
Kozan, 1997, Kozan, 2000, SCI, 2010). However, Libya has not had a functional 
railway network since independence. Some lines were built by Italian colonial 
forces, and more were built during World War II, but all have been demolished 
(bulletin, 2010). 
In September 2008, construction of a 554 kilometres double-track railway project 
was started by the Russian Railways Company in the eastern part of Libya, to 
connect Benghazi city and Sirt, parallel to the coastline (Gazette, 2008). In addition, 
another 352 kilometres long line between Al Khoms and Sirt supposed to be 
constructed by China Railway Construction Corporation, by 2013. An 800 
kilometres line is also expected to be extended from iron-ore deposits in the south, to 
the port of Misurata (Gazette, 2008). Further, the Railways Executive Board 
confirmed in 2001 that work was underway on a line from the Tunisian border to 
Tripoli and Sirt, but this has not been completed yet (RPEMB, 2013). The potential 
rail network is expected to prevent congestion in and around the big cities and will 
contribute significantly to the efficiency of land freight flow. 
2.5.3 Air Transport 
Libya has 16 airports. Seven are international airports, three are national airports, 
and six civil and air force airports. All of the civil and air force airports are national 
airports, except one located in Tripoli, called Metiqa airport, which is used 
internationally (Libyan Civil Aviation Association, 2012). 
The Arab region has become increasingly important in terms of air transport. 
However, it seems Libya has been left behind (CAPA, 2012). This is because the 
government of Gaddafi’s regime did not pay more attention to its airlines and 
airports, whereas nearby Middle Eastern countries (e.g., United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Egypt and Qatar) started to develop some of the largest global hubs (CAPA, 
2012). What made this sector worse was that Libya’s air fleet lost five airplanes 
during the uprising in 2011, and remains 15 airplanes in working order (CAPA, 
2012). Later in 16 July 2014, another 12 airplanes were destroyed when Misurata’s 
militias attacked Tripoli airport (BBC, 2014). Tripoli airport was completely closed 
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due to total damage in its terminal and severe damage in the control tower and other 
main airport facilities (Aljazeera, 2014b). 
Libyan airports are mainly used for passengers. For instance, they handled 2,344,771 
in 2010, whereas air freight reached 16.55 million ton-kilometres in the same year 
(Fedec and Sousa., 2012). This amount of freight is very small, compared to the 
freight handled by sea. 
2.5.4 Maritime Transport  
Compared to other coastal countries, including smaller ones such as Malta, Libya has 
not paid great attention to the essential maritime transport and ports sector. There is 
no doubt that Libya is affected by international sanctions, which have left the 
country underdeveloped in all aspects of its infrastructure, including ports (Fraenzel, 
2009). The lack of infrastructure has negatively influenced the throughput of Libyan 
ports compared to other North African ports (AICD, 2009). However, state 
monopoly, corruption and centralisation in decision making have had the most 
influence on the development of this vital sector (outlook, 2012). In addition, 
politics, bureaucracy, region trade productivity and port connectivity have had a 
great impact on Libya’s trade capacity, which has influenced the productivity of 
Libyan ports. 
In terms of the port industry, the private sector is not involved in Libya’s ports. 
However, the only area that consists of both public and private sectors is shipping 
and freight forwarding, which includes about 300 local companies (CETMO, 2010). 
Private carriers have a growing presence in maritime transport; the General National 
Maritime Transportation Company (GNMTC) was the only national and public 
maritime transport company until 2003. Like any other Libyan industry, GNMTC 
has suffered from the international embargoes, as Surveyor (2009) has argued. 
However, when the son of Gaddafi, who started his seafaring career in 1993, quickly 
rose to take charge of the maritime industry in Libya (Smith, 2012), this company 
was bankrupted on purpose. Before the bankruptcy, the company monopolised the 
maritime transport sector. It owned 38 ships; thirteen were general cargo ships, with 
four RO/RO ships, 17 oil tankers and four passenger ships (GNMTC, 2009). 
However, because the former regime relied on oil as the main driver of the national 
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economy, GNMTC focused on oil and oil product tankers. To act as a saviour, 
Gaddafi’s son helped GNMTC to own 14 oil tankers, seven product carriers and two 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carriers. Some of these ships were joint-ventured with 
the Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company (AMPTC) (GNMTC, 2009). 
The turning point for the Libyan maritime sector in general, and GNMTC 
specifically, was when 1,907 of GNMTC’s employees were released in a single 
resolution, to other sectors in October 2003 (GNMTC, 2009). All of these employees 
were experienced and highly ranked crews. Later on, the company cut its 
employment from 3,700 to 600, to save costs (Surveyor, 2009). Some of these 
employees obtained high-level positions in Libyan ports. 
Generally, despite Libya having a long coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, and 
being close to international trade lanes, its merchant fleet consists of only 167 ships. 
These include 19 oil tankers, nine general cargo ships and 139 other types of ships, 
such as tugs, pilot boats and other service vessels (UNCTAD, 2011b). The majority 
of these oil tankers are ostensibly owned by GNMTC; however, there is some 
evidence to show that they were actually controlled by Gaddafi’s son (Saul, 2011). 
During the 2011 uprising, the international community implemented a combination 
of sanctions and a freeze on Gaddafi family’s assets. Consequently, several tankers 
laid-up off Singapore and Malta. The 24 tankers entered into service again after the 
owners paid the operational costs to some of ship management companies (Saul, 
2011). However, the general cargo ships are owned by two small private shipping 
lines and the other ships are state owned, to provide services within the ports. 
The total gross tonnage (GT) of the Libyan fleet is 865,000. Oil tankers dominate 
this volume by 788,000 GT; the other types of tankers and general cargo ships 
supply 50 GT, due to their high numbers. The lowest GT for the general cargo fleet 
is 27,000 GT (UNCTAD, 2011b). 
Despite the dramatic demand for containerisation during recent decades, and the 
increase in container ship numbers and capacity (see Figure 2.7), Libya does not own 
any such ships. In addition, Libya does not have a single specialised container 
terminal to meet the dramatic development and demand for containerisation. 
Surprisingly, Libya has only two specialised quay container cranes, deployed in Qasr 
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Ahmed port in Misurata. This shows the impact of bureaucracy in Libya’s maritime 
industry, as decision makers do not respond quickly to market requirements and 



































Source: Derived from Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD, 2011b). 
Figure 2.7: Total World Number of Ships and Ships’ Average Size 
Evidence for this is that the Libyan market share of the total world maritime business 
is quite low. Its population represented 0.10 per cent of the world total in 2011. In 
2009, Libyan port traffic in TEUs recorded 0.03 per cent of the world total and trade 
value 0.19 per cent, measured by US dollars, which contributed 0.11 per cent to the 
total world GDP. In 2010, Libya recorded 0.0 per cent in shipbuilding GT, container 
ships operation TEU and ship scraping DWT, whereas it recorded 0.11 per cent in 
ship registration DWT, 0.08 in officers headcount; and 0.09 in ratings’ headcount 
(UNCTAD, 2011b). 
2.5.4.1 Libyan ports 
Ports are one of the key nodes of international trade (Francis, 2008). They are used 
to facilitate ships used to transport international trade. Similarly, the majority of 
Libyan trade is handled by Libyan ports. This study focuses on Libyan ports’ 
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performance and efficiency, as they are affected by the underperformance of Libya’s 
economy. This means that economic institutions like ports do not have proper 
management. Therefore, they do not have sufficient investment in infrastructure and 
superstructure. Using ports as an example, this thesis examines the way in which 
political trends have impacted upon economic performance and therefore port 
performance. The following section provides information about Libyan ports.  
There are 20 ports on the Libyan coastline (see Table 2.2). All these ports are owned 
and operated by the public sector, under the authority of the Libyan Maritime 
Administration (LMA). Seven of these ports are commercial rather than oil ports, 
which are used to handle general cargo, containers, RO/RO and dry bulk. These 
ports are Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata ‘Qasr Ahmed port’, Khoms, Derna, Tobruk and 
Zuwarah. There is also another small sized commercial harbour close to Derna port, 
called Ras el Hilal, which is used for leisure boats. 
All of these ports are operated by a state owned company, called the SPC. This 
company was established according to law number 21 of 1985. However, only Qasr 
Ahmed port in Misurata is an autonomous port. It is operated by Misurata Free Zone 
(MFZ) Company under resolution number 33 of 2006. MFZ has succeeded in 
making this port Libya’s top port. Qasr Ahmed port is located within the boundaries 
of MFZ. Therefore, the management of MFZ is close to the operations and port 
users. This ensures the management of MFZ is up-to-date with port performance and 
customer needs. Due to operating only one port and having its own budget, MFZ has 
managed to establish some strategic plans. These include employing more advanced 
cargo-handling equipment that is different from those employed in other ports 
operated by SPC. This is reflected in the volume of cargo handled compared to the 
other ports. Moreover, just after the war in 2014, this port celebrated the opening of a 
new dock, 804 metres in length (Zaroog and Westcott, 2014). MFZ also planned to 
build a new port and container terminal 20 metres in depth, close to Qasr Ahmed. 
Operating ports close to each other enables MFZ to monitor the performance of these 
ports and respond to any needs or deficiencies. The SPC could not achieve this as all 
of its ports are far away from central management, which makes the responses to 
ports’ needs very weak. All Libyan ports operate from 8am to 5pm. This includes 
cargo operation, customs services and some other key facilities. 
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Table 2.2: Libyan Ports 
 Port’s name Cargo type Operator Location 
1 Tripoli Container, GC, dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
SPC 32º 54.0' N, 013º 
11.0' E 
2 Benghazi Container, GC, dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
SPC 32 º 07.0' N, 020 
º 05.0' E 
3 Qasr Ahmed Container, GC, Dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
MFZ 32 º 21.0' N, 015 
º 13.0' E 
4 Khoms Container, GC, dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
SPC 32 º 40.0' N, 014 
º 15.0' E 
5 Derna Container, GC, dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
SPC 32 º 46.0' N, 022 
º 39.0' E 
6 Tobruk Container, GC, dry 
bulk & RO/RO 
SPC 32 º 04.0' N, 024 
º 00.0' E 
7 Zwara GC & bulk SPC 32º 55.0' N, 012º 
07.0' E 
8 Ras el Hilal Small GC  32º 55.0' N, 022º 
11.0' E 
9 Misurata Industrial ‘ORE’ Misrata Steel Co 32 º 22.0' N, 015 
º 14.0' E 
10 Marsa al Hariga Petroleum Arabian Gulf Oil 
Company 
32 º 04.0' N, 024 
º 00.0' E 
11 Mellitah Petroleum ENI Oil Ltd 32º 53.0' N, 012º 
15.0' E 
12 Es Sidra Petroleum Waha Oil Co of 
Libya Ltd 
30º 38.0' N, 018º 
21.0' E 
13 Zawia Terminal Petroleum Zawia Refining Co 32º 47.0' N, 012º 
42.0' E 
14 Bouri Petroleum ENI Oil Ltd 33º 54.0' N, 012º 
39.0' E 
15 Aljurf Terminal Petroleum Mabrouk Oil 
Oprtations 
 
16 Marsa El Brega Petroleum, other 
liquid, GC, dry bulk, 
RO/RO 
Sirte Oil Co & SPC 30º 24.0' N, 019º 
35.0' E 
17 Ras Lanuf GC & petroleum Veba Oil Operations 
BV & SPC 
30º 30.0' N, 018º 
33.0' E 
18 Rasco Harbour Petroleum Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas 
Processsing Co 
30º 30.0' N, 018º 
33.0' E 
19 Zueitina Petroleum Zueitina Oil Co 30º 51.0' N, 020º 
04.0' E 
20 Abu Kammash Petrochemicals Abu Kammash for 
petrochemicals 
33º 04.0' N, 011º 
49.0' E 
Source: Maritime Database (2012). 
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The other 11 oil and petrochemical ports and terminals are mainly used to export 
Libyan oil, gas and petrochemicals. In contrast, Ras Lanuf port also handles general 
cargo and Marsa El Brega port handles general cargo, RO/RO and dry bulk. The 
steel port in Misurata is only used to receive ore for the Misurata Steel Complex. 
Despite the fact that international trade routes pass through a similar distance 
between Africa and Europe, all gateways and hub ports are located in Europe. There 
are no hub ports in North Africa to serve the region and supply land-locked countries 
located south of Libya (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010). For instance, 86.84 per 
cent of Chad’s imports and 78.08 per cent of its exports in 2009 were sent through 
Cameroon, whereas only 8.86 per cent of its imports and 8.33 per cent of its exports 
were sent through Libya (Ministry of Infrastructure and Facilities, 2011). Similarly, 
Niger’s main trade partners are the EU, Japan and the USA, which use Nigeria and 
Benin’s ports (Global trade, 2013). 
The lack of efficient ports in North Africa, particularly in Libya, ensures that 
shipping lines avoid Libyan ports and use European ports instead. Apart from port 
connectivity, port efficiency is associated with the technology of handling equipment 
used at that port. Taking container handling as an example, most container ports 
across the world, whether fully automated or semi-automated, use quay container 
cranes with different types and specifications to deal with ship operations at seaside. 
In addition, fully automated container ports use AGVs to transport containers from 
the seaside to the storage yard and vice versa. Then the container is stacked in the 
storage yard using rail-mounted gantries (RMG) or rubber tyred gantries (RTG), 
depending on the adopted equipment. Within the semi-automated container ports, 
SCs are used to transport and stake containers. However, such equipment does not 
exist in Libyan ports. All Libyan ports still use conventional cargo-handling 
equipment to handle containers, except Qasr Ahmed port (see Table 2.3). Qasr 
Ahmed port has two specialised QC and two RTG cranes, although there are some 
limitations on its recent capacity, due to deficiencies in container-handling 
equipment. Therefore, Qasr Ahmed port, which is the best-equipped Libyan 
commercial port, cannot be used as a hub port in the region. 
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Table 2.3: Cargo-Handling Equipment at Libyan Ports in 2010 
Port’s name Crane 
no. 
Type of crane Truck AGV Forklift Trailer Tractor SC Reach 
stacker 
RMG RTG 
Tripoli 3 Boosting Telescopic mast 40 T 0 0 43 22 24 0 20 0 0 
6 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 
4 Fixed mast crane 60–100T 
Benghazi 3 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 45 17 21 0 17 0 0 
3 Boosting Telescopic mast 30–40T 
3 Fixed mast crane 60–100 T 
Brega 1 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 15 3 1 0 0 0 0 
1 Fixed mast crane 60–100T 
Tobruk 1 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 13 3 2 0 1 0 0 
2 Boosting Telescopic mast 30–40T 
Derna 2 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 14 3 3 0 0 0 0 
2 Boosting Telescopic mast 30-40T 
Qasr Ahmed 2 Panamax quay container cranes 0 0 26 30 30 0 12 0 2 
12 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80T  
11 Fixed mast crane 60–100T 
Khoms 2 Fixed mast crane 60–100 T 0 0 18 14 18 0 16 0 0 
1 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 
1 Boosting Telescopic mast 30–40 T 
Ras Lanouf 1 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 24 3 3 0 1 0 0 
2 Boosting Telescopic mast 30–40 T 
Zwarah 1 Boosting Telescopic mast 50–80 T 0 0 9 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Source: (SPC, 2011, Ghashat, 2011, Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013, Libyan Maritime Administration, 2013). 
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The lack of efficient and sufficient handling equipment has had a negative impact on 
the number of ships calling into Libyan ports and the throughput of these ports. For 
instance, in terms of the number of ship calls, Libyan commercial ports (rather than 
oil and steel ports) serviced 3,128 cargo ships in 2008 (SPC, 2011, Misurata Free 
Zone, 2013). The number of ship calls increased in 2010 to 3,961 (SPC, 2011, 
Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013). Due to the instability of the country in 
2011, this figure decreased to 3,357 ships compared to 2010 (Libyan Maritime 
Admisnistration, 2013, Misurata Free Zone, 2013) (see Figure 2.8). However, this 
number was very low in 2011 due to the small number of Libyan ships (UNCTAD, 
2011b); the majority of the ships that called at Libyan ports were foreign flagships 
(CETMO, 2010). Further, the largest container ships that can visit Libyan ports are 
from the third generation of ships of the Panamax class. Libyan ports cannot 
accommodate larger ships than this class due to water depth restrictions. The deepest 
Libyan ports are Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports, with a maximum water depth of 13 
metres (Libyan ports company, 2013, Misurata Free Zone, 2013); the draft Panamax 
container ships are 12 metres (Maersk, 2011).  
 
Source: Derived from (Ghashat, 2011, SPC, 2011, Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013, 
Libyan Maritime Admisnistration, 2013). 
Figure 2.8: Number of Ships Calling at Libyan Ports in 2008, 2010 and 2012 
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Figure 2.8 shows that the top four Libyan commercial ports for call numbers in 
2008, 2010 and 2012 were Qasr Ahmed port in Misurata (ranked first), followed by 
Tripoli, then Benghazi, and then Khoms. In 2010, the same ports had the same ranks. 
However, note that Tripoli port experienced a drop of 18.6 per cent in the number of 
calls, compared to 2008 (SPC, 2011). In contrast, Khoms port recorded more than 
double the 2008 calls in 2010 (SPC, 2011). This change was due to the prime 
minister’s resolution to stop container-handling in Tripoli port and use Khoms port 
instead, to prevent road congestion in Tripoli (Ghashat, 2011). In 2012, the increase 
in ship calls at Tripoli, Khoms and Benghazi port was nearly the same, whereas Qasr 
Ahmed port received 1,244 ships in 2012, nearly the same number as 2010. 
In terms of cargo volumes, the throughput of all Libyan ports is very low compared 
to other international ports in the region. Taking containerisation as an example, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the global container trade, which reached about 
150 million TEUs in 2010 and is still increasing (UNCTAD, 2011b). Similarly, 
Libya experienced an increase in container trade from 320,609 TEUs in 2006, to 
614,041 TEUs in 2010. These then decreased to 358,171 TEUs in 2012 (see Figure 
2.9).  
 
Source: (SPC, 2011, Ghashat, 2011, Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013, Libyan 
Maritime Administration, 2013). 
Figure 2.9: Total of TEU Volumes Handled by Libyan Ports (2006–2012) 
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This decline in TEUs was due to the security instability and changing of interim 
governments within these two years. However, the total throughput of all Libyan 
ports’ in TEUs did not reach even one million per annum during the period between 
2004 and 2012 (SPC, 2011), which is about 0.03 per cent of the world total 
(UNCTAD, 2011b). 
From Table 2.1, showing Libya’s trade structure by product group, all commercial 
ports are used predominately to off-load imported goods. This is due to the high 
dependency of Libya on imported food, manufactured goods, machinery and 
transport equipment, as well as low Libyan exports other than oil, which do not 
exceed four per cent of Libyan exports (UNCTAD, 2011a). Therefore, the statistics 
show that the total amount of off-loaded goods by Libyan ports in 2008, 2010 and 
2012 is much larger than that of loaded goods (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11). Despite 
Qasr Ahmed port being the dominant port in cargo loading compared to other ports, 
the total cargo loaded by this port in these three years did not exceed 1.5 million ton. 
 
Source: Derived from (Ghashat, 2011, SPC, 2011, Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013, 
Libyan Maritime Admisnistration, 2013, Libyan ports company, 2013)). 
Figure 2.10: Total Cargo Off-Loaded by Libyan Ports in 2008, 2010 and 2012 
(Thousand Tons) 
Tripoli port will be used to highlight the differences between the amount of off-
loaded and loaded cargo handled by Libyan ports. The amount of cargo off-loaded 
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by Tripoli port in 2008 was two million ton, compared to 7,850 ton loaded in the 
same year. Another example is the total amount of cargo off-loaded by Qasr Ahmed 
port in 2010, at 3.2 million ton. In contrast, the loaded amount for the same years by 
the same port was only 291,007 ton. This reflects the weaknesses of local economic 
policies regarding investment in agriculture and manufacturing. 
 
Source: Derived from (Ghashat, 2011, SPC, 2011, Esaheri, 2012, Misurata Free Zone, 2013, 
Libyan Maritime Admisnistration, 2013, Libyan ports company, 2013). 
Figure 2.11: Total Cargo Loaded by Libyan Ports in 2008, 2010 and 2012 
(Thousand Tons) 
In Figure 2.10, a sharp increase in the amount of cargo off-loaded by Khoms port 
can be seen, along with a sharp decrease in the amount of off-loaded cargo at Tripoli 
port. This was due to the prime minister’s resolution to use Khoms port instead of 
Tripoli ports for container handling, to prevent road congestion in Tripoli (Ghashat, 
2011). However, according to CETMO (2010) more than 50 per cent of Libyan trade 
in these goods passed through Qasr Ahmed port and the remainder was distributed 
among the other commercial ports. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
Ports compete against each other to attract users, to handle more cargo and increase 
revenue. The main strategy of competition is to provide a good service quality, as 
required by port stakeholders, in less time and for less cost. This can be achieved if a 
port performs efficiently. Reviewing the literature of port performance provides 
more insights and understandings that help to identify the related constructs. 
Therefore, this chapter examines the literature on port performance, taking into 
consideration the performance of seaside, terminal side and landside operations, to 
identify the most influential factors that influence port performance. 
Ports are closely associated with international trade. International trade is one of the 
main mechanisms for improving economies and eradicating poverty (Córdoba et al., 
2008, Francis, 2008). Both ancient and modern histories show that trade is the 
strongest method for increasing income (Francis, 2008). The ancient civilisations of 
Rome, Egypt and Carthage depended on trade for their development (Francis, 2008). 
There are many studies discussing the role of international trade in improving a 
country’s status, all of which agree that international trade is the key element for 
increasing national income, and consequently reducing poverty (Córdoba et al., 
2008, Francis, 2008). 
Currently, more than two-thirds of international trade is carried by ships 
(Vasiliauskas and Barysienė, 2008, UNCTAD, 2008). Previously, maritime general 
cargo was transferred and transported piece by piece, which was inefficient. This 
increased ships’ operating time and cost, by making sea freight labour ineffective 
and costly (Wong, 2008a). To reduce transport times and the cost of general 
maritime cargo, containerisation was introduced in the 1960s, and now dominates 
sea-born trade (Solomenikovs, 2007, Vasiliauskas and Barysienė, 2008). This 
demand continues to grow. 
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Containerisation is the most efficient way to tranship many types of cargo. Its effect 
is to reduce overall transportation costs by shrinking cargo-handling times and 
increasing the speed of transport, by streamlining handling at all transfer points 
between the different transport modes (Kozan, 2000, Wong, 2008b, Huang, 2004, 
Tierney et al., 2014). 
Recently, the main considerations have been general transport costs and time. 
Transportation costs are determined by many factors, including the efficiency of the 
port (Chang et al., 2008), which is in turn determined by the nature and status of the 
port’s infrastructure and superstructure (Huybrechts et al., 2002). Cost is one of the 
most important competitive factors, as port users are ultimately concerned with the 
total cost associated with using a specific port or terminal (Chang et al., 2008). From 
this perspective, Yap and Lam (2006) found that lower handling fees and good 
service quality at container terminals may attract more customers to use their 
facilities. Moreover, Huybrechts et al. (2002) found that those ports whose 
operations contributed most substantially to overall transportation cost reductions 
were most likely to be preferred by shipping companies, which appear to have 
become the principal player in determining the choice of port. 
Similarly, time is considered an important performance indicator for port 
stakeholders. High operating costs for container terminals and ships, as well as high 
capitalisation of ships, port equipment and containers, demand a reduction in 
unproductive time spent at port (Steenken et al., 2004b). This is a serious constraint 
in a business where lost time translates immediately into higher costs (CSIL, 2012). 
Consider two ports, the first of which operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
and the second of which operates only 12 hours a day, on weekdays. If a ship arrives 
at the second type of port after working hours or during the weekend, the ship may 
need to wait until the second day or beginning of the next week for some key 
procedures, such as customs checks, to be performed. This waiting time increases a 
ship’s operational costs, and may affect the whole ship’s timetable. Conversely, if 
the port can use the 24 working hours while the ship is at port, this increases port 
throughput. Evidence shows that all ports with high container traffic per annum work 
24 hours a day, seven days a week. However, shifting port operations from a 12-hour 
to a 24-hour schedule is unlikely to bring sustainable performance improvements 
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when the landside connectivity is insufficient and other factors outside the port 
remain the same. This could only lead to containers piling up inside the port (Gekara 
and Chhetri, 2013). 
Ports derive their revenue from cargo handling (UNCTAD, 2007). Therefore, 
effective strategies that aim to attract more users are necessary to increase the 
volume of handled goods. This can be achieved by exploiting the advantage of being 
close to international trade routes, increasing port capacity and providing a range of 
additional activities aimed at client satisfaction, based on market demand (Perez-
Labajos and Blanco, 2004). 
Due to the high demand of containerisation and the dramatic increase of container 
ships’ size and capacity (Liu, 2010a), seaports have changed to meet this demand 
(Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). To enhance performance, ports have to improve their 
capacities (Bonney, 2014) by adopting strategies such as new port designs, 
sophisticated infrastructure, long term planning, introducing more effective cargo-
handling equipment (UNCTAD, 2007, Vasiliauskas and Barysienė, 2008), 
expanding storage yards (Alessandri et al., 2007, Liu, 2009), and incorporating ICT 
(Gekara and Fairbrother, 2013, Kia et al., 2000) and software programming 
(Alessandri et al., 2007, Beškovnik, 2009, Chang Ho et al., 2004). 
Deploying efficient container-handling equipment is crucial to providing a good 
service to customers (Myung-Shin, 2003) and minimising ships’ turnaround time 
(Beškovnik, 2009, Lau and Zhao, 2008). Moreover, port performance is an important 
determinant of shipping costs (Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2008, Acosta et al., 2007, 
Chang et al., 2008, Clark et al., 2004). This is because ports with good infrastructure 
are likely to be more efficient and have lower seaport costs, whereas inefficient ports 
increase handling costs (Clark et al., 2004). 
Aside from the container-handling equipment, an important determinant of port 
performance is the use of new ICT to manage seaside, terminal and land operations 
(Beškovnik, 2008). Due to the increased demand for containerisation, the 
competition among container port terminals has become quite remarkable. Port 
operations are nowadays unthinkable without effective and efficient use of ICT 
(Steenken et al., 2004b). Better information flow is one of the keys to a port’s 
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success (Bonney, 2014). ICT has therefore become a crucial part of accurate and 
rapid transfers, processing huge volumes of data in international transport firms and 
port organisations (Kia et al., 2000). Rapid and accurate information exchange 
between ports and their users is crucial for efficient cargo transport. Therefore, many 
ports have introduced ICT to enhance the efficiency of their performance. Using ICT 
reduces bureaucracy, and thus transaction time and costs. This includes online 
customs services, cargo tracking, tracking ship movement and online transactions. 
This improves cash flow, reduces paperwork, improves efficiency and provides a 
real-time opportunity to manage finances (Jeon, 2011). 
Gekara and Fairbrother (2013) have illustrated that, through advanced ICT 
technologies, modern and highly efficient ports have been able to integrate and 
manage operations, further reducing their labour force. This has allowed them to cut 
costs, ensured efficient data and information management and exchange, and 
ultimately enhanced their operations visibility. An example of this is Singapore port. 
The application of ICT in the port of Singapore has resulted in more efficiency and 
better performance (Vis and de Koster, 2003). Myung-Shi (2003) conducted a 
comparison study of service quality at 15 major container ports and found that both 
cost and port facility groups emerged as the highest priority, followed by customer 
convenience and information. Further, previous studies on ports on the African 
continent have illustrated that a developing economy can benefit from greater 
connectivity to global markets, improved trade and reduced transport costs, by 
improving port performance (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). 
One of the most important determinants of port performance is the model of 
ownership and administration adopted. This determined the structure and level of 
capital investment and influences the levels of technology, skills and essential 
infrastructure. Ports can be classified according to the type of ownership and 
administration. The different categories of ownership include state, autonomous, 
municipal and private ownership. Ports may also be classified based on the 
management models they adopt; for example, public service ports, tool ports, 
landlord ports and private service ports (Alderton, 2013). Table 3.1 provides a 
summary of the ownership and control of various components and functions, based 
on the ownership and management type. 
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Table 3.1: Port Ownership and Management Models 
Type Infra Super Labour Other services 
Public service port Public Public Public Mostly public 
Tool port Public Public Private Public/Private 
Landlord port Public Private Private Public/Private 
Private service port Public Private Private Mostly private 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
Port reforms around the world over the past few decades have led to port 
privatisation and adoption of the landlord port model as the predominant one for 
many countries (Czerny et al., 2014). In this category, the state owns the port and 
provides all required infrastructure. It then leases out the port or the terminals to 
private stevedoring companies, which provide all the superstructure (Alderton, 
2008). This is largely due to the many benefits gained from an injection of private 
sector capital, technology and management systems and skills (Ghashat et al., 2011). 
One of the major drivers for such reforms, particularly driven by the World Bank’s 
structural reforms for developing companies in the 1990s, was the release of these 
essential economic institutions from the shackles of public sector bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, management ineptitudes and political patronage (Bank, 2007). A 
number of studies conclude that public ports failed to achieve the desired 
performance goals (Brooks and Cullinane, 2007, Alderton, 2013). All of Libya’s 
ports remain state owned and/or controlled, and therefore fall under the public 
service port model. Similarly, the literature shows that the private sector involvement 
in Libyan port industry is essential for attaining high performance (Ghashat, 2011, 
Ghashat et al., 2011). 
There is a rich and extensive literature in the area of port performance, productivity 
and efficiency. A review of this will develop a strong base for the current study. This 
review will identify the key port performance factors and thus extract the relevant 
constructs for the analysis of Libya’s container port performance. Therefore, this 
chapter defines the productivity and efficiency, and highlights the criteria, of 
measuring port productivity. It also reviews the literature of port performance in the 
three key operational phases: seaside operations, terminal operations and landside 
operations. It then reviews the literature of evaluating container port efficiency using 
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DEA. From this critical review of the performance literature, this study will develop 
an empirical model to measure the performance of Libyan ports from the perspective 
of Libyan stakeholders. 
3.2 Container Port Performance, Productivity and Efficiency 
‘Performance’ is generally understood as industry jargon to assess an organisation’s 
success in achieving some level of its strategic goals (Feng et al., 2013). Logistics 
performance may be defined as the extent to which a firm’s goals are achieved 
(Bonney, 2014). Port performance criteria are often found as determinants of port 
competitiveness, or factors influencing port competitiveness (Tongzon and Heng, 
2005). 
Performance is multi-dimensional and no one measure suffices for performance 
(Bonney, 2014). As highlighted earlier, port performance can be measured by service 
quality, port throughput, seaside accessibility, landside connectivity, storage 
facilities and capacity, cargo dwell time, port efficiency, technology, transaction 
processes, cost, ships’ turnaround time, and the variety of services provided (Liu, 
2009, Haezendonck et al., 2011, Yan et al., 2009, Le-Griffin, 2008, Acosta et al., 
2011, Myung-Shin, 2003, Yap and Lam, 2006, Perez-Labajos and Blanco, 2004, 
David Xiaosong Peng et al., 2011, Wu and Goh, 2010). These factors can be 
categorised into three categories or measures: port productivity, port efficiency and 
service quality. 
One of the most crucial measures of container port performance is its productivity. 
Measuring productivity in container ports on a regular basis is crucial for finding 
opportunities in development and optimisation (Beškovnik, 2008). Productivity and 
efficiency are the two main concepts of economic performance (Liu, 2010a). 
Generally, the concept of productivity is defined as a ratio of the volume measure of 
output, to the volume measure of input used (Chinda, 2010a, Mangat, 2006, Liu, 
2010a, Kao et al., 1995, Fried et al., 1993, Coelli, 2005). Port operators and 
authorities can only control the resources within the port. Therefore, port 
productivity only consists of the productivity of seaside and terminal operations. 
However, the productivity of landside includes the productivity of land transport, 
which is not under the control of the port. 
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High productivity implies either fewer inputs are needed to produce more output, or 
more output is produced by the same amount of input in a certain period (Chinda, 
2010a, Mangat, 2006). In addition, productivity growth is defined as the net change 
in output due to changes in efficiency and technical aspects (Fried et al., 1993). 
Therefore, productivity measures the efficiency with which a production activity 
converts inputs to outputs (Kao et al., 1995). Mangat (2006) adds that productivity is 
a comprehensive measurement of how efficiently and effectively firms satisfy five 
aims, which are: objective achievement, trend-productivity measured over a period 
of time, efficiency of the process, effectiveness and comparability with other firms. 
Further, there is also a strong relationship between efficiency and productivity, 
where efficiency is measured by productivity (Mangat, 2006, Kao et al., 1995). 
Efficiency is defined as the performance of any firm compared to the benchmark 
(Liu, 2010a). It refers to improving productivity via internal cooperation, without 
consuming extra inputs (Stuebs and Sun, 2010). Additionally, economic efficiency 
refers to the productivity of goods and services (i.e., productivity) from a given 
quantity (i.e., cost) of resources; ‘labour efficiency as a measure of labour 
productivity per unit of labour cost’ (Stuebs and Sun, 2010). 
From the above definitions, high port productivity implies high performance in a 
shorter time, using minimal resources. It could be measured by port throughput, or 
crane throughput, or by the number of containers processed per acre per year, or by 
the number of ship calls, or ships’ turnaround time, port revenue, truck turnaround 
time, gate utilisation, container dwell time, idle rate of equipment, service quality, 
customer satisfaction or market share (Ashar, 1990, Beškovnik, 2008, Beškovnik, 
2009, Cullinane et al., 2006, Doyle and Green, 1994, Kozan, 2000, Le-Griffin and 
Murphy, 2006, Liu, 2010a, Stuebs and Sun, 2010, Wong, 2008a). However, 
measurements of total throughput, such as TEUs per year, or TEUs per acre of 
terminal area, are commonly used to gauge the partial productivity of ports (Le-
Griffin and Murphy, 2006). Additionally, container throughput is the most important 
indicator for container terminal and port output, as it relates closely to cargo-
handling facilities and services. Further, it is the primary basis for comparison of 
container ports and terminals. It is also the most appropriate and analytically 
tractable indicator of port production effectiveness (Cullinane et al., 2006). 
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Therefore, total container throughput is included in this study as an output variable 
for measuring port efficiency. 
Returning to container port operations, container-handling processes in marine 
container ports are comprised of several subsystems. Disturbance in container port 
productivity could be due to an individual operational issue, such as seaside 
operations, landside operations or terminal operations. Conversely, it could be due to 
problems within more than one operational part. Both probabilities affect the 
performance of the entire port. Enhancing container port productivity is achieved by 
using port resources efficiently and in a good manner as one unit. Moreover, solving 
the problems of each subsystem individually does not provide an optimal solution 
for the whole system. It only shifts the bottleneck from one subsystem to another. 
The optimal operations management of seaside, terminal and landside resources 
depends on both infrastructure and port superstructure. They are the main influential 
factors on container port productivity, due to their high cost (Coto-Millan et al., 
2000). They are actually the main influential factors on port performance. This is 
because, in addition to their influence on port productivity, they influence the quality 
of service provided by the port, as well as port efficiency, which is represented by 
time and cost. Therefore, container ports must be efficient by achieving maximum 
results with limited resources (Beškovnik, 2008). The potential result is high 
productivity, providing the required service with minimum time and cost. 
To understand port performance, productivity and efficiency, we have to examine 
the three key operational phases of terminal work in detail. These include seaside 
operations, landside operations and terminal operations. The totality of port 
performance is made up of these three separate but inter-connected and coordinated 
operations. In this study, we shall designate them as seaside operations, terminal 
operations and landside operations. The study is mainly concerned with the first two 
operations; that is, seaside operations and sea-land operations. 
3.2.1 Seaside Operations 
Seaside operations relate to the approach, docking and berthing of ships before the 
cargo operations stage. The factors crucial to the efficiency of these operations 
include sufficient draft, approach channel dimensions, pilotage services and 
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docking/berthing services and facilities. Port operators, especially those operating 
large transhipment hubs, always seek to improve their services by ensuring a smooth 
berthing process (Lee and Jin, 2013). 
Transport cost is influenced by the size of a shipment, where larger sized shipments 
decrease transport costs (Clark et al., 2004) and increase port throughput. Moreover, 
instead of delivering a couple of thousand containers using two or three ships, one 
big ship may dump several thousand containers on a terminal during a single port 
call (Bonney, 2014). This saves docking time, which can be used in cargo-handling 
operations. In contrast, a lumpy volume, aggravated by late ship arrivals, ensures 
complications for terminal operators, truckers and other supply chain participants 
(Bonney, 2014). Therefore, to benefit from this advantage, container ship size and 
capacity have increased dramatically. In 2013, Maersk introduced the largest 
container ship, known as Triple E Maersk class, with 18,000 TEUs capacity, 400 
metres long, 59 metres wide, 73 metres high and 14.5 draft (Maersk, 2012). Due to 
the dramatic increase in ship size, port accessibility is considered one of the most 
important factors influencing port performance, as it controls the size of the ships 
that can enter the port. Therefore, sufficient water depth and suitable berth length to 
allow safe docking of the inbound ships, are crucial to commence cargo operations 
(Acosta et al., 2007). 
These two port resources, water depth and berth length, have been the subject of 
many studies. For instance, the length of a terminal and the number of deep-water 
piers are used by Lin and Tseng (2007b) to establish a competitive strategy aimed at 
enhancing port productivity. Additionally, Acosta et al. (2007) use the port of 
Ageciras Bay to study the competitiveness between Mediterranean ports from the 
supply perspective. The study includes infrastructure factors associated with 
container transhipment and maritime access to the port by large container ships. The 
results illustrate that those representing greater competitive advantages are 
associated with the maritime accessibility of ships to the port. Haezendonck, Broek 
and Jans 2011 (2011) also include sea accessibility among 25 determinants of 
competitiveness at the port of Antwerp. This study also concluded that port 
accessibility is directly related to government action, which is an important factor to 
attract users. 
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Similarly, Cullinane et al. (2005) use the berth length (among other factors) to 
examine the relationship between port efficiency and privatisation. Berth length is 
also used by Wu (2009b) to measure the performance of 28 container ports. Jose 
(2001) used berth length combined with other variables to measure the efficiency of 
a number of Australian ports. The efficiency of seaside operations could be 
influenced by berth design, and the number and specifications of the QCs dedicated 
to those berths. In this perspective, Nam et al. (2002) found that sharing QCs with 
adjacent berths can increase productivity. 
Berthing on arrival or berth availability is an important competitive advantage that 
influences port choice decisions (Chang et al., 2008). Generally, it could be said that 
berth allocation problems occur due to the unavailability of suitable berths to 
accommodate inbound container ships. This lack of berths could be due to 
insufficient numbers of efficient QCs dedicated to a certain berth. Inefficient QCs 
slow the total handling rate of QCs, due to technical or operational reasons. This 
might also be due to long QC idle times while the crane is waiting for transport 
vehicles to pick up the off-loaded containers under the QC, or to bring containers 
from a storage yard. This longer vehicle turnaround time may occur due to 
congestion or a lack of transport vehicles to serve a certain ship or QC. It might also 
be due to the longer time taken by yard cranes (YCs) to retrieve outbound containers, 
because of the vertical stacking caused by lack of space. All of this shows the 
integrity of port subsystems, where any deficiency in any subsystem affects the 
entire operation. 
The effect of berth allocation problems in a particular container port does not only 
affect the performance of that port, but may also extend to other container ports 
(Ilmer, 2008). Good performance in any container port minimises ships’ turnaround 
time, where time lost translates immediately into higher costs (CSIL, 2012); 
consequently, it positively affects the performance of the next port of call for the 
same container ship. In contrast, any ship’s delay caused by the previous port might 
disturb the berthing plans of the next port of call. This is supported by Ilmer (2008), 
who illustrates an overview of the development of northern European container port 
investments and the expected balance between supply and demand in that area in 
2010. He states that non-adherence to berthing windows—because of ship delays 
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caused by congestion in provirus ports and last minute notification of ships’ arrival 
time—puts further pressure on terminal capacity in certain ports. Further, terminal 
performance is affected by ships’ arrival times and the efficiency of container 
handling. 
Using this point, and to enhance the efficiency of berth usage, Jam Dai et al. (2008) 
investigated berth allocation problems and proposed a local search algorithm to solve 
static berth allocation problems. Another perspective is provided by Imai, Nishimura 
and Papadimitriou (2008), who addressed a variation of berth allocation problems at 
multi-user terminals. The study focused on busy container ports in developing 
countries. A genetic algorithm-based heuristic was developed to reduce the total 
service time of container ships at the external terminals, when such ships were 
expected to exceed specific waiting times at the allocated terminals. 
This brief literature review has shown the importance of water depth and berth 
length in port performance. This importance appears clearly when new generation 
container ships, such as Triple E mega container ships, were entered into service. 
Only a small number of container ports, which have a number of competitive 
advantages, can serve this type of container ship. These competitive advantages 
include a berth’s shape and length suiting the length of all these types of container 
ships and deep water to allow safe docking. Therefore, variables such as water depth 
and berth length are included in this study. 
3.2.2 Terminal Operations 
Terminal operations are very important factors for port performance (Beškovnik, 
2008). They start after the inbound container ship crosses the fairway channel that 
suits its draft, and moors alongside a suitable berth. Terminal operations include the 
entire operations of container handling, starting from loading/off-loading containers 
and ending with container transhipping. These operations involve all the resources 
dedicated to handle the containers inside the terminal or the port. 
Most cargo damage at port occurs in sea-land operation cargo. Safety, including 
cargo loss and damage, is another important factor influencing port performance 
(Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). Cargo damage was investigated by (Brooks and 
Schellinck, 2013) in combination with some other factors, to measure the 
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effectiveness of operations in meeting customer requirements. However, the study 
found that cargo damage is the least important determinant of overall service 
performance for both shipping lines and supply chain partners. 
Terminal operations could be affected by the technical and operational specifications 
of both transfer and transport equipment. Transfer equipment includes all types of 
cranes used to transfer containers between a ship and shore/transport vehicles, or 
between a storage/rail yard and transport vehicle. In contrast, transport equipment 
includes all vehicles used to transport containers horizontally within the port. These 
include AGVs, trucks, SCs, yard trailers and SLVs. Both transfer and transport 
equipment should be used efficiently to increase productivity. 
QCs are the first interface between seaside operations and sea-land operations. The 
QC is perhaps the most important equipment in cargo-handling process (SCI, 2010, 
Lu et al., 2012) and their operating efficiency has direct and indirect impacts on port 
throughput (Lu et al., 2012). Efficient QC scheduling and utilisation simplifies berth 
allocation problems. It controls ships’ service times. Consequently, it influences 
ships’ turnaround times and port productivity (Zhang and Jiang, 2008). The 
efficiency of terminal operations is influenced by the specifications of the QC; for 
example, fully or semi-automated QC, crane height, outreach, move rate and safe 
working load (SWL). All of these are manufacturing specifications and cannot be 
controlled by port operators. However, the port operators can control the way of 
using such QCs; for example, QC scheduling, which is essential for efficient 
performance. Due to the importance of QC scheduling, it is discussed by a number of 
researchers. For instance, Kim and Park (2004) developed a mixed integer program 
and attempted to solve QC scheduling problems, to enhance the efficiency of 
container movement. Their study focused on speeding up the container handling 
between ships and port and minimising ships’ turnaround times. Similarly, QC 
scheduling is investigated by Lu et al. (2012), who aim at enhancing container 
movement speed. Another perspective is provided by Legato et al. (2012), who 
provided a rich model for QC scheduling. This study covered important issues of 
practical relevance like safety requirements, crane-individual service rates, ready 
times and due dates for cranes and precedence relations among container groups. All 
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of the above studies aimed at enhancing the efficiency of QCs, which reflects on the 
efficiency of terminal operations and port performance in general. 
As mentioned earlier, berth allocation plans are closely associated with the 
performance of QCs. Due to the importance of this relationship between seaside 
operations and sea-land operations, Zhou and Kang (2008) and Liang, Huang and 
Yang (2009) discuss QC and berth allocation problems, to minimise handling, 
waiting and delay times of container ships. Zhou (2008) proposed a programming 
model under stochastic environments, which can effectively treat related random 
factors. Meanwhile, Liang (2009) used a combined generic algorithm with heuristics 
to solve the same problem. Both studies were great efforts to deal with seaside 
problems. 
Additionally, terminal operations could be influenced by berth shape and the number 
and specifications of QCs dedicated to that berth. In studying the impact of sharing 
QCs and berths on port productivity, Nam et al. (2002) applied a computer 
simulation program on the Gamman container terminal in Pusan, Korea as a case 
study. The results of four different operational scenarios revealed that sharing QC 
with adjacent berths could increase productivity. Chen et al. (2011) also discussed 
QC scheduling and developed a mixed integer programming model by considering 
the unique features of the QC scheduling problem at indented berths. 
Storage yard space, which is a part of port infrastructure, is one of the vital elements 
in container port performance and productivity. It determines the volume of 
containers that can be stored and processed, storage mode, number and type of 
handling equipment (Ioannou et al., 2000a, Wiese et al., 2010, Alessandri et al., 
2007). A wider study in analysing the main causes of unproductivity in the container 
movement process was conducted by Chen (1999). The findings illustrated that 
many factors influenced operational efficiency and caused non-productive moves. 
These included shortage of storage capacity, poor quality of container information 
received, and operational rules. It was also found that higher container storage had a 
serious impact on the number of unproductive moves and on delivery operations. 
To absorb many more containers in a small storage yard, containers are stacked 
vertically. This requires special and expensive stacking equipment to perform this 
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task. In a vertical stacking mode, double handling is required in some cases to 
retrieve lower containers, which increases operational times, and therefore container 
port performance (Alessandri et al., 2007, Kozan, 2006). It may also affect QC 
performance, and consequently a ship’s turnaround time (Steenken et al., 2004a). In 
contrast, within larger storage areas, more containers can be stored and processed. In 
this case, it might not be necessary to deploy high stacking equipment. However, 
deploying extra horizontal transport vehicles is required to accelerate container 
movement and avoid QC idle time. Therefore, a higher investment for vehicles is 
needed, and operational costs will be increased as well. These are considered as 
inputs in measuring port efficiency (Fried et al., 1993, Fried et al., 2000, Pérez-
Reyes and Tovar, 2009). Therefore, the optimal amount of storage area is a very 
important factor for port performance and efficiency. For these reasons, storage 
space and the type and number of container-handling equipment are included in this 
study. 
In this perspective, a cost model was developed by Huang and Chu (2004) to 
determine the most economical container-handling equipment used in container 
ports. The study included the cost of land, labour, equipment procurement, 
maintenance and handling efficiency. The results illustrate that YCs can be more 
economically operated only if their annual throughput was larger than the 
procurement cost and interest rate, and the number of handlings per container was 
smaller. Leading from this study, container-handling costs are influenced by 
superstructure costs, which include the cost of machinery and used technology. 
Another perspective is provided by Ioannou (2000a). The study used Los Angeles 
and Long Beach ports as case studies to investigate the impact of the cost of various 
technologies and concepts, and the traffic network outside the port on container port 
capacity. The most important results related to cost function showed that the price of 
land and the price of AGVs affected the average cost of container handling. 
Moreover, the high cost of land forced the port to increase its productivity by using 
advanced technology. This showed that land and handling equipment are crucial 
elements that should be considered for measuring container port performance. 
In addition, not only the space of storage yards is important, but the storage yard 
design is also a crucial element for container port performance. As block dimensions 
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and layout control the efficiency of container stacking and retrieval, they 
consequently affect the performance of all handling equipment and ships’ service 
times. Regarding the yard layout improvement perspective, Lee and Chao (2009) 
proposed a heuristic model, to develop a movement plan to improve the layout of an 
export container yard. They claimed that pre-marshalling exported containers 
reduced ships’ turnaround times, as it avoided the longer time used to retrieve 
containers when the ship was alongside. In studying storage yard design, Petering 
and Murty (2009) investigated the effect of block length and yard crane deployment 
systems on overall performance. The results illustrated that the long-run average QC 
rate depended on both storage block length and the system that deployed YCs among 
blocks in the same size. In contrast, Petering (2009) studied the effect of block width 
and storage yard layout on the productivity of marine container ports. The results 
showed that the optimal block width ranged between six to12 rows, depending on 
the amount of equipment deployed, and the size, shape and throughput of the 
terminal. 
In some ports, storage yards cannot be expanded due to land scarcity (Ioannou et al., 
2000a). Storage space as an individual problem has been well investigated by many 
authors. For example, Zhang et al. (2003), who developed a rolling-horizon model 
for storage yard optimisation, believed that this problem was related to all container 
port resources. The model showed a significant reduction in workload imbalance in 
the yard. 
Another factor influencing container port performance, by affecting the total 
transport and operational cost, is the location of each container in the storage yard. 
This factor has a strong impact on handling equipment numbers and routing. This 
appears clearly when the retrieved container is located in the lower layer in the 
block, or when two containers are located in two different blocks (Ilmer, 2008). In 
the first case, all upper containers have to be double handled to pick up the lower 
container. In the second case, to save on operating time, it is necessary to assign 
stacking equipment to each block. Both cases require more time and handling 
equipment: time and productivity moves are very important for container port 
performance. 
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In studying these factors, Hadjiconstantinou and Ma (2009) used the Piraeus 
container terminal as a case study, to evaluate SC deployment policies. They 
proposed an optimisation model to determine optimal container location and SC 
movement, to minimise the overall container storage and handling cost. The two SC 
deployment policies investigated were shared SC and non-shared SC. The shared SC 
policy is: SC can move to another yard block to perform container handling when 
there is no container assigned to its block. The results showed that deploying SCs 
under a shared policy makes SC perform up to their capacity. The total waiting time 
at a yard is about four times higher than with a non-share SC policy, due to the 
movement between blocks without carrying containers. In solving optimisation 
problems, particularly with the strategic planning of container ports, (Alessandri et 
al., 2007) proposed a simple model, using a set of queues to represent container 
positions within the port. That included container transfer, transport and storage. All 
of the above studies showed the effect of the storage yard on the amount of container 
transport and stacking equipment, and port performance in general. 
In estimating the optimal equipment combination of the stevedoring system, Choi 
(2003) analysed the combined productivity of container port stevedoring systems, 
taking Busan port as the case study. He demonstrated the savings effect by using 
mean waiting time rates according to equipment combinations. The results showed 
that a bottleneck occurred in transfer cranes due to an insufficient number of yard 
tractors. Leading from this study, container port resources should work together as 
one unit and any failure in any part could affect the whole process. Further, (Ottjes et 
al., 2002) investigated the influences causing peaks of variation in import and export 
flow and container dwell times. They illustrated that the influences causing peaks 
were due to the need for stacking space and handling, and transportation equipment 
in the container port. 
Hence, storage yard capacity and layout play a vital role in container port 
performance, and influence the used transport and transfer equipment. Therefore, 
container classification (import and export) and storing management are important to 
reach optimal utilisation of the storage yard resource. In carrying out studies on more 
expensive transport equipment, (Soriguera et al., 2007) investigated the internal 
transport subsystem in container ports managed by SCs. The aim of this study was to 
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optimise the internal transport cycle. The study proposed a simulation model to 
determine the optimal number of SCs. It pointed out that dividing storage yards into 
import and export areas and using a single cycle SC strategy increased productivity. 
A simulation study was also carried out by (Guenther et al., 2006). They claimed that 
the efficient use of transportation equipment determined the performance of the 
entire port. They focused only on dual-load AGVs (two 20 foot container or one 40 
foot container). The results showed that operating dual-load AGVs, instead of single-
load ones, may improve the AGV’s performance considerably, contributing to 
container port performance. 
Related to operational aspects, a number of research projects have discussed the 
scheduling of transfer and transport equipment to enhance port performance. One 
such study was conducted by Nishimura et al. (2005), who developed a heuristic 
model to solve trailer scheduling problems assigned to a specific QC until the work 
was finished. The study also proposed many efficient trailer assignment methods, 
called dynamic routing. The findings illustrated that dynamic routing decreased 
travel distance and generated substantial savings in trailer fleet size, and reached up 
to a 15 per cent overall cost reduction. Another perspective is provided by Chen et 
al. (2012). This study discussed the optimisation of operation scheduling in container 
port, based on mix cross-operation. This operation allowed yard trailers to be shared 
by different YCs in different berths to decrease yard trailers’ travel distances. It was 
found that mix cross-operations can decrease yard trailers’ empty travel distance to a 
great extent, and that integrating scheduling methods can reduce the operational 
costs of container terminals significantly. 
Transport equipment can affect QC performance when there is a lack or misuse of 
transport vehicles. The lack or misuse of such vehicles increases QC idle time, and 
consequently increases ships’ turnaround times and reduces productivity. A wider 
study was conducted by (Kozan and Preston, 1999), who analysed the major factors 
that influenced container transfer efficiency through lower throughput times. A 
genetic algorithm was developed to schedule container transfer at multimodal 
terminals. The study simulated the effects of handling equipment, an alternative 
number of containers, terminal layout, storage capacities and policies, to analyse the 
system. The study found that the high number of yard machines had a strong effect 
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on transfer time. In addition, decreasing the maximum height of storage blocks 
dramatically increased the transfer time. 
In conducting more integrated studies related to container port resources, which 
include seaside resources, transfer, transport resources and storage resource, 
Stahlbock and Voß (2008) provided a comprehensive overview of container-
handling operations and container transfer and transport equipment. In this study, 
they conducted a comprehensive survey on routing problems that arose in the 
container port domain. This study included scheduling of berths, QC, AGV, multi-
trailer, SC, trucks and stacker cranes. The study is considered important in 
understanding container port operational mechanisms. 
Regarding the scheduling problems of QCs, transport vehicles and YCs to enhance 
port performance, Lau and Zhao (2008) developed a mixed integer programming 
model, called the multi-layer genetic algorithm. They managed to schedule three 
different types of automated containers handling equipment: QCs, YCs and AGVs. 
The results showed that deploying a large number of AGVs might not improve 
performance. Regarding the same problem, another perspective was provided by 
Zhang and Jiang (2008). They developed a simulation software package to evaluate 
the efficiency of the dynamic scheduling method, in order to improve its 
performance. The study included the scheduling problem of QC, YC and trucks 
instead of the AGVs. The findings showed that dynamic scheduling increased port 
efficiency by about eight per cent, as opposed to static scheduling. 
All the above studies aimed at enhancing container port performance; for example, 
increasing port throughput, increasing storage capacity, speeding up container 
movement, minimising ship’s turnaround times, minimising handling fees and 
improving cargo delivery time. To achieve that, a port has to own sufficient and 
efficient cargo-handling equipment, such as QCs with special specifications relating 
to SWL, moves rate, spreader type and maximum outreach. Further, it has to own an 
optimal number of efficiency transport and stacking equipment. It can also be 
concluded that the storage yard, as infrastructure, is an important element for 
container port performance. In some container ports, the storage yard cannot be 
expanded, due to land scarcity. Storage yard influences the stacking mode 
(‘vertical/horizontal’), the volume of containers to be processed, and the type and 
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number of transport and stacking equipment. Its importance appears more clearly 
when a port receives a new generation container ship with a large volume of 
containers on board. 
All of these resources have to be managed and operated as one system, because any 
failure in any subsystem influences the entire operation. Therefore, evaluating the 
performance of these resources on a regular basis is essential to determine the 
destructive factors that impede optimal performance, to take the necessary measures 
to prevent their effect (Beškovnik, 2008). Therefore, it is vital to include the number 
and the type of QCs, transport equipment, stacking equipment and storage yard area 
in this research to examine container port performance and efficiency. 
3.2.3 Landside Operations 
Throughout maritime history, commercial port competitiveness has been determined 
by their physical characteristics and geographical location, as well as their 
relationship to a landside transportation system (Le-Griffin, 2008). Therefore, 
successful and efficient ports are often those that are well connected to their 
hinterlands by adequate and effective transport corridors (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013, 
Chang et al., 2008). As a consequence, rail and road transport networks are required 
to optimise container flow, increase port productivity and minimise a ship’s 
turnaround time (Parola and Sciomachen, 2005, Transystems, 2011). 
Transport infrastructure investment plays an important role in determining both the 
efficiency and sustainability of freight transport activity (Woodburn, 2013, Le-
Griffin, 2008). The increase of flow in the container supply chain is largely driven by 
the growth in demand for container transportation (Panova and Korovyakovsky, 
2013). Since the 1950s, containerisation has improved the efficiency in intermodal 
transportation and has intensified competition among ports (Wan et al., 2013). 
However, the dramatic increase in container ship capacity has led to congestion 
problems at and around ports. 
A number of studies have investigated the influence of road transport on container 
port performance. For instance, Wan et al. (2013) investigated the impacts of urban 
road congestion and road capacity expansion on seaport container throughput in the 
USA. The study found that a port’s container throughput was statistically 
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significantly associated with congestion delays on its own urban roads, as well as 
delays on its rival’s roads. 
In comparing road and sea freight transport based on private and social costs, 
Sambracos and Maniati (2012) found that sea transport was significantly more 
competitive than road transport to transport freight between port of Patras and 
Eleusis in Greece. However, road transport is fast and flexible. 
Despite the fact that trucks provide door-to-door service, which cannot be provided 
by rail intermodal services, congestion impedes the use of this option (Van Schijndel 
and Dinwoodie, 2000). Congestion affects the reliability of all parties of a container 
logistics chain, including container terminals. In contrast, one of the advantages of 
rail use is preventing congestion, which accelerates container delivery time, 
consequently minimising transport costs and supporting maritime container trade. 
From this perspective, Van Schijndel and Dinwoodie (2000) found that an average of 
between 7.5 and 14.5 per cent of trucks’ working time is spent in congestion, and a 
vehicle cost simulation attributed seven per cent of transport costs to congestion. 
Therefore, a combination of rail and road (rail-truck) is crucial for land transport 
efficiency (Hansen, 2004, Kia et al., 2003, Niérat, 1997), which reflects on the cargo 
flow between a port and its hinterland. However, the use of each method depends on 
a number of factors, such as distance between nodes, container flow volume and 
weight, as well as the distance between container ports and intermodal terminals. 
In studying the comparison between road and rail intermodal transport, (Niérat, 
1997) discussed the issue in terms of market area in France. He concluded that rail 
intermodal transport was more attractive for lighter loads and unbalanced traffic. In 
contrast, road transport was more attractive for heavier and balanced ones. Further, 
all transportation means depended on and complemented each other. 
Rail transport is an efficient way to transport large volume of containers for long 
distances (Hansen, 2004, Kia et al., 2003). Therefore, a number of studies have 
investigated the impact of rail transport on container port performance (Woodburn, 
2013, Transystems, 2011, SCI, 2010, Kozan, 1997, Kozan, 2000, Dinwoodie, 2006, 
Ashar, 1990, Economic research centre, 2000, Reis et al., 2013, Gekara and Chhetri, 
2013, Niérat, 1997). All of these studies illustrated that rail connectivity was 
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essential for efficient container flow between ports and their hinterland, which was 
associated with port performance. 
Apart from railway and road connections and services, terminal gates determined the 
performance level of the port (Beškovnik, 2008). Gate processes have a great 
influence on the congestion at ports (Brooks and Schellinck, 2013); long truck 
queues at gates often limited the efficiency of a container port (Chen et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the optimum utilisation of port gates shortens container storage time at a 
yard, so that the storage capacity can be utilised more efficiently (Chen et al., 2013). 
The gate process depends on a number of factors, such as the number of gate lanes 
and customs clearance procedures. Introducing container inspection processes in a 
seaport impedes the current workflow schedule of container operations and incurs 
additional management and operation costs (Lee et al., 2008). In addition, in many 
developing economy ports, corruption, bureaucracy and lack of new ICT-based 
technologies stifle port operations (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). 
The above literature review illustrates that container flow strongly influences port 
performance. Landside accessibility is vital for efficient container flow between a 
port and its hinterland. Road transport provides door-to-door service, which cannot 
be provided by rail transport. However, rail transport is more efficient to transport 
freight over long distances. This shows that both intermodal transport means 
complement each other and are important for port reliability and cargo delivery time. 
Gate processes also have an influence on port performance. Efficient gate processes 
accelerate container flow and increase storage yard capacity. However, the number 
of gate lanes, the efficiency of customs clearance procedures and the use of ICT have 
a direct influence on gate utilisation. 
The above literature has illustrated that port performance is influenced by a number 
of factors related to seaside, terminal and landside operations. These factors were 
divided into three main categories: productivity, service quality and efficiency (see 
Figure 3.1). 
Port productivity refers to shipside and terminal productivity. Shipside productivity 
depends on the capacity of the container-handling equipment used to load and off-
load the ship. The capacity of this equipment depends on the number and type of 
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QCs used. In contrast, terminal productivity depends on the number and type of the 
transport equipment used for container transport, as well as the stacking equipment 
used to stack containers at the storage yard. Moreover, it depends on storage yard 
capacity, which also depends on the stacking equipment number and type. It is also 
influenced by the efficient use of these resources. All of these factors are under the 
control of the port authority and operator. 
Service quality is another factor that influences port performance. Due to rapidly 
changing contexts of operations and competition, the ports have to offer an 
innovative variety of additional activities and services, aimed at generating value to 
meet customer demand and command customer preference and loyalty (Misurata 
Free Zone, 2013). These demands and requirements are port accessibility, reliability, 
flexibility, cargo safety and online services. All of these requirements depend on port 
infrastructure and superstructure. Port accessibility is a focal factor for port 
performance, as it determines the volume of containers to be processed. Port 
accessibility consists of seaside accessibility and landside accessibility. 
Due to increased container ship sizes, a small number of container ports can serve 
these mega ships and their large shipments. Water draft is important to ensure safe 
passage for deep draft container ships. Moreover, these larger ships require long 
berths for safe docking to commence container-handling operations. 
Ports are interface points between the sea and the land. To avoid containers piling up 
at ports and to accelerate container flow, proper landside accessibility is essential. 
Landside accessibility consists of road and rail transport. Road transport provides 
door-to-door service. However, congestion impedes the efficiency of this method. 
Contrarily, rail transport is more cost-efficient to transport freight over long 
distances. Therefore, a combined road and rail transport network is important to 
reduce the load on road networks, enhance the reliability of cargo delivery and 
reduce total transport cost. 
Inadequate and inefficient port facilities, poor hinterland transport networks and 
inefficient cargo clearance procedures have led to slow ship turnaround and cargo 
off-take, as well as chronic ship congestion, which is the case of most of the
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Figure 3.1: Port Performance Criteria 
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African ports (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). Eventually, this affects the reliability of 
ships’ scheduling, transport and handling costs, as well as port performance. In 
addition, the lack of adequate and efficient container-handling facilities affects the 
flexibility of port services and undermines the ability of a port to handle irregular 
shipments with irregular weights and sizes. Further, longer ship turnaround times, 
caused by the lack of adequate and efficient container-handling facilities, prevents a 
port from providing berthing on arrival. 
Apart from using ICT to manage port operations, it is important to improve port 
service quality. Online service simplifies customs clearance processes, enables port 
users to set up their plans and reduces bureaucracy, all of which influence port 
performance. Increased port throughput is not the only port performance indicator. 
Another service quality factor that influences port performance is cargo safety. 
Delivering cargo without damage or loss increases the reliability of the port, which is 
one of the most influential factors in port performance. 
Efficiency is another factor that influences port performance, because it is a port 
choice criterion. The main components of efficiency are the associated factors of 
time and cost: time lost translates immediately into cost (CSIL, 2012). The efficiency 
of container-handling equipment influences the total handling time and ships’ 
turnaround time, both of which influence port performance. In addition to these, free 
dwell time influences the utilisation and capacity of storage yards. Moreover, the 
efficiency of container-handling equipment influences cargo-handling fees; and 
customs clearance fees depend on customs legislation and clearance processes. Land 
transport costs depend on the method of land transport and infrastructure. 
Port performance depends on both infrastructure and superstructure factors. Some of 
these factors are under the control of the port authority and operator, whereas other 
factors may be considered exogenous. The objective of this study is to examine 
which of these factors are most influential in the performance of Libyan ports. This 
is based on the understanding that port performance is contextual and some factors 
are more influential that others in determining a port’s performance, depending on 
prevailing broader socio-economic and political environments. Thus, this study 
specifically examines performance factors in a developing country context, with 
Libya as the illustrative case. 
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3.3 The use of DEA to measure container port efficiency  
There is a strong relationship between efficiency and productivity, where efficiency 
is measured by productivity. Increased productivity implies either fewer inputs are 
needed to produce more output, or that more output is produced by the same amount 
of input per time unit. Changes in productivity, known as ‘efficiency’, are usually 
estimated by parametric and non-parametric methods. Non-parametric estimation 
envelopment DEA has been widely applied in research on many industries, such as 
education (Lim and Zhu, 2013, Salleh, 2012), supply chain management (Manzoni 
and M.N.Islam, 2009), electricity distribution (Pérez-Reyes and Tovar, 2009), post-
hurricane electric power restoration activities (Reilly, 2008), health insurance (Vela, 
2000) and business intelligence (Vercellis, 2009). It has also been applied to the 
wider transport sector (Cullinane et al., 2006) and specifically the port industry 
(Cheon, 2009, Cullinane et al., 2005, Cullinane and Wang, 2006, Estache et al., 
2004, Roll and Hayuth, 1993, Wang et al., 2003). 
DEA is an appropriate non-parametric method for evaluating the relative efficiency 
of a set of (homogeneous) peer entities. These entities are known as DMUs, whose 
performance is characterised by a set of multiple performance measures (Jose, 2001, 
Jie et al., 2009, Cullinane et al., 2005, Cullinane et al., 2006, Lim and Zhu, 2013). 
DEA analysis can help suggest efficiency improvements for DMUs and/or policy 
makers (Kiatpathomchai, 2008). 
Regarding container port efficiency, DEA has been applied in many studies and has 
been shown to be an appropriate technique for port efficiency evaluation. In many of 
these studies, DEA was employed as the operations research technique, as it allows 
the efficiency of selected entities to be measured and analysed comparatively, 
without the need for absolute ideal performance standards (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 
2009). Moreover, it measures the efficiency of a DMU with multiple inputs and/or 
outputs by constructing a single ‘virtual’ output to a single ‘virtual’ input without 
predefining a production function (Cullinane et al., 2006). It is also a technique that 
gives a minimal set of constraints on the input and output weights (Doyle and Green, 
1994). It does not impose any functional forms on technology, or any restrictive 
assumptions on the reward of production factors (Cullinane, 2011). 
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Many research projects have been conducted to evaluate container port efficiency 
from different perspectives using different approaches and techniques. An example 
of that is the study of Wang et al. (2003), who used two alternative techniques—
DEA and fee disposal hull (FDH)—to evaluate the production efficiency of the 
world’s most important container ports and terminals. The evaluation criteria 
considered as inputs were the optimal berth length, the number of QCs, storage yard 
area, the number of yard gantry cranes and SCs. Container throughput was used as 
an output variable. The results also showed that the two mathematical programming 
techniques led to different conclusions. Further, Roll and Hayuth (1993) used DEA 
to compare the performance of 20 ports. The study used four outputs and two inputs. 
The outputs were cargo throughput (container, general cargo and bulk), level of 
service, users’ satisfaction and ship calls. The input variables were human labour and 
capital. They concluded that DEA is a promising and easily adoptable technique for 
ranking. 
DEA has been used by many authors for ranking ports in terms of efficiency. One 
such study was conducted by Cullinane et al. (2005) to determine the relationship 
between container port efficiency and privatisation. The study used terminal length, 
area and the number of QCs, YCs and SCs as inputs. Output was represented by 
container throughput. The study showed no clear-cut theoretical relationship between 
efficiency and ownership of port land or privatisation. 
In evaluating the operational performance of major container ports in the Asia-
Pacific region, Lin and Tseng (2007b) provided five models of DEA to establish 
competitive strategies that helped to improve container ports’ resource use and 
productivity. The output measures in this study were the number of container ships 
arriving at port and the loading/unloading volume of containers. Conversely, the 
input variables included length of container terminals, area of container base, the 
number of deep-water piers and the number of QCs. The results showed that the 
overall technical inefficiencies of these ports were mainly due to pure technical 
inefficiencies, rather than inefficiencies of scale. The low pure technical efficiency 
compared to the efficiency of scale suggested that inefficiencies were mostly 
because of inefficient management practices. 
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In gaining insights into port operations in emerging markets, Wu and Goh (2010) 
used DEA to evaluate 23 international container ports related to advanced markets 
and emerging markets. The inputs used were terminal area, quay length and the 
amount of cargo-handling equipment. The output variable was the TEUs’ 
throughput. The results showed that none of the ports in advanced markets was a role 
model for the field. 
DEA was also used by Wu (2009b) to evaluate the performance of 28 container ports 
located in 12 different Asian countries. Land and equipment factors were 
incorporated into the model as input. These factors included the capacity of cargo-
handling machines, number of berths, terminal area and storage yard capacity. The 
output was represented by container throughput. Despite the homogeneity of 
container terminals, the findings showed that, in terms of efficiency evaluation, each 
group of container ports located in one country could be very different from another 
group of container ports located in a different country. Additionally, the efficiency 
score of container ports reflected the overall status of the country’s economy. In 
China specifically, Li et al. (2013) used DEA to estimate the change dynamic 
efficiency of 42 Chinese coastal container terminals. The inputs used were terminal 
length, handling equipment and staff numbers. It was found that the overall 
efficiency of these terminals was relatively low due to scale inefficiency. Secondly, 
there was a vast regional difference in terminal efficiency among different port 
groups. For instance, the efficiency of the Yangtze River Delta region was higher 
than that of three other areas, and the south-east coast had lower than average 
efficiency. 
In measuring the efficiency of a number of Australian ports, Jose (2001) provided an 
efficiency measurement for 12 international container ports, including four 
Australian container ports. The study used two output measures: container 
throughput and ship working rate, which are represented by the number of containers 
moved per working hour. In contrast, the input measures included the number of 
cranes, berths, port authority employees and tugs. They also included the area of the 
terminals and delay time. The results showed that port size was not the determinant 
of port efficiency. 
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Wanke et al. (2011) used DEA and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure the 
efficiency of major Brazilian terminals. The sample included 25 terminals. The 
inputs used were the number of berths, terminal area and size of parking lot for 
incoming trucks. The output variables were aggregate throughput (tons per year) and 
loaded shipments per year. As an extension of the contribution, conjuncture and 
structural variables were also included. The structural variables included the type of 
cargo handled (solid bulk, liquid bulk or container) and the connectivity of the 
terminal to railroad lines. In contrast, conjuncture variables encompassed the 
perceptions of interviewees on labour force qualifications, the control of the terminal 
(state or private) and the scheduling of incoming trucks to the terminal. The study 
found that the majority of Brazilian terminals ran short on capacity, due to the export 
boom that had occurred over the last few years, and due to the lack of investment in 
capacity expansion. 
Schoyen and Odeck (2013) used DEA to evaluate the technical efficiency of 24 
container ports, including Norwegian container ports and other Nordic and UK ports. 
The study used berth length, terminal areas, QCs, the number of YCs, reach stackers 
and SCs as input variables. Throughput was used as the output variable. The study 
found that all ports in the sample seemed to have improved their overall efficiency 
over the period studied, and much of this improvement was due to improvements in 
the scale of operations. The major reason for the observed scale inefficiency was due 
to ports that operated with increasing returns. 
DEA was also used by Wanke (2013) to assess the physical infrastructure and 
shipment consolidation efficiency drivers in Brazilian ports. Warehousing area, berth 
numbers and the yard area were used as inputs, whereas the throughput (tons & 
TEUs) was used as an output variable. The result indicated that private 
administration had a positive impact on physical infrastructure efficiency levels, 
while the size of hinterland and the operation of the bulk and containerised cargoes 
had an opposite effect on the efficiency of shipment consolidation levels. 
Cullinane and Wang (2006) investigated the relative efficiency of 69 European 
container terminals. Their study used container throughput as an output variable. 
Terminal length, terminal area and the amount of handling equipment were used as 
input variables. It was found that terminals could dramatically improve the level of 
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their output while using the same inputs, by up to 2.4 times of current levels. It was 
also found that the efficiency of container terminals located in different regions 
differed, to either a small or large extent. Another perspective regarding European 
ports was provided byCarlos Pestana and Athanassiou (2004). The study was 
conducted to increase the competitiveness of the seaports of Greece and Portugal 
against other European ports. The labour force and capital were used as inputs. 
Movement of freight, total cargo handled (dry and liquid cargo, containers, cars, 
trucks, motorcycles) and the number of passengers were used as outputs. The 
findings showed that the majority of seaports were efficient in managing their 
resources when they were evaluated on a VRS. 
Wilmsmeier et al. (2013) investigated port efficiency under changing market 
dynamics. The study concentrated on two aspects. The first was geographic, focusing 
on Latin America, and the Caribbean as an emergent region. The second was 
temporal, looking at the pre-financial crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The study 
used terminal area, crane capacity and labour force as inputs. Terminal throughput 
was used as output variable. The results clearly illustrated changes in productivity 
when comparing these three periods, revealing that the significant loss in 
productivity was provoked by the economic crisis. Another perspective was provided 
by Bichou (2013), who examined the relationship between port efficiency and the 
operating environment. The study focused on the market and operating conditions of 
container ports and terminals, with a sample of 420 container terminals. The input 
variables in this study were terminal area, maximum draft, berth length, yard 
stacking and QC index, and the number of gate lanes and railway tracks at the gate. 
The results showed that terminal efficiency was highly affected by variations in 
operating conditions. 
As with any analytical method, DEA has advantages and disadvantages. These are 
summarised in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Strengths and Advantages of Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEA is a powerful non-parametric tool for studying the efficiencies of DMUs in the 
same group or cohort by allowing direct peer, and peer-to-grouped-peers 
comparisons, on the basis of a multitude of input and output factors, through a new 
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diverse range of models (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009). The following shows some 
advantages of DEA: 
1. DEA can handle large numbers of variables and relations ‘constraints’ 
(Cooper et al., 2007). 
2. Productivity changes can be measured by both parametric and non-
parametric methods. The advantage of DEA as a parametric frontier 
estimation is that it imposes no functional form on technology, nor any 
restrictions on the reward of factors on production. Additionally, the frontier 
nature of DEA allows the capturing of productive inefficiencies (Cullinane, 
2011). 
3. DEA has the advantage of minimal specification error (Cullinane et al., 
2006). Therefore, it often emerges as the preferred technique in container 
terminal performance evaluation (Cullinane, 2011, Jie et al., 2009). 
4. DEA calculations are non-parametric and do not require an explicit prior 
determination of relationship between inputs and outputs (Jose, 2001). 
5. This technique gives a minimal set of constrains on the input and output 
weights (Doyle and Green, 1994). 
6. The characteristics of DEA, such as the ability to analyse simultaneously a 
number of inputs and outputs, and the ability to derive efficiency ratings 
within a set of analysed units, are particularly suitable for measuring port 
efficiency (Jose, 2001). 
7. DEA does not require the development of standards against which efficiency 
is measured (Jose, 2001). 
8. It enables the inclusion of environmental and other qualitative factors that are 
important in assessing performance (Roll and Hayuth, 1993). 
9. It recognises the possibility of different but equally efficient combinations of 
outputs and inputs (in different proportions) (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009). 
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10. It does not require the setting of rigid importance weights for the various 
factors (Roll and Hayuth, 1993, Cooper et al., 2007) . 
11. The DEA approach locates an ‘efficient frontier’ within the group analysed, 
and the salient units comprising it; thus, efficiency is measured relative to the 
highest performance, rather than against some average (Roll and Hayuth, 
1993). 
12. The approach points to specific sub-groups of the efficient units, which are 
appropriate as a reference level for each of the non-efficient units (Cooper et 
al., 2007). 
All of these characteristics make DEA a most suitable tool for measuring port 
efficiency. However, DEA has some limitations. 
3.3.2 Weaknesses and Limitations of Data Envelopment Analysis 
The limitations include: 
1. Attempting to move from partial to total factor productivity measures 
encounters some difficulties, such as selecting the outputs and inputs to be 
considered in a study and the weights to be used for obtaining a single-output 
to single-input ratio (Cooper et al., 2007, Wöber, 2007). 
2. The accuracy of the outcomes of the efficiency analysis depends on the 
accuracy of the data used. 
3. DEA is good at estimating relative efficiencies, but poor at absolute values 
(Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009). 
The above literature review illustrates that DEA is the dominant method for port 
efficiency estimation. Due to its advantage, DEA is an appropriate non-





Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a review of the literature related to port performance. 
Variables influencing port performance, as seen from an operations perspective, 
were identified. Drawing on this foundation, the theoretical framework was 
described, research questions were developed. In this chapter data collection and 
analysis techniques will be described. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and 
discuss the research methodology used in this research. 
This study takes an objective positivist perspective, with a predominately 
quantitative methodology. It is divided into two parts. The first part used a 
quantitative survey to target 200 Libyan stakeholders. The data were collected and 
analysed by two statistical techniques: descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA. 
This second part used secondary data of 25 container port and terminals, and these 
were analysed by the DEA mathematical technique. 
The choice of an appropriate research design depends on the objectives and nature of 
the research to be undertaken (Wu, 2009a). Working within a positivist framework, 
this study examines the logical causal relationships between the relevant independent 
variables derived from the literature and the performance of four Libyan ports. It 
then examines the relationships between the efficiency of seven Libyan ports and the 
independent variables that emerged as the most influential factors on port 
performance (see Figure 4.1). 
The reason for choosing this methodological design is that the positivist paradigm 
suggests that events and things are logical, linked and can be predicted, and that 
much of human behaviour can be usefully understood in this way as well (Dasgupta, 
2011, Wu, 2009b). Generally, empirical or positivist studies attempt to test theory in 
an empirical and logical way, to maximise the predictive understanding of 











Figure 4.1: The Research Process 
of a scientific approach is to establish robust causal laws that allow the anticipation 
and explanation of the phenomena (Trochim, 2006a). To achieve that, a causal 
relationship, where a change in any independent variable leads to a change in 
dependent variables, has to be well defined (Emmerson, 2010a). This study attempts 
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variables derived from the literature. Research design is broadly divided into two 
types: exploratory and conclusive (Martin and Bridgmon, 2012). An exploratory 
research design is used to provide insights into the nature of the phenomena under 
investigation, when little is known about the problem area (Malhotra, 2007). In 
contrast, a conclusive research design, which includes descriptive and causal 
designs, needs detailed input information and is used to test specific hypotheses and 
examine relationships (Malhotra et al., 2006); this approach is adopted for this study. 
The positivist approach emphasises the central importance of empiricism: the idea 
that observation and measurement is the core of scientific investigation (Trochim, 
2006a). Empiricism has been used mainly to denote a general approach to the study 
of reality. This suggests that, ultimately, only knowledge gained through experience 
and the senses is reliable (IAPH, 2012). Therefore, this study provides an empirical 
model to investigate the influence of certain factors on port performance in a very 
logical way. Some realist thinking has found its way into positivism. Realism adopts 
the interpretive stance that there are fundamental differences between the natural and 
the social world. Realism considers there is only one reality, although different 
perceptions of it exist (Caldera-Noriega, 2005). 
In many practical research projects, when causal relationships are assumed to exist, 
the cause, which is an independent variable, and the effect, which is a dependent 
variable, are often well defined through empirical observation. However, the 
relationship between the cause and effect may not be well known (Trochim, 2006a, 
Malhotra, 2007). As would be necessary if operating within a situation that can be 
explained using a positivist theory of knowledge, the phenomena of container port 
performance and efficiency can be shown to exist, are known from experience and 
can be measured. However, for specific research topics, the full causal chain or 
network between independent variables and dependent variables (outcomes) are 
often not known (Malhotra, 2007). 
Based on deductive reasoning, which is consistent with a positivist approach 
(Trochim, 2006b), this chapter is divided into two phases (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Research Methods 




To identify the factors 
that influence the 
performance of Libyan 
ports 
To find out the extent 
of that influence 
 
Incorporate the 
literature of port 
performance to identify 
the performance criteria 
Get the perspective of 
local stakeholders 
regarding these factors 
 
Cost, time, cargo safety, 
accessibility, port reliability, 
service flexibility, online 
services, seaside productivity, 
















        
Phase 2 To establish ranking 
relationship and 
examine the influence 
of the existing port 
infrastructure and 
superstructure on the 
efficiency of Libyan 
ports 
Compare the efficiency 
of Libyan ports against 
the efficiency of Libya’s 
trading partners’ ports 
Inputs: water depth, berth 
length, storage yard area, 
number of cranes, number of 
transport equipment, number 
of staking equipment 
Output: TEU throughput 
Secondary data DEA _ 
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The first phase investigates the factors that undermine container and general cargo 
port performance in Libya, against the background of global trade transport 
connectivity. This was investigated from the perspective of Libyan ports’ local 
stakeholders. Four main Libyan ports were used for this purpose: Tripoli, Benghazi, 
Qasr Ahmed and Khoms. The considered factors in this phase, derived from the 
literature, include cost, time, safety of cargo at port, port accessibility, port 
reliability, service flexibility, online services and seaside and terminal productivity. 
To address this aim, a descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA were conducted. 
The IBM Predictive Analytics Software SPSS was used for this purpose. The second 
phase describes the methodology used to measure the efficiency of seven Libyan 
container ports compared to 18 international container ports and terminals related to 
Libya’s trading partners. To confirm and validate the findings of the first part of the 
analysis, the second phase includes a number of factors that emerged as being most 
influential on port performance from the descriptive and one-way ANOVA analysis. 
All of these factors are associated with port superstructure and infrastructure, and are 
under the control of port operators and the port authority. 
Due to the overwhelming dominance of containerisation and the expected future 
growth in container-handling technology, driven by the anticipated dramatic increase 
in container ship size and capacity (Marineinsight, 2012, Maersk, 2012, Dasgupta, 
2011, Acosta et al., 2007), the second part of this analysis focuses only on container 
ports. For this purpose, DEA is employed, using the software DEA-Solver-Pro 
version 8.0. 
The research seeks to determine the nature of the relationship between causes and 
effects in relation to port performance and efficiency. Therefore, this study can be 
described as positivist, conclusive and causal (Malhotra et al., 2006). 
4.2 Phase 1: Measuring Libyan Port Performance 
The main objective of this phase is to identify the relevant variables that determine 
the performance of Libyan ports and to determine the extent of that influence. To 
address this objective and to increase the research’s validity, the study has employed 
a quantitative method approach. This involved an examination of the literature on 
port performance and efficiency, to identify relevant variables. A quantitative survey 
81 
was then undertaken to determine the causal relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, as seen from the perspective of Libyan port stakeholders. 
Accordingly, a Qualtrics online quantitative survey was developed and emailed to 
eight groups of local Libyan port stakeholders. The snowball technique was used to 
increase the response rate. These eight groups were: the LMA, Libyan port 
operators, local carriers, shipping companies, local freight forwarders, Libyan 
seafarers, port authorities and other parties associated with Libyan ports. 
It was expected that the findings of port performance analysis in this phase would 
have the capacity to be generalised, especially in regard to ports in developing 
economies, as this study investigates port performance broadly, using Libyan ports 
as an example of a developing economy. The following shows in detail who the 
targeted participants were, and provides justifications to prove they were the most 
appropriate participants and the most appropriate sample size. 
4.2.1 The Research Participants 
The first step in survey sampling is identifying the population to be studied, which 
should include all the elements that represent the unit of analysis in the study (Pike, 
2012). Well-selected sampling may reflect fairly accurately the characteristics of the 
population (Krishnaswamy, 2010). For increased reliability of results, adequate and 
accurate data are required. This was obtained by targeting an adequate sample of 
professional experts from the area subject to research; that is, Libyan ports. 
Therefore, this study targeted all Libyan port stakeholders from different managerial 
levels through a quantitative survey. These included port operators, LMPA, the port 
authority, freight forwarders, shipping companies, national carriers, seafarers and 
cargo owners. These participant groups represent the entire population of Libyan 
ports’ local stakeholders. Capturing the professional experience of these stakeholders 
was very important for developing optimal strategies for performance improvement. 
Additionally, the aim of targeting these groups was to obtain their views and 
opinions, to allow the establishment of comprehensive causal relationships. 
The port operator is one of the main stakeholders, and they are focal players in port 
performance. That is because the port operator is the service provider to all port 
users. Therefore, the port operators were included among the participants. The aim 
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of the port operator is to increase port productivity by achieving higher throughput 
with fewer berths and handling machinery, while also serving and attracting more 
users (Imai et al., 2008, Beškovnik, 2008). However, using fewer berths and 
handling machinery increases ship turnaround time, which may conflict with the 
interest of ocean carriers (Beškovnik, 2009). Port performance can be affected if an 
ocean carrier leaves the port because of a long ship turnaround time (Gaur et al., 
2011). Carriers assess the performance of container ports, taking into account a 
number of different measurements. The most important parameters for gauging 
container port performance from the perspective of the carriers are berth 
productivity, ship turnaround time (Beškovnik, 2009), service reliability, water depth 
(Chang et al., 2008) and berth availability (Chang et al., 2008). Based on the above, 
local ocean carriers were included in this study. 
Shipping companies were also considered among the port stakeholders, as they deal 
directly with and represent the carriers at Libyan ports, and they have their own 
perspectives on the performance of Libyan ports. Freight forwarders were also 
involved, due to their interest in the efficiency of cargo flow from and to the ports. 
Seafarer groups were also targeted, as they can assess performance factors properly 
and accurately owing to their visitation of different ports. Specifically, they can 
compare the level of services provided by Libyan ports against other visited ports. 
Additionally, LMA was included among the sample, as it is the official regulatory 
body overseeing the ports’ functionality with a view to increasing national revenue. 
The Ports Authority is also one of the main port stakeholders, as it is the authorised 
body for implementing local laws, regulations and rules. The targeted participants 
were thus an appropriate sample for this study. 
Appannaiah et al. (2010) argued that the theory of sampling provides little assistance 
in achieving good estimations of a sample size. However, two considerations are 
needed when determining the appropriate size of the sample. The first is that the 
sample size should increase as the variation in individual items increases. The 
second is that, the greater the degree of accuracy desired, the larger should be the 
sample size. Due to the small population of stakeholders and the expected low 
survey response rate, the research randomly targeted 200 participants, who 
represented the entire stakeholder population. Included in this population were 
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Libya’s two port operators: MFZ Company and LPC. MFZ Company operates the 
port of Qasr Ahmed in Misurata, and the LPC operates the other commercial ports. 
Further, there are approximately 300 local shipping and freight-forwarding 
companies in Libya (CETMO, 2010, Libyan Maritime Administration, 2013). Most 
of these freight forwarders have their own customs clearance officers, or deal with 
specific customs clearance companies (CETMO, 2010). In addition, there are three 
Libyan ship-owning companies (Libyan Maritime Administration, 2013). This 
shows that the entire population is less than 350 businesses, including both private 
and public sectors. Therefore, the participants and sample size are appropriate for 
research validity and reliable results. 
4.2.2 Definition of Variables and Instrument Development 
The determination and selection of variables are elementary steps in any study (Liu, 
2010b). Regarding port performance, the literature shows that it can be influenced by 
a range of factors (Huybrechts et al., 2002), such as location, general cost, safety of 
operations, quality of service, time, accessibility, reliability, flexibility, availability 
of information and availability of a variety of services (Kao et al., 1995, Coto-Millan 
et al., 2000, Kia et al., 2000, Jose, 2001, Gekara and Chhetri, 2013, Striegler, 2013, 
Carlo et al., 2014). 
According to the positivist paradigm, all causal variables should be considered to 
determine the most logical relationships between cause and effect (Trochim, 2006a). 
However, this is not practical due to the complexity of factors that determine such 
relationships (David Xiaosong Peng et al., 2011). Additionally, it is difficult to 
consider explicitly the entire range of possible influences, due to the complexity of 
factors that determine port performance (David Xiaosong Peng et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, not all of the influential factors and components were considered in 
this study. The excluded factors and components include port location and port dues. 
The reason for this exclusion is that all Libyan ports are located at an approximately 
similar distance from the east-west international trade lane. Moreover, there is no 
difference in port dues payable by any Libyan ports. In total, this study included 25 
variables related to the performance criteria. 
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The performance criteria included shipside productivity, terminal productivity, cargo 
safety, port accessibility, port reliability, service flexibility, cost and time. Terminal 
productivity was measured by the capacity of storage yards, transport equipment and 
stacking equipment. Shipside productivity was measured by the capacity of QCs and 
the efficiency of cargo-handling operations to and from the ship. Cargo safety was 
evaluated by cargo damage and loss. Online services were evaluated by the 
availability of online services, such as online tracking of cargo and ships’ movement, 
online customs services and online transactions. Port accessibility was measured by 
both seaside accessibility and landside accessibility. Seaside accessibility consisted 
of water depth and berth length. Landside accessibility consisted of the connectivity 
of the port to sufficient rail and road networks. Port reliability was evaluated by the 
accuracy of ships’ scheduling, the reliability of cargo-handling facilities used at 
Libyan ports and the reliability of cargo delivery times. Service flexibility was 
evaluated by the ability of the Libyan ports to provide berthing on arrival, and the 
ability to deal with different cargo types, sizes and weights. Cost in this study 
consisted of the fees for cargo handling and customs clearance, as well as the cost of 
land transport. Finally, time was evaluated by the free cargo dwell time at port, the 
total handling time and the ship’s turnaround time. 
The literature showed that the individual effects of the extracted variables included 
in this study were reasonably well known (Clark et al., 2004, Sanchez and et al., 
2003, Asteris et al., 2012, Zhou and Kang, 2008, Kim and Kim, 2002). Further, the 
effect of some of these variables, as a group and in a certain region highlighted by 
the studies, was also known (Yeo et al., 2008, Yuen et al., 2012, Acosta et al., 2007, 
Zhou and Kang, 2008). However, for the first time, this study investigated the effects 
of all of the above-mentioned factors when operating in combination. This was done 
by using the most appropriate method and involving stakeholder experts in the 
process, bringing the benefit of their opinions and beliefs (Phillips and Stawarski, 
2008). 
The variables were used to develop a quantitative questionnaire, consisting of 15 
structured questions. The online Qualtrics questionnaire consisted of 15 main 
questions (see Appendix 1). The first four main questions were demographic 
questions. Another question was included to measure the importance of a number of 
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customer requirements. Another question ranked the four main Libyan ports in terms 
of performance. The last nine main questions included 34 sub-questions related to 
port performance. Two scales were used to obtain respondents’ perceptions. The first 
measured the importance of some performance elements to the local stakeholders, 
based on a scale of seven, where ‘1’ denoted not important at all and ‘7’ denoted 
extremely important. The second scale expressed the level of agreement and 
disagreement of the respondents in regard to some statements used to measure the 
performance of Libyan ports. It was based on a scale of five, where ‘1’ denoted 
absolutely disagree/unlikely and ‘5’ denoted absolutely agree/more likely. 
4.2.3 The Data 
The data used in this study were quantitative data obtained by two methods: the 
quantitative questionnaire and secondary quantitative data related to the sample 
ports. Quantitative data involves measuring and counting, which can be expressed 
and represented numerically (Elizabeth and Lambert, 1990). It can be collected by 
questionnaires, surveys, psychological tests, archival searches and experiments (Al-
Mutawah 2009). From this perspective, some variables included in this study were 
described as numerical variables. Examples include container throughput, water 
depth, quay length, storage area and the amount of handling equipment. The data 
were collected in a quantitative form. Conversely, the type of container-handling 
equipment can be described qualitatively. For example, to differentiate between the 
types of QCs used in a certain container port, QCs can be described as Panamax 
cranes, Post-Panamax cranes or Ultra-Panamax cranes. However, in some cases, 
qualitative data can be converted into quantitative data (Trochim, 2006b). In the case 
of QC types, each type of QC has different specifications that can be expressed 
quantitatively; for example, handling rate, outreach, height and moves per hour. 
Therefore, the data required for this research are quantitative. These data were 
obtained from primary sources for the first phase and secondary sources for the 
second phase. 
Regarding the first phase of this study, the involved organisations were the Libyan 
ports. Primary data were used for this phase, analysed using descriptive and one-way 
ANOVA analysis. Primary data are original in character and are collected by 
research institutions or individuals for the purposes of a specific study or enquiry 
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(Appannaiah et al., 2010). The primary data of this study were collected by the 
researcher to investigate the performance of Libyan ports. These primary data were 
collected directly from the primary sources of local Libyan port stakeholders, using 
an online survey and the snowball technique. 
The data collection method is crucial for the feasibility and accuracy of the survey 
and is influenced by the type of data required (Phillips and Stawarski, 2008). For this 
study, a ‘Qualtrics’ online quantitative survey was used, as it is an inexpensive, rapid 
and appropriate method to capture the attitudes and opinions of experts in this field 
(Hair et al., 2000). The questionnaire consisted of 15 structured questions. Each 
question discussed one issue. The questionnaire was reviewed and pilot tested by 
two academics and two practitioners before it was released on 5 October 2012. 
(Qualtrics is a private research-software company that provides online services for 
data collection and analysis, including market research.) 
Due to the small size of the population, the online survey was distributed to around 
200 stakeholders using the snowball technique. Survey sampling was developed to 
confirm that it included all the elements representing the unit of analysis in the study. 
Therefore, it included participants from port operators, LMPA, the port authority, 
freight forwarders, shipping companies, national carriers, seafarers and cargo 
owners. All of these participants were from different managerial levels. Moreover, 
surveying might save time and effort and achieve more accurate results, as it extracts 
the important data from those who can tacitly assess the variables (Lam and Yap, 
2011). 
The snowball technique uses an initial set of members as informants for building up 
a sample or a list of a special population (Krishnaswamy, 2010). The snowball 
technique was used because it is ideal for data collection. It provides intensive results 
and spreads the questionnaire rapidly, economically, efficiently and effectively 
(Elizabeth and Lambert, 1990), diffusing information among professionals of various 
types (Krishnaswamy, 2010).  
Emails and Facebook were used in the snowballing technique to increase the 
response rate efficiently. Due to the researcher’s professional background, the 
researcher was linked by Facebook with many potential participants in the Libyan 
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maritime industry. Some of those potential participants have their own private 
businesses and others work for the public sector. They also work in shipping, freight 
forwarding, maritime transport, the LMA, the Port Authority and port operators. The 
link to the Qualtrics questionnaire, with an introduction and request to complete the 
questionnaire, was posted on the researcher’s Facebook timeline. It was also emailed 
to many potential participants. Potential participants were asked to forward the 
questionnaire to their colleagues at different managerial levels and to ask those 
colleagues to help in forwarding the link to others. 
The aim behind the strategy of targeting different managerial levels was firstly that 
managers are familiar with Libyan port problems and have good experience in the 
port industry. Therefore, they would not need a detailed explanation about the 
terminology used and the practical issues. Secondly, they are decision makers; they 
have the authority to release any relevant important information. Thirdly, they are 
familiar with the major factors influencing port performance and the relationships 
between them. 
Five weeks after circulating the survey, a second reminder phase was conducted. 
Other emails were sent to relevant potential participants. Telephone calls were made 
to different stakeholders to encourage them to participate and distribute the 
questionnaire to their colleagues, to increase the response rate and minimise non-
response bias. The survey was closed on 11 February 2013. From 200 targeted 
stakeholders, 186 participants responded to the questionnaire, as discussed in detail 
in the next chapter. However, only 84 respondents answered all questions, giving a 
response rate of 45 per cent. However, this was sufficient to run the analysis, as 
explained in Chapter 5. 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
Many statistical techniques are available for use in data analysis. Each technique 
depends on the research subject, research question, the kind of information to be 
discovered and the final outcomes of the research (Wu, 2009a). Additionally, the 
selected statistical techniques depend on the variable types and number, the number 
of groups being compared and the purposes of the comparison (Martin and 
Bridgmon, 2012). Sometimes there may be one most appropriate empirical technique 
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for a specific research question; however, in most cases multiple techniques could be 
used (Malhotra et al., 2006). 
Generally, basic or traditional statistical techniques use a limited number of variables 
(Kline, 2004, Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). According to Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004), some of these techniques deal with two variables and permit the prediction of 
dependent observed variable scores. This sort of technique uses linear regression 
models. Other techniques, such as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), are used to 
test a set of items that form a construct. Some other techniques are used to model 
complex relationships among observed variables; for example, path analysis models 
use regression analysis and correlation coefficients for that purpose. This study used 
three quantitative techniques for data analysis. To measure the performance of 
Libyan ports from the perspective of local stakeholders, the study used descriptive 
analysis and one-way ANOVA, assessed using the IBM SPSS program. It used DEA 
to compare the efficiency of Libyan ports against the container ports of Libya’s 
trading partners. 
Regarding the primary data of the factors determining port performance, only one 
sample of respondents’ views was drawn from the targeted population at one time 
point over a short period. Similarly, the secondary data were statistics related to the 
same year: 2010. Therefore, this study is considered a cross-sectional study (Balushi, 
2010, Liu, 2010b, Malhotra et al., 2006). Moreover, research problems and causal 
variables are well identified and the focus of this study was on the causal quantitative 
relationship. Therefore, this study is considered causal quantitative research 
(Malhotra et al., 2006). 
Descriptive analysis was used to analyse the primary data obtained through the 
questionnaire. It was used to test the frequencies of the primary data, summarise the 
raw data in a meaningful way and allow the researcher to make conclusions beyond 
the data analysed (Lund, 2013). The descriptive analysis was used to rank the 
selected variables of performance criteria, based on their importance to the local 
stakeholders in general, and then their importance to each stakeholder group. The 
descriptive analysis was also used to measure the effect of each independent variable 
on port performance as a dependent variable, according to the perspective of each 
stakeholder group. 
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Due to the different interests of the stakeholder groups, one-way ANOVA was used 
to determine the significant differences between two or more arithmetic means 
(Iversen, 2004, Martin and Bridgmon, 2012). In one-way ANOVA, there is one 
dependent variable that has to be continuously scaled at the level of interval or ratio, 
and one independent variable with two or more levels or conditions (Martin and 
Bridgmon, 2012). Similarly, in this study there was one final dependent variable, 
which is port performance. In contrast, there were a number of independent variables 
related to port superstructure and infrastructure. Their effect on Libyan port 
performance needed to be tested using a numerical scale. The influence of the 
observable independent variables was measured from the perspective of different 
local stakeholder groups and this statistical analysis was used to determine whether 
the arithmetic means of various stockholder groups were different. 
4.2.5 Validity 
Reliability and validity are two essential criteria for assessing the goodness of 
measurements (Balushi, 2010). Reliability refers to the accuracy of a measurement 
(Emmerson, 2010b). It is the degree of consistency among the items measuring a 
variable. A survey’s sample size should be sufficient to represent the population 
(Balushi, 2010). Validity, on the other hand, refers to the capability of a 
measurement to measure what it purports to measure (Emmerson, 2010b, Stawarski 
and Phillips 2008). Validity consists of internal and external validity (Emmerson, 
2010b, Balushi, 2010, Stawarski and Phillips 2008). 
To determine internal validity, whether the cause and effect relationship is indeed 
causal is assessed, based on the manipulations and measures of the variables used in 
a study (Martin and Bridgmon, 2012). The key issue in internal validity is whether 
the indicators that comprise the scale or index are consistent; that is, whether 
respondents’ scores on any indicator tend to be related to their scores on any other 
indicator (IAPH, 2012). Internal validity depends on the research design and its 
ability to show a causal relationship (Emmerson, 2010b) and face validity. 
In terms of research design, this study used validated instruments used by previous 
researchers, as shown in Figure 3.1. The research incorporated the literature of port 
performance and efficiency to construct the related variables and identify the 
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relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Individual 
relationships between port performance and some independent variables have been 
illustrated in the literature. However, this research investigated the relationships 
between container port performance and a group of interacting independent variables 
from the perspective of different groups of stakeholders. Additionally, the 
questionnaire was designed to ensure that it measured the effect of any variable by 
more than one equestion. All of this achieved internal validity. 
Face validity refers not to what the test actually measures, but to what it superficially 
appears to measure. It pertains to whether the test looks valid to the examinees who 
take it. Face validity is determined by a review of the items and not through formal 
procedures or through the use of statistical analyses (Trochim, 2006a). Accordingly, 
to ensure face validity, the survey was moderately sized and had a friendly design, to 
make it more pleasurable to complete, and to motivate respondents to answer all of 
the questions (see Appendix 1). It also used clear, written, formal and simple 
questions that were easy to understand and were designed to have a single meaning 
(Malhotra et al., 2006, Emmerson, 2010b). To confirm this, the questionnaire was 
presented to a group of academics and practitioners, including the researcher’s two 
supervisors and three other carefully selected experts on the port industry, two of 
whom held PhDs related to the port industry. Based on this, the questions can be 
considered clear and understandable. 
External validity refers to the ability of sampling procedures to ensure that the 
research results can be generalised (Emmerson, 2010b), and to ensure reliability and 
construct validity as a positivist causal study. This study surveyed samples from all 
Libyan ports’ local stakeholder groups, to achieve consistency, as well as to remove 
potential bias (Malhotra et al., 2006). Moreover, commercial Libyan ports are 
operated by the same operators and they deal with the same types of goods. 
Additionally, container ports perform almost the same handling operations and deal 
with broadly the same types of cargo and kinds of ships. They also deal with the 
same sort of stakeholders. Moreover, English is mainly used by these organisations 
when they deal with international parties. All of these factors show homogeneity in 
the sample, which ensures the validity of the proposition or the conclusion (Trochim, 
2006a). However, one of the weaknesses is that this study targeted only local 
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stakeholders, and not all the stakeholders of Libyan ports. Foreign stakeholders 
might have different opinions regarding the variables used in this study. Moreover, 
due to the small population of local carriers (only three companies own all Libyan 
flagships) their responses might undermine the study’s validity. In addition, all 
Libyan ports are operated by the public sector. Therefore, public port operators could 
have different opinions from private ones. Despite all of the above disadvantages, the 
findings of this study can still be generalised. 
4.3 Phase 2: Evaluating the Efficiency of Libyan Ports 
A quantitative analysis using DEA analysis was undertaken to measure and compare 
the efficiency of seven Libyan ports (Tripoli, Misurata, Benghazi, Khoms, Derna, 
Tubrouk and Brega) against 18 international container ports and terminals related to 
Libya’s trading partners. The purpose of this comparison was to establish ranking 
relationships and confirm the findings of the descriptive and one-way ANOVA 
analysis. For greater understanding about how the DEA has been applied in many 
studies to evaluate the efficiency of container ports in particular, and to identify the 
different variables that affect port efficiency, the literature of DEA analysis in the 
port industry was reviewed. 
Firstly, efficiency refers to the performance of any organisation compared to the 
benchmark (Liu, 2010a). Technical efficiency is known as the capacity of obtaining 
the maximum amount of output from certain inputs, which is called ‘output 
orientation’. The ability of decision-making units (DMUs) to decrease input used to 
achieve the given levels of output is known as ‘input-orientation’ (Reilly, 2008). The 
DMU in this study is the container port or terminal. 
It is important to gain a better understanding of factors attributed to container port 
efficiency (Yuen, Zhang & Cheung 2012). These factors can be used to evaluate port 
performance and determine the weaknesses that prevent a port from being efficient, 
and help in developing business strategies that contribute to business performance 
(Gonzalez and Trujillo, 2008). 
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4.3.1 Identifying the Variables 
The output and input variables used for container port performance evaluation 
should reflect the process of container port production and the actual objectives as 
accurately as possible (Lin and Tseng, 2007a). Therefore, this section identifies the 
output variables used to measure efficiency. It also identifies the input variables that 
influence the efficiency of container ports, based on the literature. It can be seen 
from the literature of port performance that all port resources contribute to 
productivity. From the definition of productivity, increased productivity means 
increased port throughput using existing port resources as inputs to achieve this 
throughput. In this case, to be efficient, a port has to obtain maximum throughput 
using fewer resources. 
Several factors affect container port efficiency. Such factors are related to port 
infrastructure, superstructure and human resources. In DEA evaluation, these 
influential factors are used as input variables. In contrast, the output variables are 
represented by performance criteria, such as cargo throughput, number of ship calls, 
ships’ turnaround time and other factors related to service quality and customer 
satisfaction. However, cargo throughput is the most common factor for measuring 
port efficiency and the most important indicator for port output, as it is closely 
related to cargo-handling facilities and services. 
The literature review has also shown that the efficiency of container ports and 
terminals has been evaluated using a range of sets of inputs and outputs. However, 
the literature does not include any study investigating Libyan ports. Moreover, 
variables that have influence in one region do not necessarily have the same 
influence in another region. Therefore, this study used a set of input variables to 
evaluate the efficiency of Libyan container ports against 18 container ports and 
terminals related to Libya’s trading partners, as explained in detail in the following 
sections. This set of input variables has not been used in the previous literature. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the knowledge and the literature by providing an 
empirical model for evaluating container port efficiency using different sets of 
variables. This includes infrastructure variables, such as water depth to ensure safe 
passage for the container ships, berth length for safe docking and storage yard area to 
absorb the volume of container carried by these ships. The superstructure variables 
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include those related to the amount of container-handling equipment; that is, QCs, 
transport equipment and stacking equipment. 
4.3.1.1 Output Variables 
Container port productivity as an output can be measured by different criteria, such 
as revenue, throughput per time unit, QC throughput, yard throughput, human 
resource performance, dwell time, equipment idle time, number of ship calls and 
berth utilisation (Trevor, 2006, Ghashat et al., 2011, Sean D, 1997, Beškovnik, 2008, 
Ilmer, 2008, Imai et al., 2008, Carpenter and Macgill, 2001, Le-Griffin and Murphy, 
2006, Coto-Millan et al., 2000, CSIL, 2012, Fried et al., 1993). However, container 
throughput, ship calls and ship turnaround times are considered the primary 
benchmark measures for comparing container port efficiency (Ashar, 1990, 
Beškovnik, 2008, Beškovnik, 2009, Chang et al., 2008, Duinkerken et al., 2006, 
Jose, 2001, Le-Griffin, 2008, Roll and Hayuth, 1993, Yuen et al., 2012, Zegordi and 
Nahavandi, 2002). The author had trouble in collecting data related to all of these 
primary benchmark measures, except container throughput. Therefore, only the 
container throughput variable is considered as an output variable for this research 
project to measure the efficiency of Libyan ports. 
4.3.1.2 Input Variables 
Port facilities require a variety of basic functions, traditionally considered under two 
broad categories: port infrastructure and port superstructure (Liu, 2010a). These 
facilities are considered input variables for the DEA analysis in this study. These 
input variables, which are derived from the descriptive and one-way ANOVA 
analysis, are expected to be closely associated with the recent growth in container 
ships’ size and capacity. 
The historical evolution of container ships demonstrates a dramatic increase in the 
dimensions of container ships, to increase the volume of containers being transported 
(Marineinsight, 2012, Maersk, 2012). This increase includes ship’s length overall 
(LOA), width, freeboard and draft. However, most of the container ports, including 
Libyan ports, were built decades ago to serve the previous generation of container 
ships, which had smaller dimensions. The evidence for this is that the current crop of 
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ultra-large container vessels are only able to dock at a handful of the world’s ports 
(Kremer, 2013). 
Given these increases, container ports need to accommodate ultra-large container 
vessels and increase productivity if they are to create or retain a competitive 
advantage. This could be done through having specific port infrastructure that suits 
the new generation of container ships. The essential port infrastructure includes 
water depth greater than the drafts of these ships to ensure safety of navigation and 
enable such ships to enter the port and moor. It also includes long berths to suit the 
overall length of the inbound container ships to provide safe docking. It also needs to 
include an optimal storage yard area that is able to absorb the volume of containers 
off-loaded from such ships. Basically, the carriers are saying to the ports: 
If you do not expand, if you do not build new wharves and deepen the 
harbours and get high speed cranes, we’ll take our business someplace else 
(Kremer, 2013). 
Therefore, port infrastructure, as represented by water depth, length of berths and 
storage yard area, is considered one of the most important input variables in this 
study. 
Similarly, sufficient and efficient port superstructure is critical to facilitate this new 
generation of ships. Port superstructure includes all the equipment used for container 
transfer and transport within the port. These include QCs, SCs, AGVs, trucks, 
forklifts, trailers, reach stackers and yard cranes. 
Each container port uses different types of these equipment categories, depending on 
many factors, such as container flow, storage yard dimensions and investment cost. 
For instance, within seaside operations and during the 1960s, container ships were 
loaded and discharged via normal shore cranes and wire slings. However, 
simultaneous with the changes in container ships, container ports changed to deploy 
more advanced and sophisticated handling equipment. On the seaside, when 
Panamax container ships entered into service, container ports deployed Panamax 
QCs. This type of crane, with 27 metres height and around 36 metres outreach (to 
reach about 14 rows), was appropriate to deal with Panamax container ships at that 
time. Once the dimensions of the container ships increased and post-Panamax 
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container ships were introduced, the QCs were upgraded again from Panamax QC to 
post-Panamax, with about 35 metres height and about 42.5 metres outreach (to cover 
16 to 22 rows). Similarly, once the super post-Panamax container ships with bigger 
dimensions entered into service, super post-Panamax cranes were deployed to meet 
this increase in container ship size and capacity. The height of this kind of crane 
reached to around 42 metres with an outreach from 50.5 to 65.5 metres (to cover 18 
to 24 container rows). In addition, these types of cranes have faster move rates to 
meet the increase in container volume carried by the new generation of container 
ships. The evolution of cranes was necessitated by the higher volume of containers 
and the increased size of container ships. 
All of these changes determined how ports and terminals derived competitive 
advantage and kept pace with the changes in container ships. However, not all of the 
container ports use the same advanced QCs. Each container port uses different QCs 
with different move rates, height and outreach. Due to these differences in 
specifications, the throughput of these ports, and thus their performance, is different.  
Between seaside and landside, containers are transported to storage yards and vice 
versa by horizontal transport vehicles, such as SCs, trucks, AGVs, trailers and 
tractors. Each container port uses different transport equipment, determined by 
factors such as the area of the port or terminal, the volume of containers being 
processed and capital investment (Lau and Zhao, 2008, Ioannou et al., 2000a). 
Once a container has been transported to the storage yard, it has to be stacked in a 
specific spot. That can be done by forklift, reach stacker, RMG, RTG or SC. The 
choice of equipment depends on the stacking mode, the area of storage yard and the 
volume of containers at that port, as well as the investment (Kim and Kim, 2002, 
Lau and Zhao, 2008). Adopting a different container port superstructure leads to 
differentiation of performance among container ports. Therefore, the number of 
container-handling equipment is considered an input variable. 
4.3.2 Secondary Data Collection for Measuring Port Efficiency 
For the second phase of this study, secondary data were used to assess the efficiency 
of Libyan ports. The secondary data were collected and compiled for another 
purpose by other researchers (Krishnaswamy, 2010). Secondary data are used 
96 
because they are highly economical and time saving (Appannaiah et al., 2010), and 
cover a wider geographical area and longer reference period without much cost 
(Krishnaswamy, 2010). Yin (1994) argued that using evidence from multiple sources 
(triangulation) and establishing a chain of evidence could increase construct validity. 
Therefore, to increase validity, the research used a secondary data analysis to 
measure the effect of certain influential factors on the efficiency of Libyan container 
ports, in comparison to the container ports of Libya’s trading partners. The data were 
related to a number of variables that emerged as being most influential from the 
primary analysis. The secondary statistical data included data related to 25 
international container ports and terminals, including Libyan ports. The primary 
analysis of the first phase of this study broadly investigated port performance. 
However, the DEA analysis of this study focused specifically on container ports and 
did not include any other type of port. This makes the findings of this study 
generalisable. 
The secondary data were retrieved from reports and statistics issued by accredited 
bodies such as the International Association of Ports and Harbours and maritime 
authorities, UNCTAD, and the websites and annual reports of the sample container 
ports and terminals. These data consisted of port water draft, berth length, storage 
yard area, and the number and type of QCs, transport equipment and stacking 
equipment; these were used as input variables. Data on port throughput in TEUs 
were also collected, and this was used as an output variable in this study. 
The 25 container ports and terminals included in this sample were: Shanghai Pudong 
International Container Terminals, Shanghai Mingdong Container Terminals, La-
Pezia, Gioia Tauro, Jebel Ali, Alexandria port, HHLA Container Terminal 
Altenwerder, Izmir, Mersin, Tripoli, Benghazi, Berga, Tobruk, Derna, Qasr Ahmed, 
Khoms, Antwerp gateway terminal, Marsaxlokk Terminals, Tanger Med port APM 
terminals, Terminal TCB SL in Barcelona, Terminal Catalunya SA in Barcelona, 
Pirraeus container terminal, Amsterdam container terminals, Patrick East Swanson 
Dock Melbourne and Brisbane Autostrad Terminal.  
These ports and terminals have been chosen because they are belonging to Libya’s 
trading partners. Therefore, they handle the same cargo type and volume that are 
handled by Libyan ports. These ports and terminals are belonging to different 
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developed and developing countries and located in different regions. In addition, all 
of them use different cargo handling cargo equipment and have different features of 
infrastructure. They are also owned and operated under different systems of 
governing. All of these differences provide a comprehensive measurement 
environment for identifying the factors that make a certain port or terminal most 
efficient, which can be used to identify the inefficiency factors or weaknesses of 
Libyan ports. However, This study will not investigate the relationship between port 
efficiency and the type of port ownership and management, because it is already 
investigated by  Cullinane et al. (2005) and Ghashat et al. (2011).. 
To increase the sample size, officials in some other ports and terminals were 
contacted individually and asked to provide some missing data. However, some of 
those officials could not disclose any further data and others did not reply at all. 
Therefore, they were excluded from the sample. These ports and terminals include 
Amsterdam container terminals, Piraeus container terminal, Trinity terminal in Port 
of Felixstowe, Antwerp Gateway terminal, Mersin container port in Turkey, 
Eurogate container terminal, Singapore port, Alexandria and Al-Dekhila in Egypt.  
4.3.3 Data Analysis for Port Efficiency 
In the first phase, descriptive and one-way ANOVA were used to analyse the data 
obtained from the local stakeholders of Libyan ports. Some of these variables 
emerged as the most influential variables on port performance. Further quantitative 
mathematical analysis was conducted to assess and compare the efficiency of seven 
Libyan ports against 18 container ports and terminals related to Libya’s trading 
partner countries, using secondary data related to the variables that emerged as 
influential on port performance. DEA was used for this purpose. DEA was chosen as 
it is an appropriate non-parametric method for measuring the efficiency of a DMU 
(Jose, 2001, Jie et al., 2009, Cullinane et al., 2005, Cullinane et al., 2006). DEA has 
been widely applied in many industries, including the wider transport sector 
(Cullinane et al., 2006). It is the dominant estimation method, because it does not 
impose any functional forms on technology, or any restrictive assumptions on the 
reward of production factors (Cullinane, 2011). It measures the efficiency of a DMU 
with multiple inputs and/or outputs by constructing a single virtual input and a single 
virtual output, without predefining a production function (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 
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2009). It is also a technique that imposes minimal constraints on the input and output 
weights (Doyle and Green, 1994). 
From the results of the DEA analysis, the study established relationships regarding 
ranking differentiation between Libyan and trading partner ports and terminals in 
terms of efficiency. These relationships determine the efficiency level of Libyan 
ports against the other container ports. They also determine the reason for Libyan 
port underperformance, as explained in detail in Chapter 6. Further, regarding 
measuring the efficiency of Libyan container ports against its trading partners’ 
container ports, the findings of this analysis can be generalised, as this study 
particularly investigated the efficiency of container ports and did not include any 
other types of ports. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has explained the research methodology used in this study. It was 
divided into two parts. The first part illustrated the methodology of measuring the 
performance of Libyan ports from the perspective of local stakeholders. The second 
part illustrated the methodology of evaluating the efficiency of Libyan container 
ports against 18 container ports and terminals related to Libya’s trading partners. In 
the first part, the participants were identified. They included participants from the 
port authority, port operators, shipping companies, freight forwarders, LMPA, 
carriers, seafarers and cargo owners. The relevant variables were well defended, 
based on a critical review of the port performance literature. Accordingly, the types 
of data were illustrated and the instrument was developed. For collecting the primary 
data, an online questionnaire was adopted using the snowball technique to increase 
the efficiency of the response rate. This chapter also illustrated the methods of data 
analysis, which included descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA. A justification 
for using these two methods was provided. Finally, external and internal validity was 
discussed in detail. This methodology will be implemented in Chapter 5 to measure 
the performance of Libyan ports. 
In the second part, the variables used to evaluate the efficiency of Libyan ports were 
well defined. They were divided into one output and six inputs. The output variable 
was port TEU throughput. The input variables used were closely associated with the 
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escalating increase in container ship size and capacity. Secondary data were used for 
the second phase of analysis. This phase also showed that DEA was the adopted 
technique for data analysis, as discussed in Chapter 6.   
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Chapter 5: Descriptive Analysis and One-Way ANOVA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the analysis and findings of the survey questionnaire returned by 
the respondents, which was used to understand performance issues in relation to 
Libyan ports. It provides numerical results obtained by analysing the questionnaire 
responses. The descriptive analysis was conducted to investigate the frequencies of 
respondents’ perceptions obtained from this questionnaire, to obtain meaningful 
conclusions regarding Libyan ports’ performance. 
Port performance is an important issue for all port stakeholders. The literature 
revealed that port performance could be measured by port productivity, efficiency 
and customer service quality. Recently, pressure has increased on transport 
operations due to logistics practices to minimise costs while enhancing service 
quality (Madeira Junior et al., 2012). This can be achieved by improving port 
performance and enhancing efficiency (Clark et al., 2004). However, due to the 
limitations of port capacities, the performance of Libyan ports seems to be poor. 
Therefore, this chapter quantitatively examines the performance of Libyan ports and 
attempts to understand—from the perspective of Libyan ports’ local stakeholders—
the main issues that have undermined the performance of Libyan ports. This is done 
by analysing the data obtained through survey questionnaires using SPSS software. 
The chapter includes discussions about the survey response rate, the non-response 
bias, and descriptive statistics of issues related to port performance from the 
perspective of Libyan ports’ local stakeholders. It also discusses the analysis of one-
way ANOVA used to examine whether there are any significant differences in the 
perceptions of stakeholders regarding these issues. 
5.2 Instrument Development 
The questionnaire was designed based on a critical review of the literature of port 
performance. Port performance is influenced by shipside and terminal  productivity, 
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cargo safety, port accessibility, port reliability, service flexibility, cost and time. 
However, the influence of each of these factors is a combination of a number of 
related variables. Therefore, the online questionnaire consisted of 15 main questions 
(see Appendix 1) that attempt to cover the influence of all these variables 
individually. 
The first four main questions were considered demographic questions. To ensure that 
the right stakeholder groups and respondents were involved, the first question asked 
about the type of organisation in which the respondent was employed. This is 
because each stakeholder group has different interests, based on the nature of its 
business. To ensure that the respondents were familiar with Libyan ports and had 
good experience in the port industry, were familiar with the major factors 
influencing port performance, and had the authority to release any relevant important 
information, the second question identified the respondent’s position in the 
organisation. The third question identified the period for which this position had 
been held. Due to the differences in interests between the public and the private 
sectors, the fourth question asked about whether the respondent worked for the 
public or private sector. 
Each group of port stakeholders measured port performance based on the type and 
quality of service required by this group. Therefore, the importance of these services 
was evaluated using a scale of seven, where ‘1’ denoted not important at all and ‘7’ 
denoted extremely important. Measuring the importance of these requirements 
determined the factors to be included in the further questions. This was also used to 
rank the four main Libyan ports, based on their performance in meeting these 
requirements. The requirements include: 
1. seaside accessibility 
2. berth availability 
3. cargo loading and off-loading to and from the ship 
4. ships’ scheduling 
5. ships’ turnaround time 
6. cargo-handling facilities 
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7. total cargo-handling time 
8. port efficiency 
9. free cargo dwell time 
10. online services 
11. the competency of port labourers 
12. cargo damage 
13. cargo loss 
14. level of services for fresh water, bunkering and provisions 
15. cargo-handling fees 
16. customs clearance fees 
17. customs clearance processes 
18. landside accessibility (gate, road and rail transport) 
19. inland transport cost 
20. cargo delivery time. 
The questionnaire was also developed to examine in detail the three key operational 
phases of terminal work. These include seaside operations, terminal  operations and 
landside operations. For instance, seaside operations start from seaside accessibility, 
which includes sufficient water depth and suitable berth length (Acosta et al., 2007, 
Lin and Tseng, 2007a). Port accessibility is important to commence cargo-handling 
operations. Therefore, it is required by the stakeholders, especially by carriers, port 
operators and port authorities. Accordingly, the questionnaire included a number of 
questions used to evaluate the ability of Libyan ports to accommodate the inbound 
ships and to meet the demand of larger ships. It also examined the ability of these 
ports to provide berthing on arrival for the inbound ships. This was in the form of 
‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ on statements using a scale of five, where ‘1’ denoted 
absolutely disagree and ‘5’ denoted absolutely agree. Examples of these statements 
are: 
1. port’s water depth meets the demand of larger ships 
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2. berth length is suitable to accommodate larger ships 
3. availability of berthing on arrival for the inbound ships. 
The sea-accessibility-related questions were seen as important because a larger 
shipment carried by one larger ship reduces transport costs and increases port 
throughput and revenue. 
Terminal operations link the operations of shipside and yard operations. To have an 
overall assessment on cargo-handling equipment used in the four main Libyan ports, 
a general question was developed in the form of ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ on statements, 
using a scale of five to test the statement of: ‘Libyan ports use sufficient and 
effective cargo-handling equipment’. In this scale, ‘1’ denoted absolutely disagree 
and ‘5’ denoted absolutely agree. To confirm the stakeholders’ perspective and 
determine what type of handling equipment was insufficient and inefficient, the 
questionnaire examined the existing handling equipment in both shipside and 
landside in detail. 
The performance of shipside operations is measured by the capacity of QCs and the 
efficiency of cargo-handling operations to and from the ship. To measure the 
performance of shipside, the questionnaire developed three questions in the form of 
‘agree’ or ‘disagree’, with these statements using a scale of five, where ‘1’ denoted 
absolutely disagree and ‘5’ denoted absolutely agree. The statements are: 
1. the available seaside cranes are sufficient to provide good quality service to 
the inbound ships in general 
2. the quantity and quality of used cranes are optimal to deal with the inbound 
container ships 
3. the quantity and quality of used cranes are optimal to deal with the potential 
demand for containerisation. 
Port reliability and service flexibility at these ports have been considered among the 
port performance criteria. In terms of shipside operations, these two criteria depend 
on the performance of QCs. Therefore, the following statements were developed to 
test the potential effect of the existing cargo-handling equipment, particularly QCs 
using the same scale: 
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1. the port can provide some special handling services, such as handling heavy 
weight containers and different container sizes 
2. the available cranes lead to reasonable ship turnaround times 
3. ships’ schedules in port are accurate. 
To measure the performance of sea-land operations, the questionnaire developed 
questions related to transport equipment, stacking equipment and storage yard area. 
A scale of five was again used for this part, where ‘0’ meant absolutely disagree and 
‘5’ meant absolutely agree. The questionnaire provided a general approach to 
examine the effect of the existing transport and stacking equipment on port 
performance, and to see whether the stakeholders agreed or disagreed with the 
statement. The general statement is: ‘The quality and quantity of used transport and 
transfer equipment in the port are sufficient and efficient for good port performance’. 
Two statements were then developed to examine the status of each type, to measure 
their capacity to deal with the current cargo volume and the potential demand for 
containerisation in Libyan ports. 
In terms of transport equipment, the following two statements were used: 
1. the quality and quantity of the transport vehicles used is sufficient to deal 
efficiently with the current volume of cargo handled by Libyan ports 
2. the quality and quantity of used transport vehicles can meet the potential 
demand for containerisation in Libyan ports. 
Similarly, the following two statements were used to examine the stacking 
equipment: 
1. the used stacking equipment provides an efficient cargo stacking and 
retrieving service 
2. the used stacking equipment (reach stacker, forklift, SCs, gantry crane) can 
meet the potential demand for containerisation in Libyan ports. 
Storage capacity at port is crucial to absorb the volume of cargo handled by that port. 
It also affects the free dwell time at port. Therefore, the capacity of Libyan ports’ 
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storage yards was examined by the following statements, using the same scale of 
five: 
1. the space of storage yards is enough for the volume of cargo/containers that 
is dedicated to the local market 
2. the space of storage yards is able to absorb the cargo/container volume 
dedicated to international transhipment and local market. 
Port performance is also influenced by other factors, such as land accessibility 
(Gekara and Fairbrother, 2013). Land accessibility starts from the port gate and 
includes rail and road networks (Parola and Sciomachen, 2005, Transystems, 2011). 
Proper road and rail networks enhance cargo flow between a port and its hinterland, 
and therefore port performance. To examine the effect of the existing rail and road 
networks on port performance, the study used the following statements to gain the 
perspective of Libyan ports’ stakeholders accordingly. The questionnaire used a 
scale of five for this purpose, where ‘0’ meant absolutely disagree and ‘5’ meant 
absolutely agree: 
1. the number of lanes of port gates undermine the cargo flow to and from the 
port 
2. the existing road networks are suitable for hinterland transport if the demand 
for Libyan ports increases 
3. integrated rail networks are needed to reduce transport costs, increase cargo 
flow and increase port performance. 
Cargo flow is also influenced by other factors, such as cargo clearance processes, 
port working hours and the optimal use of these working hours. It is also influenced 
by implementing ICT to facilitate the cargo flow process. A scale of five, where ‘0’ 
meant absolutely disagree and ‘5’ meant absolutely agree, was used to examine these 
aspects from the perspective of local stakeholders: 
1. cargo clearance processes are efficient 
2. customs services are complicated and corrupt 
3. port working hours are sufficient 
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4. the actual working time is efficiently used, without any idle time. 
All of these factors affect cargo delivery time, which is one of the most important 
factors used to measure port performance from a customer perspective. Therefore, 
the questionnaire included a statement to examine the influence of the above factors 
on cargo delivery time, using the same scale of five, where ‘0’ meant absolutely 
disagree and ‘5’ meant absolutely agree: 
1. cargo delivery time is reasonable. 
The lack of new ICT stifles port operations (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013). Therefore, 
four questions about online services were developed and included in the 
questionnaire, to evaluate whether such types of online services provided by Libyan 
ports met customer demand. This was done after measuring the importance of online 
services to the stakeholders. A scale of five was used, where ‘0’ meant absolutely 
does not meet the demand and ‘5’ meant absolutely meets the demand. The 
statements are: 
1. online customs services 
2. online information accessibility for port users for cargo tracking 
3. online information accessibility for port users to track ships’ movements 
4. online transactions. 
Due to the high value of commodities handled by ports, cargo safety is another factor 
used to measure port performance. In this study, cargo safety consisted of cargo 
damage and cargo loss. Cargo safety is influenced by the level of safety awareness 
among port personnel. Cargo damage and cargo loss may occur at any port, but the 
concern is how likely it is to occur, and how complicated the settlement process of 
an accident claim is. Therefore, the complexity of accident claim settlements was 
included in the questionnaire. The questionnaire also included two statements to 
measure the likelihood of cargo loss and cargo damage. A scale of five was used for 
this purpose, where ‘0’ denoted less likely and ‘5’ denoted more likely: 
1. frequency of cargo loss 
2. frequency of cargo damage. 
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By including these questions, the questionnaire was designed to cover all port 
performance factors included in the empirical model. Thus, the questionnaire will 
answer the research questions of this study. 
5.3 Data Collection 
The primary data were collected from the local stakeholders of Libyan ports via an 
online questionnaire. The questionnaire was emailed to eight groups of stakeholders 
using the snowball technique. All the targeted stakeholders were Libyans, and 
included individuals from LMA, seafarers, freight forwarders, shippers, local ship 
owners, port operators, port authorities and other groups. The other group included 
people from the offshore oil industry, consultancy and training groups, marine 
construction and marine survey companies. The respondents of this group shared the 
same maritime background and they were working for maritime transport 
companies. 
The entirety of the local Libyan port stakeholder groups is relatively small. It 
consists of two port operators, about 300 local shipping and freight-forwarding 
companies, three ship owners, seafarers, four port authorities, one LMPA, cargo 
owners and shippers. Due to the small population of Libyan port stakeholders, the 
targeted sample was 200 participants from different managerial levels. As the 
researcher came from the Libyan maritime industry, the researcher sent the 
questionnaire link to stakeholders whose contact details he could access. 
Additionally, some contact details were derived from the official websites of the 
stakeholders’ organisations. The questionnaire link was also posted on the 
researcher’s Facebook timeline, to increase the response rate. An introduction and 
request to complete the questionnaire were attached to the questionnaire. The 
introduction also asked the participants to forward the link to other stakeholders that 
they dealt with, to increase the response rate. 
The first response was obtained on 6 October 2012, and the last response was 
obtained on 11 February 2013. In December 2012, the response rate slowed. 
Approaches such as developing a short questionnaire, persuasive communication to 
encourage participants and multiple rounds of follow-up contact were used as 
methods to increase the response rate (Pike, 2012). Therefore, apart from developing 
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a short questionnaire, five weeks after the initial emails, a second reminder phase 
was conducted. Other emails were sent to the relevant participants, and telephone 
calls were made to different stakeholders to encourage them to participate and to 
distribute the questionnaire to their colleagues, to increase the response rate and 
minimise non-response bias. 
From about 200 targeted participants, 186 responses were obtained within four-and-
a-half months. However, after cleaning the data, it was found that only 84 responses 
were valid and could be used in the analysis. This represented 45 per cent of the total 
respondents. The other 102 respondents answered only the first four demographic 
questions. Two respondents answered most of the questions, but not the entire 
questionnaire. These respondents represented 2.4 per cent of the total respondents. 
Fifty-six respondents were from the public sector, which represented 68.3 per cent. 
The remaining 26 respondents were from the private sector, which represented 31.7 
per cent (see Table 5.1). The relatively high response rate from the public sector was 
due to all Libyan ports being owned and operated by the public sector. It is also due 
to targeting participants from the LMA, port authorities, public carriers, shipping and 
freight-forwarding companies, which are all from the public sector. 
Table 5.1: Classifying the Respondents by Sector 
 Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage 
Valid 
Private sector 26 31.0 31.7 
Public sector 56 66.7 68.3 
Total 82 97.6 100.0 
Missing System 2 2.4  
Total 84 100.0  
 
In terms of groups, the highest response rate was recorded by the seafarer group, 
which reached 17.1 per cent of the total respondents, followed by LMA with 14.6 
per cent, and then the carrier group with 13.4 per cent. Other groups represented 12.2 
per cent. Additionally, port operators, shipping companies and freight forwarder 
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groups had the same response rate of 11 per cent. The lowest response rate was 9.8 
per cent, which was recorded by the port authority (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Classifying the Respondents by Stakeholder Group 
 Frequency Percentage Valid 
percentage 
Valid LMA 12 14.3 14.6 
Port authority 8 9.5 9.8 
Port operator 9 10.7 11.0 
Shipping company 9 10.7 11.0 
Freight forwarder 9 10.7 11.0 
Carrier 11 13.1 13.4 
Sea farer 14 16.7 17.1 
Other 10 11.9 12.2 
Total 82 97.6 100.0 
Missing System 2 2.4  
Total 84 100.0  
 
The majority of respondents were from the management level (see Table 5.3). These 
included 17 department managers and nine chief executive 
officers/directors/chairpersons, representing 30.9 per cent in total. Nine respondents 
worked as superintendents, representing 10.7 per cent. Six coordinators responded to 
the questionnaire, which represented 7.1 per cent. Additionally, 10 supervisor 
respondents completed the questionnaire, which represented 10 per cent of the total 
respondents. The total seafarers who responded to the questionnaire were 12, which 
represented 17 per cent of the total respondents. The other group that completed the 
questionnaire included 15 respondents from different industries associated with port 
activities. This consisted of marine pilots, a harbour master, a stevedoring 
foreperson, respondents from the oil industry, respondents from offshore oil 
installations, a mooring master, retired captains, marine surveyors and employees of 
consultancy and training organisations. 
Surveying different port stakeholders from different managerial levels and obtaining 
different perspectives is important to obtain a heuristic view. In addition, involving 
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other groups working in different areas and having good experience in maritime 
transport and the port industry provides essential information to this study. This is 
due to their ability to measure the impact of Libyan port performance on their 
organisations. Further, Libyan seafarers are a good information resource, because 
they can compare the performance of Libyan ports against the other international 
ports they visit. 
Table 5.3: Classifying the Respondents by Position 
 Frequency Percentage Valid 
percentage 
Valid Head/CEO/director/chairman 9 10.7 10.8 
Department manager 17 20.2 20.5 
Superintendent 9 10.7 10.8 
Coordinator 6 7.1 7.2 
Supervisor 10 11.9 12.0 
Pilot 3 3.6 3.6 
Seafarer 12 14.3 14.5 
Harbour master 1 1.2 1.2 
Stevedoring foreman 1 1.2 1.2 
Other 15 17.9 18.1 
Total 83 98.8 100.0 
Missing System 1 1.2  
Total 84 100.0  
 
Work experience is another important factor that increases the reliability of the 
collected data and therefore the results. The statistics showed that the majority of the 
respondents had experience of 15 years or more. This group represented 44.2 per 
cent of the total respondents; a further 19.5 per cent of the respondents had 
experience of between 10 to 15 years. This also increased the reliability of the data. 
Five to 10 years’ experience was held by 10.4 per cent of the respondents, so they 
can also provide useful responses about Libyan ports’ performance; 16.9 per cent 
had experience of between one to five years, whereas the lowest percentage was 9.1 
per cent, representing the respondents with experience of less than one year in their 
current positions. 
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Table 5.3 shows that the primary data were collected from a wide range of local 
stakeholder groups representing the entire targeted population. This provided the 
most comprehensive perspective, which increased the validity of the findings. 
5.4 Non-Response Bias 
Non-response errors occur when some prospective respondents are not included in 
the final sample (Kolb, 2008). The problem posed by survey non-responses is that 
the individuals who do not respond to a survey may differ from respondents in 
important ways on survey variables (Pike, 2012). Generally, there are many reasons 
that some respondents do not participate in the survey, such as a lack of interest in 
the topic under study, the respondents’ company policies of non-participation in 
external surveys, and the respondents being too busy (Tivesten et al., 2012). 
The late respondents who responded after a considerable time and researcher effort 
are expected to be the most similar to non-respondents on the measures of interest 
(Maclennan et al., 2012). Therefore, a non-response bias can be analysed by 
comparing early and late responses (van der Vorst, 2000). Moreover, non-response 
bias tests examine whether there is any difference between those who choose to 
respond to the research, and those who choose not to respond (Wrenn et al., 2001). 
The samples were drawn from Libyan port stakeholders. In total, 186 participated 
and responded within nearly four-and-a-half months. However, of these, only 82 
were valid responses, which represented 45 per cent of the total responses. To test 
the non-response bias, the responses were divided into two groups to determine 
whether there was any difference between the means of the early wave and the late 
wave of responses. The earlier responses are those obtained within the first five 
weeks before the second reminder was sent. The rest of the responses are considered 
late responses. 
Non-response bias was evaluated using ex-post-statistical techniques (Maclennan et 
al., 2012). T-tests were performed to test for significant differences between the 
means of early and later responses, at the significance level of 0.05 (Martin and 
Bridgmon, 2012). Survey non-response can produce biased estimators when 
respondents and non-respondents differ significantly on survey variables (Pike, 
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2012). Therefore, random variables—such as the type of stakeholder group, water 
depth and the efficiency of transport vehicles at the four Libyan ports—were chosen 
for this purpose. The results suggest that non-response bias does not appear to be a 
problem when the means of the early and late responses are compared at the 
significance level of 0.05. For instance, there is no significant difference among the 
means of early responses (t = 1.335; p = 0.186) and late responses (t = 1.365; p = 
0.178) regarding the variable of water depth in Tripoli port. Moreover, there is no 
significant difference between the early responses (t = -1.187; p = 0.239) and late 
responses (t = -1.205; p = 0.234) regarding the variable of water depth in Qasr 
Ahmed port. Further, the non-response bias test shows no significant difference 
between the means of early responses (t = -0.909; p = .0362) and late responses (t = -
0.888; p = 0.379) in terms of the efficiency of transport equipment used at Benghazi 
port. Regarding the efficiency of transport equipment used at Khoms port, the test 
also shows no significant difference between the means of early responses (t = -
0.594; p = 0.554) and late responses (t = -0.566; p = 0.574). 
The above tests illustrate there is no mean difference across respondents with respect 
to early or late response. This increases the validity of the study findings. 
5.5 Performance Criteria 
Every port works to achieve the goal of performing more efficiently at lower costs, 
and maintaining competitiveness by providing customers with a high quality of 
service (Ioannou et al., 2000b). This can be achieved by enhancing the performance 
of seaside operations, terminal operations and land operations. 
Productivity is defined in different ways, based on the industry, as shown in Chapter 
3.1. Generally, it is a ratio of output to input (Al-Darrab, 2000). Increased 
productivity implies either fewer inputs are needed to produce more output, or more 
output is produced by the same amount of input in a certain period (Chinda, 2010b). 
In addition, improving productivity is a key issue for survival and success in the long 
term (Chinda, 2010a). 
Container-handling productivity is directly related to the transfer functions of a 
container terminal, including the number and movement rate of quayside container 
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cranes, the use of yard equipment and the productivity of workers employed in 
waterside, landside and gate operations (Le-Griffin and Murphy, 2006). 
Accordingly, cargo volume and container TEU throughput is commonly used as the 
key performance indicator of ports (Feng et al., 2013). Port throughput is determined 
by a number of elements. These include the total working hours and the efficiency of 
seaside operations, terminal operations and landside operations. It is also influenced 
by the extent to which advanced ICT is used to integrate and manage operations, and 
ultimately enhance operations visibility (Gekara and Fairbrother, 2013). Therefore, 
the following examines the performance criteria of these three areas from the local 
stakeholders’ perspectives. Prior to that, the total working time and its use were also 
examined from the local stakeholders’ perspectives. At the end, some other factors 
related to cargo safety and online services were investigated. 
5.5.1 The Total Working Hours 
Many ports in the region work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. However, the total 
working time at all Libyan ports is fixed and set by the LMA from 8am to 5pm. This 
time is insufficient to provide the required services to customers. This was illustrated 
by the perception of the local stakeholders when they were asked to express their 
agreement or disagreement with the statement that the port total working hours are 
sufficient to provide the required services (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Total Means of the Respodents Regarding the Working Hours at 
Libyan Ports 
Port’s name No. Missing Total mean 
Tripoli 69 15 1.94 
Benghazi 69 15 1.91 
Qasr Ahmed 70 14 2.11 
Khoms 69 15 1.86 
 
Around 69 respondents out of 84 answered this question. The total means were 
around 2.00. These total means illustrated that the total working hours at Libyan 
ports are insufficient to provide the required services to their customers. 
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In more detail, due to the similarity of the working hours at all Libyan ports, the 
analysis showed similarity in the perceptions of the respondents. For instance, 
regarding Tripoli and Benghazi port, the analysis showed that 36.2 per cent of the 
respondents absolutely disagreed with the statement that the working hours at these 
ports were sufficient to provide the required services. It is also showed that 39.1 per 
cent of the respondents disagreed with the above statement regarding these two 
ports. These two percentages represent around two-thirds of the total respondents. 
Qasr Ahmed and Khoms differ slightly in regard to the respondents who absolutely 
disagreed with the above statement: 31.4 per cent for Qasr Ahmed port, and 40.6 per 
cent for Khoms port. However, nearly 36 per cent of the respondents disagreed with 
the above statement regarding these two ports. This illustrates that around 67 per 
cent of the respondents were not satisfied with this operating time. 
Generally, it can be concluded that the working hours at Libyan ports are not 
sufficient to provide the required services to customers, which influences the total 
cargo-handling time. Therefore, this time has to be extended (from the respondents’ 
perspective). However, it is also important to know whether these working hours are 
used efficiently and without any idle time. 
5.5.2 Using Total Working Time 
It seems that the total working hours have not been used efficiently and there is 
wasted or idle time. The stakeholders were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement that the total working time at Libyan ports is efficiently used 
without any idle time. The analysis showed that the total mean of the respondents’ 
perceptions in terms of utilising the working time at all ports is around 1.9, with no 
significant difference. This illustrates no consensus on the above statement from all 
of the groups. The analysis showed that around 80 per cent of the respondents 
believed that the working hours at Libyan ports were not utilised efficiently and 
there was wasted time during the total working time. 
From the above two analyses regarding the dedicated working time and the actual 
working time, it can be concluded that the total working hours at Libyan ports are 
insufficient to provide what customers need. In addition, this time is not used 
efficiently. This increases ships’ turnaround time and cargo delivery time. As a 
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result, it increases ships’ total operational costs and influences the choice to use the 
port. Further, it reduces the port throughput and increases the total operational cost 
of a port’s facilities, which all undermine port performance. 
5.5.3 Seaside Operations 
Seaside operations concern the operations of ship docking. Apart from the pilotage 
and tugging/towing services, ship docking requires sufficient water depth to ensure 
safe passage and suitable berths to secure a ship’s mooring, which is essential to 
commence cargo-handling operations. This section illustrates the influence of 
seaside accessibility on port performance, focusing on water depth and berth length. 
Accessibility has generally been defined as the ease with which activities may be 
reached from a given location, using a particular transportation system (Economic 
research centre, 2000). Port accessibility refers to the infrastructure used to facilitate 
cargo flow, and allows the use of a port’s essential facilities. To reduce the cost of 
maritime transport, ship sizes and capacity have increased dramatically (Maersk, 
2012, Clark et al., 2004). Consequently, ports have to meet these changes to 
accommodate these kinds of ships and deal with the increased volume of cargo being 
transported. To examine the role of seaside accessibility on Libyan ports’ 
performance through providing the required customer service, this study set up 
questions about accessibility to the four main Libyan commercial ports. Seaside 
accessibility is represented by water depth and the length of berths to accommodate 
such larger ships. 
Seaside accessibility refers to the ability of a port to accommodate inbound ships. 
Libyan ports have a strategic location close to the routes of international trade, and 
between industrial and consuming countries. This provides a potential opportunity to 
increase the volume of trade handled by Libyan ports. 
The demand for larger ships, particularly container ships, has dramatically increased 
due to the advantages of containerisation (Dasgupta, 2011). Consequently, the 
dimensions of such mega ships, including their drafts and overall length have also 
increased. Therefore, to be competitive in attracting larger ships and their cargoes, 
ports have to provide sufficient water depth to ensure safe passage for these ships, as 
well as suitable berths to accommodate them. 
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In general, seaside accessibility seems to be very important to the local stakeholders, 
with a total mean of 6.15. This was based on the perception of the 79 respondents 
who completed the relevant question. It was found that seaside accessibility was 
extremely important for freight forwarders, the port authority and carrier groups. 
Moreover, seaside accessibility was very important to shipping companies, LMA, 
seafarers and other groups. However, and surprisingly, the port operator group 
perceived that seaside accessibility was only somewhat important (see Appendix 2). 
This shows that port operators of the Libyan ports have not paid much attention to 
the dramatic increase in ships’ sizes and drafts. 
Due to the importance of seaside accessibility to local stakeholders, further 
investigation was conducted to measure the impact of the existing water depth at 
Libyan ports on the ability of these ports to meet the escalating size of container 
ships. In this perspective, seaside accessibility was represented by water depth and 
berth length. 
5.5.3.1 Water Depth 
This section details the findings regarding the suitability of the Libyan ports’ water 
depth for deep draft container ships. Starting with Tripoli port, the water depth is 
between eight and 12 metres. On the scale of five, where ‘1’ denoted strongly 
disagree and ‘5’ denoted strongly agree, the analysis showed that the total mean of 
the perspective of 73 respondents was 2.13, with no significant difference. This 
indicates that the respondents disagreed with the statement that water depth at Tripoli 
port did not meet the demand of larger ships. The percentage of respondents who had 
this perception represents 69.8 per cent of the total respondents. 
Similarly, the water depth of Benghazi port is between seven and 13 metres. The 
descriptive analysis showed that the total mean of 72 respondents regarding 
Benghazi port was 1.99, with significant difference. This showed that about 73 per 
cent of the respondents believed that the water depth at Benghazi port did not meet 
the demand of larger and deep draft ships. However, Qasr Ahmed port, with a water 
depth of 13 metres, had the highest total mean of 2.97. This showed no consensus 
about the ability of Qasr Ahmed port water depth to meet the demand of larger ships. 
Similarly, the water depth of Khoms port is about 13 metres. This port had the 
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second highest total mean after Qasr Ahmed port, at 2.85. This mean also indicated 
no consensus on the ability of Khoms port to attract deep draft container ships. The 
analysis also showed that around half of the respondents did not consider Khoms 
port to meet the recent demand of mega ships. 
Concerning water depth, it can be concluded that Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports can 
receive up to third generation container ships with a maximum draft of 12 metres. 
However, Tripoli and Benghazi ports can only receive the second generation 
container ships of 10 metres draft. Therefore, Libyan ports cannot provide the 
required seaside accessibility for larger ships. This is due to insufficient water depth, 
which has become an important requirement for carriers, shippers and traders. 
5.5.3.2 Berth Length 
As mentioned above, ship sizes have increased and can now exceed 400 metres in 
length (Maersk, 2012, Marineinsight, 2012). Therefore, to provide the required 
service to such ships, a port has to own berths that can dock these larger ships (Imai 
et al., 2008). Libyan ports have different berth designs and lengths. To see the ability 
of Libyan ports to meet this requirement from the perspective of Libyan port 
stakeholders, the study set up questions focusing on this aspect. 
Starting with Tripoli port again, and on the scale of five, the participants were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that berth length at Tripoli port 
is suitable to accommodate larger ships. The descriptive analysis showed the total 
mean of 72 responses was 2.54, with no significance among the means. It also found 
that about 55.5 per cent of the respondents believed that the berth lengths at Tripoli 
port were not suitable to accommodate the larger ships, compared to about 29 per 
cent of the respondents with different perspectives. 
On the same scale, Benghazi port had a total mean of 2.33, with no significant 
difference among the respondents’ perceptions. This illustrates that the respondents 
similarly disagreed with the statement that the berth lengths in Benghazi port were 
suitable to accommodate larger ships. For instance, 66.6 per cent of the respondents 
believed this port could not dock the larger ships. 
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Regarding Qasr Ahmed port, the total mean of the perception of 72 respondents was 
3.33, with no significant difference. Despite the fact that Qasr Ahmed port is a 
comparatively new port with long berths, only about 51.5 per cent of the participants 
agreed with the statement that berth length at Qasr Ahmed port was suitable to 
accommodate larger ships. The lowest percentage was 12.5 per cent, representing the 
respondents who did not agree or disagree with the statement. In general, we can say 
that Qasr Ahmed port can accommodate larger ships. 
Regarding Khoms port, which is also a comparatively new port, the total mean of 71 
respondents’ perceptions was 3.13, with no significant difference. The analysis 
showed that about 55 per cent of the respondents agreed with the above statement 
regarding Khoms port. About 39.5 per cent of the respondents had a different 
perception. In general, it was considered that the port of Khoms could provide the 
required berths to the larger ships. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the berth lengths of Khoms and Qasr 
Ahmed port, which are comparatively new, can meet the demand of the larger ships, 
in terms of berth length. However, about half of the respondents believed that berth 
lengths at Tripoli and Benghazi port were not suitable to accommodate new 
generation container ships, due to the large ships’ length overall, compared to the 
existing length of berths. Moreover, despite the fact that berth lengths at Khoms and 
Qasr Ahmed allowed them to accommodate larger ships, the limited water depth 
undermined the ability of these two ports, and the other Libyan ports, to attract deep 
draft ships. 
5.5.4 Terminal Operations 
Terminal operations include the entire operations of container handling from the 
ship’s hold to the storage yard. Terminal operations depend on port superstructure. 
Port superstructure includes all cargo-handling equipment used within the port for 
cargo-handling operations. The number and type of cargo-handling equipment play a 
vital role in the efficiency of cargo handling, which is a determinant of port 
performance. This influences the speed of cargo movement within the port, storage 
mode and capacity, as well as the total operational time, including ship turnaround 
time. No Libyan ports employ specialised and sophisticated cargo-handling 
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equipment, with the exception of Qasr Ahmed port, which is the only Libyan port 
that operates two QCs and two RTGs. 
5.5.4.1 General Port Superstructure 
Based on 79 responses, the analysis showed that the importance of cargo-handling 
facilities in general is very high to local stakeholders, with a total mean of 6.18. It is 
extremely important to the freight forwarder group, carriers, LMA and port 
authorities (see Appendix 2). Port operators mainly rely on cargo-handling facilities 
in serving ships calling at the port. In the same manner, a shipping company depends 
on cargo-handling facilities to accelerate cargo flow and minimise ship turnaround 
times at port. Therefore, both of these groups believe that cargo-handling facilities 
are very important. 
In examining the sufficiency and efficiency of the cargo-handling facilities used at 
Libyan ports, the analysis showed that 85 per cent of 70 respondents absolutely 
disagreed with the statement that Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms ports use sufficient 
and efficient cargo-handling facilities. The total means of the responses regarding 
these ports were around 1.5. In addition, 40 per cent of the respondents absolutely 
disagreed with the statement regarding Qasr Ahmed port, and 38 per cent of the 
respondents just disagreed with it. The total mean of this group was 1.94 (see Figure 
5.1). The analysis also showed no significant difference among the means of the 
groups in terms of the sufficiency and efficiency of the cargo-handling facilities, 
except for Benghazi port. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the performance of the four main Libyan 
commercial ports is low, due to a lack of sufficient and efficient cargo-handling 
equipment. This low performance affects port users, whether by providing 
unsatisfying service quality, increasing ships’ turnaround time or increasing total 
operating costs for inbound ships and port facilities. The lack of efficient cargo-
handling equipment also affects cargo-handling times, which are very important to 
the local stakeholders (see Appendix 2). It would also affect the cargo-handling fees 
in some ports; however, cargo-handling fees are fixed at all Libyan ports and are 
regulated by the LMA. Therefore, they are somewhat important to the local 
stakeholders, with a total mean of 5.30. 
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Figure 5.1: The Sufficiency and Efficiency of Cargo-Handling Equipment used 
at Libyan Ports 
Apart from the influence of the number and the type of cargo-handling equipment 
used at each port, the total cargo-handling time is influenced by the total working 
hours at port, and how efficiently this time is used, as discussed earlier. 
The terminology of cargo-handling facilities, which consist of cargo transfer and 
cargo-transport equipment, is a general term. Therefore, to be more specific, the 
study has classified cargo-handling equipment into three types of equipment. The 
first type is seaside cranes. The second type is transport equipment, and the third is 
stacking equipment. The strategy behind this classification is to confirm the above 
findings and to determine specifically which type of equipment has more influence 
on the capacity of Libyan ports and their performance. 
Cargo loading and off-loading to and from the ship is considered a crucial factor for 
port performance. It depends on the productivity of seaside cranes (Imai et al., 2008). 
It influences berth allocation plans, ship turnaround times, berth availability, port 
reliability and flexibility. In terms of the importance of cargo loading and off-loading 
operations to and from the ship, the analysis showed that the total mean of 81 
responses was 6.30, which confirms that cargo loading and off-loading to and from 
the ship is very important to local stakeholders in general. In addition, four groups 
believe that this element is extremely important: freight forwarders, port operators, 
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shipping companies and LMA. The other stakeholder groups who believe that this 
element is very important are carriers, port authorities, seafarers and other groups. 
The efficiency of terminal operations in general, and cargo loading and off-loading 
to and from the ship specifically, depends mainly on seaside cranes (SCI, 2010). Due 
to the importance of QCs on port performance, the following section examines the 
status of the cranes used at Libyan ports. 
5.5.4.2 Quay Container Cranes 
Crane productivity is measured by the throughput in TEUs per year, or by moves per 
hour. Each port uses a different type and number of seaside crane. This depends on 
many factors, including port type, cargo type and volume, port capital and some 
other factors. Therefore, some ports employ just mobile cranes, others use fixed 
shore cranes with comparatively high handling rates, other ports depend on ships’ 
cranes for cargo-handling operations and others employ specialised and more 
sophisticated QCs. 
Due to the high demand for containerisation, container ports have employed 
specialised QCs with high move rates. The QCs are developed according to the 
changes in container ship size and capacity. However, Libyan ports still do not 
employ an optimal quality and quantity of cranes to deal with the inbound container 
ships that call at Libyan ports (see Table 5.5). This is illustrated by the total means of 
the perception of respondents, which was 1.50 regarding Tripoli, Benghazi and 
Khoms and 2.24 regarding Qasr Ahmed port. The descriptive analysis showed no 
significant difference among the means. 
Table 5.5: The Number and Types of Cranes Used at Libyan Ports 
Crane type Tripoli Benghazi Qasr Ahmed Khoms 
Quay container cranes 0 0 2 0 
Boosting telescopic mast cranes 9 3 11 2 
Fixed mast cranes 4 7 0 2 
Source: (Misurata Free Zone, 2013, Libyan Maritime Admisnistration, 2013). 
More specifically, around 92 per cent of the respondents believed there was a severe 
lack of efficient seaside cranes at Tripoli and Khoms ports. This group represents 
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87.5 per cent of the total respondents regarding Benghazi port. However, this 
percentage was slightly smaller regarding Qasr Ahmed port, at 69.4 per cent of the 
total respondents. This difference was due to employing two specialised QCs at Qasr 
Ahmed port. The severe deficiency of efficient QCs had a negative impact on port 
performance (Zhou and Kang, 2008, Zhang and Jiang, 2008) and the perceived 
future demand for such ports. Consequently, this lack enforced the operators of 
Libyan ports’ to use ships’ cranes for loading and off-loading operations. 
 
Figure 5.2: Seaside Cranes at Libyan Ports v. the Demand for Containerisation 
The severe lack of efficient QCs at Libyan ports has undermined the ability of all 
Libyan ports to meet the potential demand for containerisation. This was confirmed 
by the perception of 72 respondents. On the scale of five, the descriptive analysis 
showed that more than 90 per cent of the respondents had the same perception 
regarding Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms ports, with total means of around 1.30, and 
with no significant difference. Qasr Ahmed port had the highest total mean (1.63), 
with no significant difference. This shows that, despite Qasr Ahmed port being the 
only Libyan port operating two QCs, it has still been unable to meet the potential 
demand for containerisation, similar to the other Libyan ports. This is the perception 
of more than 85 per cent of the total respondents (see Figure 5.2). 
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the seaside cranes used at Libyan 
ports do not have the capacity to deal efficiently with the ships that call at Libyan 
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ports, as they are unable to meet the potential demand for containerisation if this 
increases. This is due to the absence of efficient and specialised QCs at these ports, 
which is considered a bottleneck that ensures underperformance. Therefore, it is 
crucial to include seaside cranes in the DEA analysis as an input variable to evaluate 
the efficiency of Libyan ports in the next chapter. 
The impact of the severe deficiency of QCs extends to port reliability, which 
concerns ship turnaround times and scheduling. This also affects port service 
flexibility, which concerns berth availability and the provision of some special 
handling services. Therefore, the following sections investigate these aspects from 
the perspective of local stakeholders in more detail. 
5.5.4.3 Ship Turnaround Times 
A ship’s turnaround time is the time spent by the ship being loaded and off-loaded at 
port. To assess the importance of ship turnaround times, a scale of seven has been 
used. The descriptive analysis showed that ship turnaround time had a total mean of 
6.05, indicating it is very important to the local stakeholders of Libyan ports. From 
79 responses, a ship’s turnaround time was extremely important to port authorities 
and freight forwarders. The groups of LMA, carriers, shipping group and port 
operators believed that a ship’s turnaround time was very important. In contrast, the 
seafarers and the other group believed that a ship’s turnaround time was somewhat 
important. It can be concluded that most of the stakeholders are interested in shorter 
ship turnaround times, which is closely associated with the efficiency of port 
operations, especially seaside operations. However, the analysis shows that ship 
turnaround times are still lengthy at all Libya ports, due to the lack of efficient QCs. 
This affects the reliability of Libyan ports, as it affects ships’ scheduling negatively. 
5.5.4.4 Ships’ Scheduling 
Ships’ scheduling refers to the timetable of ships’ movements from one port to 
another. Any interruption in a ship’s scheduling influences the entire ship sailing 
timetable, as well as berth allocation plans at the next port of call. Ships’ scheduling 
is associated mainly with the efficiency of seaside operations, which strongly 
depends on seaside cranes, as well as the handling equipment in general. 
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Based on 78 responses, a ship’s scheduling seems to be very important to local 
stakeholders in general. It had a total mean of 6.00 (see Appendix 2). The analysis 
showed that a ship’s scheduling was extremely important to the port authority and 
port operator groups. Despite freight-forwarding group concerns about landside 
distribution, the respondents of this group believed that the accuracy of ships’ 
scheduling is extremely important. Further, LMA, carrier, shipping group, seafarer 
and the other group believe that a ship’s scheduling is very important. 
 
Figure 5.3: Accuracy of Ships’ Scheduling at Libyan Ports 
Despite the importance of ships’ scheduling to Libyan port stakeholders, it is 
inaccurate at all Libyan ports. Therefore, the Libyan ports are not reliable in terms of 
ships’ scheduling. This can be seen through the total means of the respondents’ 
perceptions concerning these four ports, which was around 1.50, with no significant 
differences. Moreover, the analysis showed that around 90 per cent of the 
respondents believed that ships’ scheduling was inaccurate at Tripoli and Khoms 
ports, and about 80 per cent had the same perspective of Qasr Ahmed and Benghazi 
(see Figure 5.3). 
This inaccuracy in ships’ scheduling is due to the inefficiency of seaside operations, 
caused by the lack of efficient cranes to load and off-load such ships. This could be 
one of the reasons that shipping lines avoid Libyan ports. 
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5.5.4.5 Berth Availability 
In some cases, an inbound ship can wait at an anchorage area for extra hours or days 
due to the unavailability of berths. This waiting period increases a ship’s operational 
costs and prevents the ship from maintaining a sailing timetable. Therefore, the 
ship’s owners or charterers tend to avoid ports with low berth availability to 
minimise operational costs and to allow for many more trips per time unit. This 
prevents such ports from attaining high throughput. 
Accordingly, this study found that the service of berthing on arrival seems to be very 
important to local stakeholders in general. This was confirmed by the total mean of 
respondents’ perception, which is 6.09 (see Appendix 2). More specifically, the 
descriptive analysis showed that berth availability is not only very important to the 
ships’ owners, but it is also very important to the local carriers, freight forwarders, 
LMA, port authority, shipping companies and the port operator group. In contrast, it 
is somewhat important to the seafarers and the other group. However, the availability 
of berthing on arrival is unavailable at all Libyan ports. 
In more detail, from 71 responses and on the scale of five, the analysis showed that 
the total means of the respondents’ perceptions were 2.00 for all Libyan ports, with 
no significant difference among these means. This illustrates that the respondents 
disagreed with the statement that berthing on arrival is available at Libyan ports. 
Also noted is the similarity between Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms ports. Around 80 
per cent of the total respondents disagreed with the statement regarding these three 
ports. However, this group represents 71.8 per cent of the total respondents regarding 
Qasr Ahmed port. This could be due to that port operating two specialised QCs. 
From the above, it can be concluded that berthing on arrival is very important, not 
only to the carrier group, but also to the majority of local Libyan port stakeholders. 
The service of berthing on arrival at these four commercial Libyan ports is 
insufficient, due to the unavailability of berths to accommodate the inbound ships. 
This might be because the number of ships is greater than the capacity of the port, or 
that inefficient terminal operations exist, caused by a lack of efficient seaside cranes. 
126 
5.5.4.6 Service Flexibility 
The lack of efficient QCs has also affected port service flexibility. Service flexibility 
refers to the ability of a port to provide a variety of services needed by the customer, 
where the time and quality of services are crucial (David Xiaosong Peng et al., 
2011). This includes the ability of a port to provide a berth for inbound ships at short 
notice, as discussed earlier. It also includes the ability to deal with non-standardised 
cargo, such as handling heavy weights and different sizes of containers. 
From this perspective, it seems there is no consensus on the ability of Libyan ports to 
provide some special handling services, such as handling heavy weight containers 
and different sizes of containers. From around 73 responses, and on a scale of five, 
the total means of these responses regarding Tripoli and Benghazi port was 2.1, with 
no significant difference. This illustrates that these ports cannot provide such special 
services. In more detail, around 65 per cent of the respondents believed that these 
two ports could not provide some special services. Similarly, the port of Khoms has 
no capability to provide such services, where the total mean of the responses 
regarding Khoms port was only 1.72. Around 80 per cent of the respondents 
disagreed with the statement that Khoms port could provide some special services. 
However, the highest total mean was recorded for Qasr Ahmed port. This mean was 
2.88, which illustrated there is no consensus among the respondents about the ability 
of Qasr Ahmed port to provide some special services. It was also found that 37.8 per 
cent of the respondents agreed with the statement regarding the capability of 
providing some special services, compared to 43.3 per cent who disagreed with this 
statement. 
In general, due to the severe lack of efficient QCs at the four main Libyan 
commercial ports, these ports have no flexibility to provide any irregular service 
related to the volume and weight of containers. This also emphasises the negative 
effect of employing traditional mobile cranes at Libyan ports, which consequently 
undermines the performance of these ports. 
5.5.4.7 Transport Equipment 
Transport equipment includes all the equipment used to transport the cargo and 
containers from one side of a port to another. In addition to the role of QCs, the type 
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and the number of cargo-transport vehicles at ports plays an essential role in port 
performance. In other words, the performance of a container port that uses 
conventional transport equipment, such as trucks or trailers, to transport containers 
between the ship’s side and yard is lower than the performance of a port that uses 
more sophisticated equipment, such as AGVs or SCs (Ioannou et al., 2000a). Libyan 
ports still use conventional transport equipment. Therefore, it is expected that the 
performance of Libyan ports is low and they would be unable to meet recent and 
potential increased demand. 
Regarding recent demand, the descriptive analysis showed that around two-thirds of 
the respondents believed these Libyan ports did not have a sufficient amount of 
efficient transport equipment to deal with the volume of containers processed. The 
total means of about 66 responses regarding the four Libyan ports were around 2.00, 
with no significant difference. 
Similarly, the analysis shows that the quality and quantity of transport vehicles used 
at Libyan ports cannot meet the potential demand for containerisation if it increased 
at Libyan port. On the scale of five, the analysis found that the total means of the 
responses regarding Tripoli, Khoms Benghazi ports were around 1.50, with no 
significant differences. Despite the fact that Qasr Ahmed port is the most developed 
Libyan port in terms of container-handling equipment, it had a total mean of 1.77. 
All of these means indicated that the quality and quantity of the transport vehicles 
used at these four Libyan ports could not meet the potential demand for 
containerisation if it is increased. This was the perspective of more than two-thirds of 
the total respondents. 
The above illustrates that these four main Libyan commercial ports suffer from the 
lack of efficient technology used to transport cargo and containers within the ports. 
This is also considered a bottleneck that undermines Libyan port performance. 
Therefore, transport equipment is included as an input variable to evaluate the 
efficiency of Libyan ports, as detailed in the next chapter. 
5.5.4.8 Storage Yard Capacity 
Storage yard capacity refers to the ability of storage areas to absorb the current and 
the potential volumes of cargoes if demand increases. Storage yard capacity is 
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another influential port performance factor. In the case of Libyan ports, regarding the 
two relatively old ports, Tripoli and Benghazi, there was no consensus on the ability 
of these ports’ storage yards to absorb the volume of containers dedicated to the local 
market. However, more than 60 per cent of the respondents believed that these ports 
did not have the capacity to absorb both the local and international transhipment 
cargoes in the same time. However, regarding the two relatively new ports, Qasr 
Ahmed and Khoms, nearly 60 per cent of the respondents agreed that these two ports 
had enough space for the local market cargo. In contrast, there was no consensus on 
their ability to absorb the cargo dedicated to both the local market and international 
transhipment (see Table 5.6). This illustrates that under the current conditions of the 
storage yards, Libyan ports can only deal with the cargo dedicated to the local 
market. The above also indicated that storage yard capacity is a crucial factor for 
port performance. Therefore, it is considered as an input variable in the efficiency 
analysis using DEA. 
Table 5.6: Storage Yard Capacity of Libyan Ports 
Port Storage capacity No. Missing  Total mean p value 
Tripoli 
Local market  67 17 2.94 0.082 
Local and international 
transhipment 
66 18 2.08 0.824 
Benghazi 
Local market  65 19 3.08 0.329 
Local and international 
transhipment 
65 19 2.34 0.967 
Qasr Ahmed 
Local market  66 18 3.76 0.128 
Local and international 
transhipment 
66 18 3.29 0.726 
Khoms 
Local market  65 19 3.48 0.012 
Local and international 
transhipment 
65 19 3.08 0.533 
 
Port performance in general and the capacity of storage yards in particular are also 
influenced by the type and the number of stacking equipment used. The type and the 
number of stacking equipment form the stacking mode as ‘vertical or horizontal’, 
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and influence the efficiency of stacking and retrieving operations. Therefore, 
examining their impact on Libyan ports’ performance is important. 
5.5.4.9 Stacking Equipment 
Stacking equipment is complementary to transport equipment. This equipment plays 
a vital role in the optimal utilisation of storage yard (Lau and Zhao, 2008). Most high 
performing ports use sophisticated stacking equipment, such as RMGs or RTGs or 
SCs, to maximise the capacity of storage yards and enhance the efficiency of 
container stacking and retrieving operations (Kim and Kim, 2002). However, Libyan 
containers still use forklifts and reach stackers for stacking and retrieving containers. 
Employing such conventional equipment undermines the performance of yard 
operations, which is the case with Libyan ports. 
This was confirmed by the answers of 71 respondents, when they were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the stacking equipment 
used provided efficient cargo stacking and retrieving services. On the scale of five, 
the total mean of the responses was about 1.70, with no significant difference among 
the perceptions of the respondents; 83.1 per cent of the respondents believed that the 
stacking equipment used at Tripoli port was inefficient. Similarly, 81.7 per cent and 
85 per cent of the respondents had the same perception regarding Benghazi and 
Khoms ports, respectively. Qasr Ahmed port was the only Libyan port with two 
RTGs used to stack containers in its storage yard. However, two-thirds of the 
respondents believed that the stacking equipment used at Qasr Ahmed port did not 
provide efficient cargo stacking and retrieving services. 
The deficiency of efficient stacking equipment has a negative impact on the ability 
of these ports to meet potential demand. The local stakeholders of Libyan ports 
confirmed this. The descriptive analysis showed that the total mean of the responses 
was about 1.70, with no significant difference. The analysis also showed that more 
than 90 per cent of the respondents believed that Tripoli and Benghazi port could not 
meet the potential increased demand in terms of stacking equipment. This percentage 
decreased to 88.7 per cent of the respondents regarding Khoms port and 76.7 per 
cent regarding Qasr Ahmed port. 
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From the above, it can be concluded that the majority of the respondents believed 
there was a severe lack of efficient stacking equipment at all Libyan ports. 
Therefore, the performance of these ports was low due to inefficient cargo-stacking 
operations. The shortage of stacking equipment requires special measures to increase 
the capacity of the storage yards of the four main Libyan ports. This may include 
redesigning storage yard layout and deploying new technology, such as RTGs or 
RMGs, or extending the storage areas if land is available. Due to the effect of 
stacking equipment on the performance of Libyan ports, stacking equipment, in 
parallel with the storage yard area, has been included to evaluate the efficiency of 
Libyan ports, using DEA analysis in the next chapter. 
5.5.4.10 Free Cargo Dwell Time 
Free cargo dwell time is one of the performance components used to attract port 
customers. It refers to the time that allows keeping the cargo and containers at port 
for free. Normally, the crowded ports allow a shorter free dwell time because of land 
scarcity. Due to the limited capacity of Libyan ports’ storage yards, the following 
examines the importance of free cargo dwell time to the stakeholders. Regarding this 
particular component, 80 responses were obtained. 
The analysis showed that free cargo dwell time had a total mean of 5.24, indicating it 
is considered somewhat important from the stakeholders’ perceptions. Freight 
forwarders, the other group, port operators and the carrier group believed it was 
somewhat important. However, it was very important to port authorities, LMA and 
shipping companies. Only the seafarer group believed that cargo dwell time was 
neither important nor unimportant. 
5.5.5 Landside Operations 
Landside operations concern landside accessibility to enhance the efficiency of 
container flow between a port and its hinterland. Landside accessibility to sea ports 
has become one of the major concerns of port authorities and public policy makers, 
as it is an important factor for port performance and for enhancing economic 
development, for both land-locked and coastal regions (Economic research centre, 
2000). 
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Landside accessibility is also one of the most influential factors affecting cargo flow 
through a port (Gekara and Chhetri, 2013, Chang et al., 2008). Port landside 
accessibility starts from the port gate, which is the first interface point between a port 
and the hinterland. It is also associated with the capacity of the existing road and rail 
networks. To illustrate the importance of landside accessibility from the perspective 
of local Libyan port stakeholders, the study employed a seven-point scale. The 
question of the importance of landside accessibility was answered by 79 respondents 
out of 84. The analysis found that landside accessibility, which includes ports’ gate 
performance, road transport and rail transport, is very important to local stakeholders 
in general; with a total mean of 5.82 (see Appendix 2). In more detail, landside 
accessibility is extremely important to the freight forwarder group, due to the nature 
of the service provided by this group. It is also very important to LMA, shipping 
companies, port operators, port authority and carrier groups. In contrast, the other 
group and seafarer group believed that landside accessibility is only somewhat 
important. 
Due to the importance of landside accessibility to the majority of stakeholders, the 
following section examines the influence of the existing number of gate lanes and 
road networks on the performance of Libyan ports. It also investigates the necessity 
of the potential rail network to enhance cargo flow. 
5.5.5.1 Number of Gate Lanes 
The number of gate lanes influences the flow of cargo through the port, which has an 
influence on the capacity of the storage yard and the quality of the cargo delivery 
service. All of the four Libyan ports have two gate lanes, an entrance and exit. When 
the respondents were asked about whether the existing number of lanes of Tripoli 
port gate undermined cargo flow, the total mean of 72 responses was 3.57, with no 
significant difference (F = .2.154; p = .050). This illustrates that the number of lanes 
at Tripoli port’s gate undermines cargo flow through the port. 
The total means of the respondents regarding Benghazi, Qasr Ahmed and Khoms 
ports were less than 3.00, which showed no consensus on the statement that the 
number of lanes undermined cargo flow through these ports. In more detail, 
regarding Benghazi port, half of the respondents disagreed with the above statement. 
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Concerning Qasr Ahmed port of Misurata city, the analysis also showed that 43.1 per 
cent of the respondents believed that the number of gate lanes at Qasr Ahmed port 
did not undermine cargo flow, compared to 34.8 per cent of the respondents who had 
different perceptions. Similarly, around 45 per cent of the respondents disagreed 
with the statement regarding Khoms port, compared to 36.6 per cent of the 
respondents who agreed with the statement, with significant difference among the 
means (F = 2.654; p = .018). This might be because Tripoli has a larger population 
than the other cities, which means that these cities have less traffic. 
The above shows no consensus among stakeholders regarding the influence of the 
number of gate lanes at Libyan ports on the cargo flow. However, the procedure of 
cargo clearance has a strong effect on the cargo flow and delivery time. This is well 
investigated in the following two sections. 
5.5.5.2 Customs Clearance Process 
Customs clearance processes play an important role in port performance. They 
influence the flow of cargo through the port. Therefore, their effect extends to 
influencing the capacity of the storage spaces if clearing the imported cargo is 
complicated or slow. Moreover, they affect a ship’s turnaround time in the case of 
exported cargo. Therefore, the customs clearance process seems to be important 
from the perspective of Libyan port stakeholders, with a total mean of 5.5 (see 
Appendix 2). 
The customs clearance process is very important to the freight forwarding and 
shipping company groups, due to the nature of their work. It is also very important to 
LMA and port operators, as the efficiency of cargo clearance increases the volume of 
cargo being handled, and therefore a port’s income. However, it is only somewhat 
important to the other group, the port authorities, the carrier group and the seafarer 
group. In contrast, customs clearance fees do not have any influence on the process. 
Therefore, they are considered somewhat important to local stakeholders (see 
Appendix 2). This could be because the fee for cargo customs clearance is regulated 
by the customs authority, which is fixed at all Libyan ports. 
The performance of ports can also be affected by the cargo clearance process, as it 
influences the cargo flow through the port. However, according to 72 responses, the 
133 
local stakeholders believed that cargo clearance processes at Libyan ports were 
inefficient. The analysis showed that the total mean of responses regarding all 
Libyan ports was around 1.80, with no significant difference (F = .160; p =.992). 
 
Figure 5.4: The Quality of Customs Services at Libyan Ports 
In more detail, 44.4 per cent of the respondents absolutely disagreed with the 
statement that the cargo clearance processes in Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports were 
efficient, and 30.6 per cent of the respondents only disagreed with the statement. 
This represents 75 per cent of the total respondents. Moreover, 80.3 per cent of the 
respondents declared that the cargo clearance process was inefficient at Tripoli port, 
and 83.3 per cent shared the same perception in regard to Benghazi port. Therefore, 
from the above, the cargo clearance processes at all Libyan ports were inefficient, 
which affects the performance of these ports. 
The cargo clearance process is inefficient as it is corrupt and complicated. This was 
derived from the responses of 71 participants. The analysis showed no significant 
difference among the perceptions of the respondents regarding the quality of the 
customs service. Despite the fact that about a quarter of the respondents did not 
agree nor disagree with the statement that customs services at the Libyan ports were 
complicated and corrupt, around 63 per cent of the respondents agreed with this 
statement (see Figure 5.4). Therefore, this shows that the cargo clearance process is 
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inefficient. The complexity of the cargo clearance process is also influenced by the 
lack of ITC, as discussed in detail in Section 5.5.6. 
5.5.5.3 Cargo Delivery 
Cargo delivery in this research refers to the time taken to off-load the cargo from a 
ship, clear it and deliver it out of the port gate in good condition. The efficiency of 
cargo delivery depends on a number of factors. These include the efficiency of the 
operations within the seaside, terminal and landside operations, including the 
efficiency of the cargo clearance processes. 
From 81 responses, cargo delivery seems to be very important to local stakeholders 
in general, with a total mean of 6.06. It is considered extremely important to freight 
forwarders, due to the main interest of this group, and the nature of its business. It is 
also extremely important to the port operator and shipping company groups. 
Moreover, the groups declaring cargo delivery to be very important included the 
LMA, port authority, the other group and carriers. The seafarer group was the only 
group who believed it was only somewhat important. This could be because 
seafarers are concerned with seaside operations, rather than landside operations. 
Cargo delivery is an important factor in terms of port reliability. However, cargo 
delivery times at Libyan ports are unreasonable, according to the perspective of 72 
respondents. The total means of the responses related to all Libyan ports were around 
2.00, with no significant difference among the respondents. About two-thirds of the 
respondents believed that cargo delivery times at Libyan ports were unreasonable. 
These times are due to a number of factors, such as the total cargo-handling time at 
ports, and the cargo clearance processes and efficiency. It also could be affected by 
not implementing online services. All of these factors make Libyan ports unreliable 
and low performing. 
5.5.5.4 Road Networks 
The total length of Libya’s paved road network is around 43,000 kilometres, 
including about 15,000 kilometres of main roads (RABA, 2012). However, the 
analysis showed that the existing road networks are not considered suitable for 
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hinterland transport if the demand for Libyan ports increases. It also showed there is 
no significant difference among the respondents’ perceptions. 
By comparing the answer of 72 respondents regarding both Tripoli and Benghazi 
ports, which are located in the biggest cities, similarity is revealed in the perception 
of the respondents about these two ports. The total means for Tripoli and Benghazi 
ports were 1.85 and 1.88, respectively. Moreover, the analysis showed about two-
thirds of the respondents believed that the existing road networks were not suitable 
for hinterland transport if the demand for Tripoli and Benghazi port increased. 
Regarding Qasr Ahmed port of Misurata, the result was slightly different, with 63.9 
per cent of the respondents not supporting the statement that the existing road 
networks were suitable for hinterland transport if the demand for these ports 
increased, compared to 11.1 per cent of the respondents who supported the 
statement. The total mean of the respondents’ perceptions regarding Qasr Ahmed 
port was 2.15, which is the highest mean compared to the other ports, with no 
significant difference (F = .614; p = .743). Khoms port had a total mean of 2.03, with 
no significant difference (F = .525; p = .812). This illustrates that, in general, the 
respondents disagreed with the statement that the existing road networks were 
suitable for hinterland transport if the demand for Khoms port increased. This was 
represented by 71.9 per cent of the total respondents. 
The above indicates that the existing road networks linked to Libyan ports are 
working over their capacity. In addition, they may not be able to handle the potential 
demand for these ports if it increases. This not only affects cargo flow, but also 
increases the cost of inland transport, which is very important to the freight 
forwarders group, LMA and the port authority and shipping company groups (see 
Appendix 2). The lack of proper road networks also disconnects Libyan ports from 
land-locked countries, which undermines the potential regional role of these ports. 
Therefore, to enhance the performance of Libyan ports though improving cargo 
flow, the existing road networks need to be developed. Alternatively, finding another 
way, such as establishing rail networks to reduce the load on the existing road 
networks, is essential. 
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5.5.5.5 Rail Networks 
Libya still does not have functional rail networks. Therefore, the necessity of 
efficient rail networks is very important, according to the perceptions of all 
respondents (see Appendix 2). This is reflected in the total means of the respondents’ 
perceptions, which were between 4.04 and 4.13, with no significant differences. In 
addition, around 72 per cent of the respondents absolutely agreed with the statement 
that integrated rail networks were needed to increase cargo flow and reduce transport 
costs. 
The above shows that the number of gate lanes at Libyan ports is a bottleneck neither 
for cargo flow nor for processing the recent volume of cargo dedicated to the local 
market. Conversely, the lack of rail networks puts more pressure on the existing road 
networks, which affects the ports’ performance throughput, undermining cargo flow. 
However, these three variables are excluded from port efficiency evaluation in the 
following chapter, as they are not under the control of the ports. 
5.5.6 Online Services 
In addition to efficient container-handling equipment, ICT is considered an 
important determinant of port performance to manage seaside, sea-land and land 
operations (Beškovnik, 2008). Contemporary port operations are unthinkable 
without effective and efficient use of ICT (Steenken et al., 2004b). Therefore, better 
information flow is one of the keys to port success (Bonney, 2014). 
ICT has become a crucial part of the accurate and rapid transfer and processing of a 
huge volume of data processed in international transport firms and port organisations 
(Kia et al., 2000). Rapid and accurate information exchange between ports and their 
users is crucial for efficient cargo transport. Therefore, many ports have introduced 
ICT to enhance the efficiency of their performance. This has led to less bureaucracy 
and reduced transaction times and costs. 
This has been confirmed by this study, which shows that online services are very 
important to the local stakeholders, with a total mean of 5.58 (see Appendix 2). It is 
also very important to freight forwarders, LMA, shipping companies and port 
authorities. However, the groups who believe that online services are only somewhat 
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important are carriers, port operators, the other group and the seafarer group. Despite 
the high demand for e-commerce, no Libyan ports have implemented e-commerce or 
any kind of online transactions as yet. Online services in this study consist of online 
customs services, online cargo tracking, online tracking for ships’ movements and 
online transactions. 
Around 70 respondents out of 84 answered questions regarding the above types of 
online services. The analysis showed that the total means of the respondents’ 
perceptions regarding these services were around 1.10, with no significant 
difference. Further, around 90 per cent of the total respondents absolutely disagreed 
with the statement that online services in these ports met customer requirements. 
Due to the absence of online customs services, Libyan port users have to complete 
customs paper work manually. Moreover, due to the absence of online information 
accessibility about ships’ movement tracking, the local stakeholders face planning 
difficulties in terms of knowing a ship’s arrival time, departure time, cargo delivery 
and customs clearance. Consequently, the absence of an online service undermines 
the performance of Libyan ports. However, this factor was not included in the 
analysis in the next chapter, as it could not be quantified. 
5.5.7 Cargo Safety 
Efficient and safe cargo-handling operations require competent staff, according to 
the respondents’ perceptions. The importance of port labour competency had a total 
mean of 5.74, which indicates it is very important to the stakeholders in general (see 
Appendix 2). Port labour competency includes the level of awareness of port 
personnel about safety measures and responsibilities at port. Safety awareness 
reduces the unproductive time that might cause accidents or incidents, thereby 
increasing performance. It may also prevent any liabilities with loss of life, injuries, 
cargo loss, cargo damage and pollution caused by port personnel. In the meantime, it 
contributes to the quality of port services provided to the customer. From the 
analysis of about 70 responses, about 85 per cent of the respondents believed that the 
staff of Libyan ports were not aware of the safety measures at these four main ports 
(see Figure 5.5). The total means of these respondents was around 1.58, with no 
significant differences among the means. This low level of safety knowledge and 
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awareness could be due to a lack of training and/or a lack of implementing strict 
regulations and rules. 
Safety awareness may influence cargo safety, such as cargo damage and loss. Cargo 
damage could happen during cargo-handling operations, such as loading or off-
loading cargo to or from a ship, train or truck. It could also occur during storing or 
retrieving the cargo. The consequences of cargo damage may affect many 
stakeholders, such as insurance companies and port operators, due to the liability of 
cargo handling. The port authority may also be affected by pollution. Shipping 
companies are also subject to this impact, according to the bill of lading agreement. 
Therefore, cargo damage is one concern of local stakeholders. The descriptive 
analysis confirms that cargo damage is very important to the stakeholders in general 
(see Appendix 2). The total mean of the stakeholders’ perceptions regarding cargo 
damage was 5.56. This shows that it is very important to all Libyan ports 
stakeholders, except the port authority group, who believed that it was neither 
important nor unimportant. 
 
Figure 5.5: The Level of Port Personnel Safety Awareness 
Despite the lack of safety awareness among the staff of Libyan ports, the analysis 
illustrates that the frequency of cargo damage at these ports is unlikely to be high, 
based on 80 responses. The total means of the responses regarding the likelihood of 
cargo damage were around 2.20, with no significant difference. There was similarity 
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in the perceptions of the respondents regarding Tripoli and Benghazi ports in terms 
of cargo damage (see Figure 5.6). 
For instance, the total means of the respondents’ perceptions for Tripoli and 
Benghazi ports were around 2.37. This indicated that the frequency of cargo damage 
in these two ports was unlikely to be high. Moreover, the percentage of the 
respondents who believed that cargo damage was most unlikely totalled about 15 per 
cent of the total respondents. The respondents who believed that cargo damage was 
unlikely represented around 50 per cent of the total respondents. Further, the 
respondents who believed that cargo damage was between more likely and unlikely 
represented 20 per cent of the total respondents. 
 
Figure 5.6: The Likelihood of Cargo Damage in Libyan Ports 
Qasr Ahmed port in Misurata was slightly different from Tripoli and Benghazi on 
this item. Thirteen respondents out of 84 did not answer the question regarding cargo 
damage in Qasr Ahmed port. Of those who did answer, the total mean of their 
perceptions was 2.17. The analysis showed that more than two-thirds of the 
respondents believed that cargo damage in Qasr Ahmed port was between most 
unlikely and unlikely (see Figure 5.6). 
Regarding the likelihood of cargo damage at Khoms ports, the total mean of the 
respondents’ perceptions was 2.23, with no significant difference (F = 1.829; p = 
.097). The respondents who believed that cargo damage was between most unlikely 
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and unlikely represented 68.5 per cent of the total respondents. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that cargo damage does not affect the performance of Libyan ports, as a 
high frequency of cargo damage is unlikely. 
Similarly, cargo loss is very important to the stakeholders in general. It has a total 
mean of 5.65 (see Appendix 2). The question of the importance of cargo loss was 
completed by 79 respondents out of 84. The analysis showed that it was extremely 
important to the shipping company group only. Four groups claimed that cargo loss 
was very important; that is, LMA, port operators, freight forwarders and the other 
group. In contrast, carriers, seafarers and the port authority believed that cargo loss 
was only somewhat important. 
By investigating the likelihood of cargo loss at Libyan ports, it was deemed unlikely 
to happen, with the total means of the respondents’ perceptions around 2.00. More 
specifically, regarding Tripoli port, 70 respondents out of 84 answered this question. 
With no significant differences among the means of the respondents’ perceptions (F 
= 1.175; p = .330), the descriptive analysis showed that the total mean was 2.16. This 
indicated that the frequency of cargo loss at Tripoli port was considered unlikely on 
average. About two-thirds of the respondents believed that cargo loss in Tripoli port 
was unlikely (see Figure 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.7: The Likelihood of Cargo Loss in Libyan Ports 
Similarly, cargo loss seems to be unlikely at Benghazi port. Seventy-one respondents 
out of 84 responded to the question of cargo loss at Benghazi port. The analysis 
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showed that the total mean of these responses was 2.08, with no significant 
difference (F = 1.238; p = .296). The analysis also showed that 76.1 per cent of the 
respondents believed that cargo loss at Benghazi port was unlikely. 
Similarly, Qasr Ahmed port has no significant difference among the perception of 
the respondents (F = 1.693; p = .127), and the total mean was 2.00. This also 
indicates that cargo loss at Qasr Ahmed port was considered unlikely. The analysis 
illustrates that 78.8 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with Qasr Ahmed port 
in terms of cargo loss. Khoms port is almost similar to Tripoli port. The total mean 
of the respondents’ perceptions was 2.11, with no significant difference (F = .751; p 
= .630). Around two-thirds of the respondents believed that cargo loss at Khoms port 
was unlikely (see Figure 5.7). 
Generally, it can be concluded that cargo loss was considered unlikely at Libyan 
ports, which means that it is not a bottleneck affecting the performance of Libyan 
ports. Therefore, cargo safety has been excluded from the efficiency analysis in the 
next chapter. 
5.6 Analysis of Variance 
ANOVA is the generalisation of a t-test to more than two groups (Iversen, 2004). 
ANOVA was used to detect any discriminant effects of independent groups (i.e., 
local stakeholders) on dependent variables (Martin and Bridgmon, 2012). 
There are many Libyan local stakeholders, including LMA, port authorities, port 
operators, shipping companies, freight forwarders, carriers, seafarer and other groups 
that use Libyan ports for their business. These stakeholders have different activities 
and interests. For instance, port operators aim at loading and off-loading the ships 
safely and efficiently. However, this is not the interest of freight forwarders. The 
main concern of freight forwarders is to clear and receive cargo from the port and 
deliver it to the end user in the minimum time and at the minimum cost. Moreover, 
carriers or shipping lines have no interest in the tasks of port authorities. The carriers 
or shipping lines’ concern is to minimise the ship’s turnaround time, whereas the 
port authority’s priority is to implement the local laws and regulations, and then the 
efficiency of the port. Due to these differences in interests, a significant difference 
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among these groups was expected in terms of their perspectives about the selected 
performance variables. 
As the dependent groups numbered more than two, a one-way ANOVA test was 
used to determine whether there was a significant difference in the perception means 
of these groups regarding the selected variables. Moreover, a post-hoc Tukey HSD 
test was used to identify the pairs that had significant differences. Post-hoc Tukey 
HSD tests are a more conservative way to detect the difference between group 
means, which hold the entire experiment’s error rate to a specific α level (Zhou and 
Kang, 2008). However, the analysis showed that there was consensus among the 
stakeholder groups about most of the variables selected to measure the performance 
of Libyan ports. Therefore, only the values of variables with differences are listed 
under the following headings. 
5.6.1 The Total Working Hours 
Despite the total working hours being fixed at all Libyan ports, one-way ANOVA 
showed a significant difference among the total means of the respondents regarding 
Khoms port (F = 2.909; p = .011).  
Table 5.7: One-Way ANOVA Analysis Regarding the Working Time at Libyan 
Ports 
Port Mean Square F Sig. 
Tripoli 
Between groups .925 1.193 .321 
Within groups .775 
  
Benghazi 
Between groups 1.093 1.674 .132 
Within groups .653 
  
Qasr Ahmed 
Between groups 1.358 1.462 .197 
Within groups .929 
  
Khoms 
Between groups 1.736 2.909 .011 




Further post-hoc Tukey HSD tests, at the significance level of 0.05, were conducted 
to determine the pairs with significant difference. Only one pair has the lowest 
significant difference, which is the other and the carrier group (p = .050). However, 
there was no significant difference among the respondents regarding the utilisation 
of total working time in the rest of the ports (see Table 5.7). 
5.6.2 Seaside Operations 
Seaside accessibility is associated with the water depth of the fairway channel and 
port basin, as well as the berth length. In terms of water depth, one-way ANOVA 
showed no significant difference among the means of the respondents’ perceptions 
regarding Tripoli, Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports (p > .05). However, there is a 
significant difference among the perceptions of respondents regarding Benghazi port 
(p = .016) (see Table5.8).  
Table 5.8: One-Way ANOVA Analysis Regarding Water Depth 
Port Mean square F Sig. 
Tripoli Between groups 2.876 .996 .443 
Within groups 2.888   
Benghazi Between groups 3.899 2.715 .016 
Within groups 1.436   
Qasr Ahmed Between groups 2.076 .966 .464 
Within groups 2.149   
Khoms Between groups 1.370 .652 .711 
Within groups 2.101   
A post-hoc Tukey HSD analysis was run and showed significant differences between 
the pairs of port authority and seafarer group (p = .032) and between seafarer and 
carrier group (p = .010). The significant difference of seafarers might be because 
seafarers used to visit different international ports with different water depths, and 
may have compared these international ports with the Benghazi port. However, a 
one-way ANOVA test showed that there was no significant difference among the 
respondents’ perceptions regarding berth length and the ability of the Libyan ports to 
provide a berthing on arrival service for inbound ships. 
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5.6.3 Terminal Operations 
Regarding the respondents’ perceptions about the type and quantity of cargo-
handling equipment employed by Libyan ports, and their efficiency and capacity, 
one-way ANOVA showed no significant differences among the means of the 
respondents’ perceptions, except as related to the capacity of seaside cranes at 
Benghazi port (F = 2.373; p = .032) (see Table 5.9). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test 
showed that the smallest p value was 0.055. A significant difference was only 
between one pair, which is the seafarer and freight forwarder group, as the means of 
these groups were 2.23 and 1.00, respectively. The low mean of the freight-
forwarding group could be due to the unsatisfactory way they dealt with the Libyan 
ports during delivering or shipping their cargo. However, the comparatively higher 
mean of the seafarer group was because seafarers are not greatly concerned about the 
general efficiency of cargo-handling equipment, other than the efficiency and 
capacity of QCs. 
 
Table 5.9: One-Way ANOVA Analysis Regarding the Capacity of Seaside 
Cranes 
Port Sum of squares F Sig. 
Tripoli Between groups 8.319 1.655 .137 
Within groups 45.230   
Total 53.549   
Benghazi Between groups 13.965 2.373 .032 
Within groups 53.813   
Total 67.778   
Qasr Ahmed Between groups 6.739 .615 .742 
Within groups 100.247   
Total 106.986   
Khoms Between groups 7.362 1.447 .203 
Within groups 45.793   
Total 53.155   
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Additionally, in terms of providing special services, such as dealing with irregular 
cargo weights and sizes, Benghazi port was the only port with a significant 
difference among the means of the respondents’ perceptions (F = 2.434; p = .028) 
(see Table 5.10). This difference was between the port authority group and seafarer 
group (p = .026). However, one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference 
among the respondents’ perceptions regarding ports’ reliability, including ships’ 
scheduling and ship’s turnaround times. 
Table 5.10: One-Way ANOVA Analysis Regarding the Ability of Libyan Ports 
to Provide Special Cargo-Handling Services 
Port Mean square F Sig. 
Tripoli Between groups 1.107 .686 .684 
 Within groups 1.615   
Benghazi Between groups 3.164 2.434 .028 
 Within groups 1.300   
Qasr Ahmed Between groups 2.417 1.358 .238 
 Within groups 1.780   
Khoms Between groups .922 .719 .656 
Within groups 1.281   
 
In terms of the ability of the storage yards to absorb the cargo/containers dedicated to 
the local market and international transhipment, the analysis did not show any 
significant difference among the means of the groups. However, regarding the ability 
of the storage yards to absorb the cargo/containers dedicated to the local market, 
one-way ANOVA test showed no significant difference among the means of the 
groups regarding Tripoli, Benghazi and Qasr Ahmed port. However, Khoms was the 
only port that had a p value less than .05 (see Table 5.11). A post-hoc Tukey HDS 
test was employed and found that the pair with a significant difference was the 
freight-forwarding group and the other group (p = .018). Similarly, there was a 
significant difference among the means of the port authority and seafarer group 
regarding the importance of free dwell time (F = 2.281; p = .037). 
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Table 5.11: One-Way ANOVA Analysis Regarding the Capacity of Storage 
Space to Absorb Cargo Dedicated to the Local Market 
Port Mean square F Sig. 
Tripoli Between groups 4.769 1.922 .082 
Within groups 2.481   
Benghazi Between groups 2.831 1.179 .329 
Within groups 2.400   
Qasr Ahmed Between groups 3.109 1.696 .128 
Within groups 1.834   
Khoms Between groups 5.701 2.894 .012 
Within groups 1.970   
 
5.6.4 Landside Operations 
Landside connectivity is also crucial for port performance. The port gate is the first 
interaction point between the port and its hinterland. Regarding the number of gate 
lanes, the analysis showed significant difference among the perceptions of the 
respondents regarding the number of gate lanes at Benghazi, Qasr Ahmed and 
Khoms ports. For instance, regarding Benghazi port, it was found that the p value 
was .016 (see Table 5.12). A post-hoc Tukey HDS test showed that this significant 
difference was only between the LMT and seafarer group (p = .027). 
In addition, a significant difference was found among the respondents’ perceptions 
regarding Qasr Ahmed port (F = 2.436; p = .028). A post-hoc Tukey HDS test 
showed that the smallest p value was 0.054, which was between the freight 
forwarder group and the other group. Further, a Games-Howell test was conducted 
and found that the mean significant difference at the level of .050 was between the 
same pair, where p was .036. Yet another significant difference among the means 
was in relation to Khoms port (F = 2.654; p = .018). This significant difference was 
between the freight forwarder group and seafarer group (p = .024). 
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Similarly, there was a significant difference among the respondents’ perceptions 
regarding the importance of the customs clearance process. The pair that had the 
smallest p value was the LMA and seafarer group, with a significant difference (p = 
.068). However, there was no significant difference regarding the corruption of 
customs clearance processes and cargo delivery times.  
Table 5.12: ANOVA Test Regarding the Number of Gate Lanes 
Port Mean square F Sig. 
Tripoli Between groups 77.556 2.154 0.05 
Within groups 36.012   
Benghazi Between groups 5.51 2.718 0.016 
Within groups 2.027   
Qasr Ahmed Between groups 4.408 2.436 0.028 
Within groups 1.809   
Khoms Between groups 5.138 2.654 0.018 
Within groups 1.936   
Regarding the suitability of the existing road networks for hinterland transport and 
the necessity of rail networks to enhance the efficiency cargo flow, no significant 
difference among the means of the respondents’ perceptions was found. However, 
the analysis showed that there are significant difference between the perceptions of 
the LMA and carrier group in terms of the importance of inland transport cost (F = 
2,278; p = .038). 
5.6.5 Online Services and Cargo Safety 
One-way ANOVA showed no significant difference among the means of the 
respondents’ perceptions regarding online services (e.g., online services for customs 
services, cargo tracking, tracking of ships’ movements and online transactions). 
Similarly, one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference among the total means 
of the stakeholders’ perceptions regarding cargo safety (e.g., the level of labour 
competence, safety awareness, cargo damage and cargo loss). 
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5.7 Summary 
The study used primary data obtained from an online survey questionnaire to 
examine the performance of the four main Libyan ports. The response rate was 45 
per cent of the total participants. The participants were from local Libyan port 
stakeholders and from different managerial levels. A non-response bias test was 
conducted using a t-test. The t-test illustrated no mean difference across the 
respondents with respect to the early and late responses. 
The performance criteria consisted of port productivity, port efficiency and customer 
service quality related to seaside operations, terminal operations and landside 
operations. The poor performance of Libyan ports was due to a lack of capacity of 
the seaside, sea-land and landside resources. Improving productivity by expanding 
the capacity of port facilities appeared to be the only viable solution for meeting 
growing customer demand. This includes the capacity of port infrastructure and 
superstructure. 
Concerning seaside, the lack of deep water has prevented Libyan ports from 
attracting larger ships. Moreover, the berth length of Tripoli and Benghazi ports has 
had the same effect in relation to attracting larger ships. This has forced Libyan ports 
to deal only with smaller ships, which has a negative effect on performance. Apart 
from the larger shipments reducing transport costs, serving smaller ships leads to 
wasting the time used to dock and undock the ships. 
Regarding terminal operations, the analysis showed that all Libyan ports suffer from 
a severe deficiency in cargo-handling equipment. The lack of efficient QCs has 
forced the Libyan ports to use ships’ cranes for loading and off-loading containers. 
This has resulted in longer ship turnaround times, unavailability of berths for 
inbound vessels, and disturbances in ships’ scheduling and consequent port 
performance. It has also prevented the ports from meeting customer requirements, 
such as port reliability and service flexibility. 
Additionally, the lack of efficient transport equipment has slowed down container 
movements between the ship’s side and storage yard. This has resulted in idle crane 
time and a consequent low crane throughput. Similarly, the severe lack of 
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sophisticated stacking equipment has undermined the optimal utilisation of Libyan 
ports’ storage yards. Consequently, the storage yards of Libyan ports can only 
absorb containers dedicated to the local market. However, apart from other 
influential factors, Libyan ports cannot be used as hubs for international distribution 
unless the capacity of stacking equipment is increased by replacing the currently 
used conventional stacking equipment with more sophisticated ones. 
In terms of landside operations, the number of gate lanes of Libyan ports is not 
considered a bottleneck that undermines container flow between the ports and the 
hinterland. However, the corrupt and complicated customs clearance process is the 
main obstacle of container flow and delivery time. Further, the study has showed that 
improving the existing road networks is required to enhance cargo flow. 
Additionally, establishing rail networks is essential to reduce pressure on the existing 
road networks. 
Other factors also undermine the performance of Libyan ports. These include the 
total working hours and the absence of online services. Regarding the total working 
hours at Libyan ports, the existing working time is not sufficient to provide the 
required services to customers. Moreover, this time is used inefficiently. Therefore, 
to increase performance, this time has to be increased to 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week and idle time has to be eliminated. 
The second factor is the non-adoptability of online services. This includes online 
customs services, online cargo tracking, online tracking for ships’ movement and 
online transactions. Implementing all of these online services enhances port 
performance as it minimises bureaucracy and processing time and effort. 
The above illustrates that there are some factors related to port infrastructure and 
superstructure that have substantial influence on the performance of Libyan ports. 
Some of these factors are under the control of the port authority and can be 
quantified. Such factors are water depth, berth length, the number and the type of 
QCs, transport equipment, stacking equipment and the storage yard area. These 
factors are used again in Chapter 6 to evaluate and compare the efficiency of seven 
Libyan ports against 18 container ports related to Libya’s trading partner countries. 
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Chapter 6: Data Envelopment Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter contained the descriptive and one-way ANOVA analysis. The 
performance of Libyan ports is low. The performance of Libyan ports is influenced 
by the limitation of the ports’ capacity, which is caused by the lack of key port 
resources. These resources are closely associated with port infrastructure and 
superstructure. This chapter uses the same variables associated with port 
infrastructure and superstructure to evaluate the efficiency of Libyan ports using 
DEA. 
DEA relies on productivity indicators that provide a measure of efficiency, which 
characterises the operating activities of the units being compared (Vercellis, 2009). 
Efficiency can be measured totally or partially. However, due to the quantity and 
availability of the data required, it is difficult to measure the total factor productivity 
(Manzoni, 2007). The total factor productivity attempts to obtain the output-to-input 
ratio value, which considers all outputs and all inputs (Cooper et al., 2007). The 
partial productivity ratio has become the most widely used as it is easy to 
understand, calculate and obtain data for. However, one of the disadvantages of the 
partial productivity measurement is that it may mislead and fail to give a true and 
complete picture of the situation (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009). 
Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007) have divided the efficiency measures in DEA into 
two types: radial and non-radial. The differences between these two measures lie in 
the characteristics of the items of inputs or outputs. Most DEA models can be 
categorised into four categories: 1) radial and oriented, 2) non-radial and oriented, 3) 
radial and non-oriented, and 4) non-radial and non-oriented (Cooper et al., 2007). 
Radial means that a proportional reduction or enlargement of inputs/outputs is the 
major concern in efficiency measurement, while oriented indicates input-oriented or 
output-oriented. The radial approach is represented by the CCR and BBC models. 
The non-radial approach, or slacks-based measure (SBM), utilises input and output 
slacks directly. The outcomes of DEA analysis are efficiency scores, which represent 
performance indicators: ‘1’ is the best performance and ‘0’ is the worst performance. 
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Two choices of formulation are required by a basic DEA analysis: choice of 
envelopment surface and choice of orientation. The choice of envelopment surface is 
possible as constant return-to-scale (CRS) or VRS. The choice of orientation used in 
this research, or focus of analysis, is possible as a maximisation of outputs or 
minimisation of inputs or no orientation (Cooper et al., 2007). 
An assumption of the CRS model refers to the situation where the changes in output 
are in the same proportion as the changes in inputs, while assumptions of the VRS 
model reflect increasing changes; for example, changes of 25 per cent in inputs 
correspond to changes of 50 per cent in outputs (Samoilenko and Osei-Bryson, 
2013). 
The two most basic DEA models are the CCR model and the BCC. The CCR model 
was initially proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (Wöber, 2007). It is 
based on the assumption that CRS prevails at the efficient frontiers. 
Computationally, it is likely to be more efficient, as it involves fewer constraints 
(Vercellis, 2009). Therefore, the use of the CCR model might be preferred to the 
BCC model for returns-to-scale analyses. 
Efficiency frontier is a line that envelops all the efficient MDUs (1 score) in the 
sample, which is very precisely defined and allows the calculation of potential 
improvements for the inefficient MDUs (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009) (see Figure 
6.1). 
The BCC is the CCR model modified by Banker, Charnes and Cooper in 1984 
(Reilly, 2008). BCC and additive models assume VRS frontiers; that is, increasing, 
constant and decreasing returns-to-scale (Cooper et al., 2007). The BCC model 
separates the analysis in a twofold manner by: (1) evaluating technical efficiency in 
its envelopment model and (2) evaluating returns-to-scale efficiency in its dual 
(multiplier) model. The CCR model simultaneously evaluates both types of 
efficiency (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 2009, Cooper et al., 2007). 
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Figure 6.1: Efficient Frontier for Seven MDUs with Two Inputs and One 
Output 
This chapter uses the two most basic DEA models, which are the DEA-CCR model 
and the DEA-BCC under input-oriented approach. CCR was used to measure the 
global technical efficiency and BCC was used to measure the local pure technical 
efficiency. The multiple performance measures are classified into inputs and outputs 
(Lim and Zhu, 2013). In this study, an input-oriented measure was applied. In the 
input-oriented analysis, the production frontier explains the minimum amount of 
inputs required to achieve the given levels of output. In other words, technical 
efficiency (TE) refers to the ability of DMUs to decrease the input used to achieve 
the given levels of output, or evaluate by how much input quantities can be 
proportionally decreased without changing the quantities produced (Reilly, 2008). 
This implies that the improvement of container port efficiency by reducing inputs 
used can automatically increase the port container throughput. 
6.2 Variables Identification 
The TE analysis is the ratio form of actual productivity (output per unit of input) and 
frontier (best practice) productivity (Kiatpathomchai, 2008). Accordingly, it requires 







































factors that influence port efficiency could complicate the study (Wöber, 2007). 
Further, obtaining quantitative data for all of these factors is impractical (Lim and 
Zhu, 2013). Despite the author searching on the official websites of a number of 
container ports and port operators to obtain as much data as possible, as well as 
contacting some officials related to these ports, he could not access all of the 
required data to increase the sample size and the number of variables. Therefore, the 
study partially measured the efficiency of seven Libyan ports compared with 18 
container ports and terminals in Libya’s trading partner countries. Moreover, it 
focused on the factors determined out of the descriptive analysis (in Chapter 5), as 
the most influential factors on Libyan port performance. 
The output and input variables used for performance evaluation should reflect the 
process of container port production and the actual objectives as accurately as 
possible (Lin and Tseng, 2007a, Cullinane and Wang, 2006). Therefore, the study 
relied on secondary data derived from the official websites, reports and media 
releases of the sample ports. Some other data were obtained directly from the port 
authorities through email or phone communication. 
As the focus here is on container ports, the total throughput in terms of TEUs is a 
good measurement for output (Tongzon and Heng, 2005). Therefore, TEU 
throughput was considered as an output variable in the DEA analysis of this study. 
To produce this output and facilitate port operations, certain types of inputs were 
needed (Tongzon and Heng, 2005). 
The descriptive analysis in Chapter 5 showed that Libyan ports do not perform well 
because of a deficiency in port superstructure and infrastructure. Similarly, the 
efficiency of container ports is associated with some resources related to ports’ 
infrastructure and superstructure, which were used as inputs in DEA analysis. For 
instance, carriers require deep water and berths suitable for the size of their ships and 
an optimal storage yard area (Kremer, 2013). Therefore, port infrastructure resources 
including port water depth and the total length of berths to provide seaside 
accessibility were included as input variables. Further, such resources consist of the 
storage yard area to accommodate the volume of containers handled at the port. In 
contrast, port superstructure resources consist of all the equipment used to handle 
containers within the port. 
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Container-handling equipment includes transport equipment, stacking equipment and 
gantry container cranes. Therefore, these three types of superstructure resources were 








Figure 6.2: Port Superstructure 
For more explanation in terms of seaside cranes, some ports included in the sample 
use mobile cranes such as boosting telescopic mast cranes and fixed mast cranes. 
Others employ more specialised and sophisticated cranes, such as Panamax or post-
Panamax or Super-post-Panamax gantry container cranes. Employing different types 
of cranes leads to different port performances, due to the different capacities of each 
type. 
Similarly, the data showed that each port in the sample use different numbers and 
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and reach stackers for container stacking. Others ports, which adopt a vertical 
stacking mode, use more sophisticated equipment, such as RMGs or RTGs to 
optimise storage capacity. 
In the same manner regarding transport equipment, some ports employ trucks or 
trailers and tractors to transport containers between the seaside and storage yards. 
Others use remotely controlled vehicles called AGVs to enhance the efficiency of 
container transport within the port. Other ports use SCs for both transporting and 
stacking the containers. The differences in using this equipment are expected to lead 
to different port performance. 
Apart from the type of handling equipment used, the amount of this equipment also 
has an influence on container port efficiency. Moreover, port infrastructure, 
combined with port superstructure, influences efficiency. The statistics also show 
that the amount of equipment and the dimensions of the infrastructure differ from 
one port to another. Table 6.1 shows the differences in container-handling equipment 
and port infrastructure of the selected container ports and terminals around the world 
belonging to Libya’s trading partner countries. 
The port equipment included in Table 6.1 were consolidated and classified based on 
their functionality into three input variables, for two reasons. The first is to have 
homogenous variables and the second is to minimise the number of variables that 
suit the sample size. Moreover, using the data in Table 6.1 increases the number of 
efficient ports dramatically, because of the zero value in most variables. Therefore, 
the total input variables considered in this analysis are six related to port 
infrastructure and superstructure. The variables related to port infrastructure were 
port water depth, berth length and storage yard area. The port superstructure 
variables were seaside cranes, transport and transfer equipment (see Figure 6.2), 
whereas the output variable used was TEU throughput. 
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Terminal 1. Shanghai Pudong Int. Cont.Terminals Ltd 10 0 73 0 0 11 36 900 500 13 2.450176 
Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong Cont.r Terminals Ltd 16 0 0 48 0 25 48 1300 781 12.8 9.061 
La-Pezia 9 2 0 0 66 16 18 1232 372 14 0.85 
Gioia Tauro 22 2 0 0 110 13 0 3391 1600 18 2.857438 
Jebel Ali Terminal 1&2 79 0 1301 0 0 78 206 7475 20563.9 17 11.6 
Alexandria 5 0 44 0 0 35 6 732 120 14 0.543 
HHLA container terminal Altenwerder  15 0 0 84 0 0 52 1400 1000 16.7 5.844 
Mersin 5 5 50 0 0 24 19 3255 0.25132 14 1.015567 
Izmir 5 0 70 0 0 60 19 1050 0.21594 13 0.716083 
Tripoli 0 13 46 0 0 63 0 4929 75 12 0.131833 
Benghazi 0 10 38 0 0 50 0 4400 444.5 12.5 0.138901 
Brega 0 2 4 0 0 16 0 380 64 11 0.002241 
Tobruk 0 3 5 0 0 13 0 1395 15 8.5 0.000616 
Derna 0 4 6 0 0 18 0 949 15 9 0.002669 
Qasr Ahmed 2 23 50 0 0 50 2 4150 46 13 0.25587 























































































Antwerp gateway terminal 9 0 0 0 47 1 14 1700 1260 16 0.795534 
Marsaxlokk terminals 20 0 346 0 0 24 62 2000 615 15.5 2.37 
Tanger Med port APM terminals 8 0 90 0 0 0 23 800 40 16 1.35 
Terminal TCB SL Barcelona 12 0 0 0 64 11 0 1380 13.8 16 1.017733 
Terminal Catalunya SA Spain 9 0 56 0 0 33 11 1085 3.607 14 0.928 
Piraeus container terminal 15 0 74 0 58 0 8 1487 764 16.5 0.684881 
Amsterdam container terminals 9 0 13 0 38 2 0 1415 542 15 9.215 
Patrick east Swanson dock "Melbourne" 7 0 0 0 42 1 0 885 96.746 14 0.088883 
Brisbane Autostrad terminal 4 0 0 0 27 3 0 930 85.821 14 0.918999 
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6.3 Sample Size 
Sample size is crucial for reliable results. If the number of DMUs is less than the 
combined number of inputs and outputs, a large portion of the DMUs will be 
identified as efficient; additionally, efficiency discrimination among DMUs is 
questionable due to an inadequate number of degrees of freedom (Cooper et al., 
2007). 
Some rules of thumb are used to suggest the optimal number of DMU ‘sample size’, 
inputs and outputs in the envelopment model. The first says that the number of 
DMUs should be equal to or greater than the sum of inputs and outputs (Cooper et 
al., 2007). Another rule of thumb says that the sample size should be equal to or 
greater than three times the sum of outputs and inputs. Finally, the third rule states 
that the sample size is acceptable if the number of fully efficient DMUs is no greater 
than one-third of the total number of DMUs in the sample (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 
2009). 
In this study, six variables were used as input variables. These include the number of 
cranes, transport equipment, stacking equipment, berths length, storage yard and 
water depth. The single output variable is the TEU throughput. Taking the most 
restricted rule, which is that the sample size should be equal to or greater than three 
times the sum of outputs and inputs, the required DMUs are: 
DMUs= 3(inputs + outputs) 
DMUs= 3(6+1) = 21 port 
Accordingly, the total DMUs included in this study are 25 container port and 
terminals, which are more than the required DMUs. Seven are Libyan ports and 18 
are related to 13 countries of Libya’s trading partners (see Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2: The Selected DMUs and Input and Output Variables 










































































1 China Terminal 1. Shanghai Pudong International Container Terminals Ltd 10 73 47 900 500 13 2.450176 
2 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong Container Terminals Limited 16 48 73 1300 781 12.8 9.061 
3 Italy La-Pezia 11 66 34 1232 372 14 0.85 
4 Gioia Tauro 24 110 13 3391 1600 18 2.857438 
5 UAE Jebel Ali Terminal 1&2 79 1301 293 7475 20563.9 17 11.6 
6 Egypt Alexandria 5 44 35 732 120 14 0.543 
7 Germany HHLA Container Terminal Altenwerder  15 84 52 1400 1000 16.7 5.844 
8 Turkey Mersin 10 50 43 3255 251.32 14 1.015567 
9 Izmir 5 70 79 1050 215.94 13 0.716083 
10 Libya Tripoli 13 46 63 4929 75 12 0.131833 
11 Benghazi 10 38 50 4400 444.5 12.5 0.138901 
12 Brega 2 4 16 380 64 11 0.002241 
13 Tobruk 3 5 13 1395 15 8.5 0.000616 
14 Derna 4 6 18 949 15 9 0.002669 
15 Qasr Ahmed 24 50 52 4150 46 13 0.25587 
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16 Khoms 4 32 33 1680 125 13 0.081381 
17 Belgium Antwerp gateway terminal 9 74 15 1700 1260 16 0.795534 
18 Malta Marsaxlokk Terminals 20 346 75 2000 615 15.5 2.37 
19 Morocco Tanger Med port APM terminals 8 90 23 800 40 16 1.35 
20 Spain Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 12 64 11 1380 13.8 16 1.017733 
21 Terminal Catalunya SA  9 28 44 1085 360.7 14 0.928 
22 Greece Piraeus container terminal 15 132 8 1487 764 16.5 0.684881 
23 Netherland Amsterdam container terminals 9 51 2 1415 542 15 9.215 
24 Australia Patrick East Swanson Dock "Melbourne" 7 42 1 885 96.746 14 0.088883 
25 Brisbane Autostrad Terminal 4 27 3 930 85.821 14 0.918999 
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6.4 Empirical Findings of the BCC and CCR Analyses 
The software DEA-Solver-Pro 9.0 was employed to solve the DEA-BCC-I and 
CCR-I returns-to-scale model. To deal with multiple inputs and outputs, a ratio like 
the following may be used: 
 
Where: 
yr = amount of output r 
Ur = weight assigned to output r 
Xi — amount of input i 
Vi = weight assigned to input i. 
The BCC model assumes that convex combinations of the observed DMUs form the 
production possibility set. The BCC score is known as local pure TE (Lim and Zhu, 
2013). However, the CCR model assumes that the radial expansion and reduction of 
all observed DMUs and their non-negative combinations are possible (Manzoni and 
M.N.Islam, 2009). The CCR score is called global TE. This means that the CCR 
model assumes the constant returns-to-scale production possibility set (Cooper et al., 
2007). 
The input-oriented efficiency is defined as the ratio between the ideal input quantity 
that should be used by DMU if it were efficient, and the actually used quantity 
(Vercellis, 2009). Similarly, the output-oriented efficiency is defined as the ratio 
between the quantity of the actual output produced by the unit and the ideal quantity 
that should be produced in conditions of efficiency (Manzoni, 2007). 
The CCR model, which is an input-oriented model, aims at minimising inputs while 
producing at least the given output levels (Vercellis, 2009). However, the output-
oriented model attempts to maximise outputs, while using no more than the observed 
amount on any inputs (Cooper et al., 2007). 
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One important reason for undertaking a DEA study is to identify inefficient DMUs, 
so that they can be projected onto the efficient frontier (Manzoni and M.N.Islam, 
2009). The efficient frontier provides some indications for improving the 
performance of inefficient DMUs. It identifies, for each output level, the minimum 
level of input used to produce that output (Vercellis, 2009). If a DMU’s actual 
productivity is equal to frontier productivity or lies on the frontier, it means it is 
perfectly technically efficient. Conversely, if a DMU’s actual productivity is less 
than frontier productivity, or lies below the frontier, this illustrates that it is 
technically inefficient (Manzoni, 2007). In other words, the outcomes of DEA 
analysis are efficiency scores, which are represented as performance indicators: (1) is 
best performance and (0) is worst performance (Reilly, 2008). 
6.5 Efficiency and Return-to-Scale 
Table 6.2 shows data from 25 container ports and terminals. Seven of these container 
ports and terminals are Libyan ports. The other 18 belong to 13 of Libya’s trading 
partner countries. The data include variables related to port infrastructure and 
superstructure. To evaluate the relative efficiency of these container ports, the study 
employed six inputs and one output. These inputs are seaside cranes, transport 
equipment, stacking equipment, storage yard area, berths’ length and water depth. 
The single output is container throughput TEUs. From the correlation table (see 
Table 6.3), there is a generally high positive correlation between all the variables, 
except water depth. The value of the correlation coefficient between the water depth 
variable and the other variables is between 0.2065 and 0.4567. This shows that the 
variables are highly associated with each other in a positive linear sense, except that 
the water depth variable is relatively high in relation to the number of cranes, 
transport equipment and total throughput. 
The study used input-oriented models to measure port efficiency. If a DMU has a 
low CCR score and full BCC efficiency, then it is operating efficiently locally, but 
not globally due to the scale size of the DMU. As a result, it is reasonable to 
characterise the scale efficiency of a DMU by the ratio of the two scores (Cooper et 
al., 2007). If a DMU is fully efficient (100%) or scores (1) in both the BCC and CCR 
scores, this means that it is operating at the most productive scale size (Cooper et al., 
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2007). The CCR, BCC and scale efficiency and returns-to-scale characteristics of 
each port/terminal are listed in Table 6.4. 











































































No. of cranes 1 0.942166 0.886753 0.78492 0.933412 0.456677 0.657598 
Transport equip. 0.942166 1 0.913891 0.6708 0.971258 0.392489 0.618799 
Stacking equip. 0.886753 0.913891 1 0.71694 0.905878 0.207453 0.602849 
Quay length/m 0.784923 0.6708 0.716942 1 0.685635 0.206503 0.342201 
Storage area/ km2 0.933412 0.971258 0.905878 0.685635 1 0.334151 0.644314 
Water depth/ m 0.456677 0.392489 0.207453 0.206503 0.334151 1 0.393606 
Tput 2010 (M. 
TEUs) 
0.657598 0.618799 0.602849 0.342201 0.644314 0.393606 1 
 
The results of CCR input-orientation, listed in column three of Table 6.4 show that 
four of the container ports and terminals performed efficiently when they were 
evaluated on the constant returns-to-scale assumption. These ports and terminals are: 
1) Terminal 5 of Shanghai port, operated by Shanghai Mingdong C/T LTD; 2) 
Tanger Med port APM terminals in Morocco; 3) Terminal TCB SL in Barcelona 
Spain; and 4) Amsterdam container terminals in the Netherlands. No Libyan ports 
were included. 
Terminal 5 of Shanghai port was one of best performers, and therefore it is the most 
frequent referent (the largest λ value). It is considered as the most frequent referent 
in ten instances, followed by Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona), with seven and finally 
Tanger Med port APM terminals with six instances. This confirms that these 
container ports and terminals use unique and efficient cargo-handling equipment, in 
contrast to the Libyan ports (see Table 6.1). This issue is discussed in Section 6.8. 
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Table 6.4: Efficiencies and Return-to-Scale 
  CCR-I BCC-I  
No. DMU Score Reference set (lambda) Score RTS Scale efficiency score 
1 Terminal 1. Shanghai Pudong Int. C/T Ltd 0.39599 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.847329 Increasing 0.467339 
2 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong C/T Ltd 1 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
1 Constant 1 
3 La-Pezia 0.130712 Tanger Med port APM terminals 0.698646 Increasing 0.187093 
4 Gioia Tauro 0.25431 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.622271 Increasing 0.40868 
5 Jebel Ali Terminal 1&2 0.963924 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
1 Decreasing 0.963924 
6 Alexandria 0.235609 Tanger Med port APM terminals 0.765082 Increasing 0.307953 
7 HHLA Container Terminal Altenwerder 0.612868 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.743745 Increasing 0.82403 
8 Mersin 0.220678 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 0.641543 Increasing 0.343981 
9 Izmir 0.188416 Tanger Med port APM terminals 0.772781 Increasing 0.243816 
10 Tripoli 0.074841 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 0.713516 Increasing 0.10489 
11 Benghazi 2.01E-02 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.685244 Increasing 0.029274 
12 Brega 2.97E-03 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
1 Increasing 0.002974 
13 Tobruk 2.05E-03 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 1 Increasing 0.002054 
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  CCR-I BCC-I  
14 Derna 8.55E-03 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 1 Increasing 0.008545 
15 Qasr Ahmed 0.189183 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 0.666988 Increasing 0.283638 
16 Khoms 3.55E-02 Tanger Med port APM terminals 0.7038 Increasing 0.050455 
17 Antwerp gateway terminal 8.63E-02 Amsterdam container terminals 0.66384 Increasing 0.130047 
18 Marsaxlokk Terminals 0.243609 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.629022 Increasing 0.387282 
19 Tanger Med port APM terminals 1 Tanger Med port APM terminals 1 Constant 1 
20 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 1 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 1 Constant 1 
21 Terminal Catagunya SA Spain 0.180206 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.721346 Increasing 0.249819 
22 Piraeus container terminal 7.04E-02 Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong  
C/T Ltd 
0.72871 Increasing 0.096562 
23 Amsterdam container terminals 1 Amsterdam container terminals 1 Constant 1 
24 Patrick East Swanson Dock "Melbourne" 5.26E-02 Terminal TCB SL (Barcelona) 1 Increasing 0.052567 
25 Brisbane Autostrad Terminal 0.562528 Tanger Med port APM terminals 1 Increasing 0.562528 
Average   0.341251  0.824154  0.388298 
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The BCC scores provide an efficiency assessment using a local measure of scale 
under variable returns-to-scale. In this model, six container ports and terminals were 
accorded efficient status, in addition to the four CCR efficient container ports and 
terminals. Three of these additional ports were Libyan ports: Brega, Tobruk and 
Derna (see Table 6.4). The full efficiency of these Libyan ports is due to their use of 
the smallest amount of inputs compared to the other most efficient ports. 
According the BCC scores, the Libyan ports exhibited scores in which ruof out of 
seven were below average (0.824154), while the trading partner container ports and 
terminals achieved ten out of 18. This means that both the inefficient Libyan and 
trading partner ports are positioned on average at nearly the same relative distance 
from the efficient BCC frontiers, although there are differences in efficiency among 
these ports and terminals. 
DEA provides a way to investigate the sources of inefficiency that a DMU might 
have and determine whether they are caused by the DMU inefficient operation itself, 
or by the disadvantageous conditions under which the DMU is operating. This can 
be achieved by comparing the CCR-I and BCC-I scores, as mentioned earlier 
(Cooper et al., 2007). 
The scale of efficiency (SE) is defined by the ratio of CCR to BCC as follows: 
 
 
The CCR is known as the global TE, whereas BCC expresses the local pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) under returns-to-scale circumstances. Therefore, using these 





Ɵ* CCR is the score of the global TE, and 
Ɵ* BCC is the score of the local PTE. 
This means that: 
The TE = PTE] x SE (Wöber, 2007). 
Referring to Table 6.4, comparing the trading partner ports and terminals in terms of 
SE score reveals that nine out of 18 ports and terminals are below the average 
(0.388298). However, all the Libyan ports’ scores are below the average, with 
remarkable differences. This may mean that the Libya’s trading partner ports 
experience advantageous conditions compared with the Libyan ports. Moreover, the 
global inefficiency of Libyan ports (CCR) was mainly attributed to the inefficient 
operations associated with port infrastructure and superstructure. 
For instance, Qasr Ahmed port has a low BCC score (0.66699) and a relatively high 
SE compared to the other Libyan ports. This means that the overall inefficiency 
(0.18918) in the CCR column is caused by inefficiency operations, rather than SE 
(0.28364). The inefficient operations are closely associated with the equipment that 
are used for cargo handling. This is similar to Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms ports. 
However, Berga port has a fully efficient BCC score (1.0) and a low SE (0.00297). 
This can be interpreted as meaning that the global inefficiency of this port as given 
by its CCR score is mainly attributable to its disadvantageous port infrastructure and 
superstructure conditions. These results are similarly applied to Derna and Tobruk 
ports. 
Referring to Table 6.4 again, the returns-to-scale, as identified by the input-oriented 
BCC model is under the sixth column ‘RTS’. Any DMU with full efficiency in the 
CCR score is also efficient in the BCC model, and is positioned in the most 
productive scale size (MPSS), in the region where constant returns-to-scale prevails. 
Therefore, Terminal 5 in Shanghai port, operated by Shanghai Mingdong C/T LTD, 
Tanger Med port APM terminals in Morocco, Terminal TCB SL in Barcelona and 
Amsterdam container terminals in the Netherlands are considered in the MPSS 
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region. In contrast, 20 out of the 25 container ports and terminals could possibly 
improve their efficiency by scaling up their activities. This includes all Libyan ports. 
6.6 The Effects of Port Superstructure and Infrastructure 
Based on the BCC model, which provided an efficiency assessment using a local 
measure of scale under VRS, three Libyan ports are fully efficient. These are Brega, 
Tobruk and Derna ports. The full efficiency of these Libyan ports was due to their 
use of the smallest amount of inputs compared to the other efficient ports, which is 
associated with the types of inputs. 
In terms of superstructure, it is noted that all the CCR efficient ports and terminals 
use more sophisticated and specialised container-handling equipment (see Table 
6.5). This is not the case with Libyan ports. For instance, all these ports use different 
types of quay container cranes for ship cargo operations. These include Panamax or 
Post-Panama or Super post-Panamax quay container cranes, with high container 
move rates. However, all the Libyan ports operate mobile cranes for the same 
purpose. Qasr Ahmed is the only Libyan port with two Panamax quay container 
cranes. Moreover, at all the Libyan ports, including Qasr Ahmed in some berths, the 
port operator uses ships’ cranes for ship cargo operations. That is due firstly to the 
lack of efficient cranes at port, and secondly to the efficiency of ships’ cranes 
compared to the ports’ mobile cranes. Thirdly, it is because the ships’ cranes are 
located above the cargo holds; therefore, they are more convenient than the ports’ 
mobile cranes. Fourthly, ships’ cranes have less blind sectors, enabling the crane 
operator to control the container-handling operations more efficiently and safely. 
These findings match the findings of the descriptive and one-way ANOVA analysis, 
which illustrate that the performance of seaside operations in Libyan ports is low 
because of the lack of efficient and specialised cranes at these ports. 
Similarly, Libyan ports use external trucks for container transport, with some port 
tractors and trailers. However, the most efficient ports and terminals use more 
sophisticated transport equipment, such as AGVs, straddle carriers and tractors and 
trailers. For instance, the most efficient terminal, Terminal 5 in Shanghai port, 
employs 48 AGVs. In addition, Terminal TCB SL in Barcelona operates 64 SCs to 
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Terminal 5. Shanghai Mingdong C/T Ltd 
13 PP 0 2x60 8X8 0 0 0 2 0 48 1300 781 12.8 9.061 
1 SPP   46x40 10x3                     
2 P     4x5                     
        1x25                     
Tripoli 
3 BTM 40 T 0 0 43 22 24   20 0 0 4929 75 12 0.131833 
6 BTM 80T                           
4 BTM 100T                           
Benghazi 
3 BTM 80T 0 0 33 17 21   17 0 0 4400 444.5 12.5 0.138901 
4 BTM 40T                           
3 FMC 100T                           
Brega 2 BTM 100T 0 0 16 3 1 0 0 0 0 380  64 11 0.002241 
Tobruk 3 BTM 80T   0 12 3 2 0 1 0 0 1395 15 8.5 0.000616 
                Derna 4 BTM 40T 0 0 17 3 3 0 1 0 0 949 15 9 0.002669 
Qasr Ahmed 
2 P 0 0 38 25 25 0 12 0 2 4150 46 13 0.25587 
11 FMC 100T                           
































































































2 FMC 100T 0 0 17 14 18   16 0 0 1680 125 13 0.081381 
1 BTM 80T                           
1 BTM 40T                           
 8 SPP 0 0   45 45 0   0 23 800 40 16 1.35 
Tangier Med port APM terminals 
3 SPP 0 0 0 0 0 64 11 0 0 1380 13.8 16 1.017733 
5 PP                           
4 P                           
Amsterdam container terminals 9 PP 0 0 1 10 3 38 1 0 0 1415 542 15 9.215 
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transport and stack containers in the same time. Similarly, Amsterdam container 
terminals use a combination of SC and trailers, depending mainly on the straddle 
carriers. A Tangier Med port APM terminal in Morocco uses 45 tractors and 45 
trailers, which is the same type of transport equipment used by the Libyan ports. 
However, the amount of this equipment at the Libyan ports is not enough to ensure 
the efficiency of Libyan ports. This illustrates that the used transport equipment is 
both insufficient and inefficient, which is an outcome similar to that indicated by 
data derived from the descriptive and one-way ANOVA analysis in Chapter 5. 
According to the perspective of Libyan port stakeholders, the transport equipment 
used at Libyan ports undermines the performance of ports’ performance. 
Similarly, regarding stacking equipment, some of the most efficient ports use SCs 
for transport and stacking operations. The most efficient Terminal 5 in Shanghai port 
uses 48 RTGs for container stacking and retrieving. However, Libyan ports still use 
conventional forklifts and reach stackers for container stacking and retrieving. As a 
result, both the descriptive and DEA analysis show that Libyan ports are not efficient 
due to their use of inefficient stacking equipment. Using such conventional stacking 
equipment increases the stacking and retrieving time, which is closely associated 
with the total operations time. 
All of this shows that the existing superstructure at Libyan ports has a negative 
impact on their efficiency. It is also validates the findings derived from the local 
stakeholders of Libyan ports. Therefore, Libyan port superstructure needs to be 
developed to enhance efficiency. 
In terms of infrastructure, specifically water depth, the analysis shows that the 
correlation coefficient value of the water depth and other variables is between 0.2065 
and 0.4567, which is comparatively low. However, the highest correlation value of 
water depth was with the number of cranes (0.457), followed by transport equipment 
and container throughput (0.39). Therefore, this variable is considered in the DEA 
analysis. 
A port with deep water can attract the mega ships with deep draft to use its facilities 
(Maersk, 2012). Serving mega ships with a large volume of containers increases the 
throughput per time unit. This increase in throughput is achieved by saving the time 
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used for ships’ docking/undocking. In other words, the time required to handle 7,000 
TEUs from a single ship, using a certain amount of handling equipment, is shorter 
than the time required to handle the same number of TEUs from two or three ships 
using the same handling equipment. This time difference is the time used for 
undocking the first ship and docking the next ship. Further, part of this time is 
considered idle time for cranes, transport and stacking equipment, which is spent in 
docking operations. However, the water depth of Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports, 
compared to Terminal 5 in Shanghai port (which is the most efficient terminal) are 
nearly the same. This implies that the Libyan ports’ water depth does not undermine 
the performance of these ports. Therefore, some Libyan ports can enhance their 
efficiency through better use of other port resources, rather than dredging their 
seabed. This also validates the findings of the descriptive analysis regarding water 
depth. However, this cannot be applied to the Tripoli and Benghazi ports. 
Similarly, the length of berths, as part of the infrastructure, does not seem to disrupt 
the efficiency of Qasr Ahmed and Khoms ports. This is because some of the most 
efficient ports and terminals have shorter total berth lengths than these ports. 
However, berth design, which is not included in this study, may influence both berth 
allocation and crane allocation plans (Imai et al., 2008, Kim and Park, 2004, Zhou 
and Kang, 2008), which are associated with port efficiency. This could be the case 
with Tripoli and Benghazi ports: they have a corrugated berth design, which makes 
the length of each individual berth short, whereas the new ports of Qasr Ahmed and 
Khoms have straight and long berths. 
Storage yard use depends mainly on cargo-handling equipment, particularly stacking 
equipment (Chen, 1999). It also depends on storage mode and block design (Kim 
and Kim, 2002). The storage yard area of the most efficient ports and terminals, and 
Libyan ports, is nearly similar. For instance, the storage yard area of the first most 
efficient terminal is 781 square kilometres, compared to 444.5 square kilometres for 
Benghazi port. In contrast, the storage yard area of Terminal TCB SL in Barcelona is 
only 13.8 square kilometres, as compared to the 15 square kilometres of Derna port. 
Therefore, the influence of storage yard area on the efficiency of Libyan ports could 
be due to a severe lack of efficient stacking equipment at Libyan ports. This is also 
confirmed by the perspective of the local stakeholders in Chapter 5, which illustrated 
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that the existing area of the storage yards can deal with the existing volume of cargo 
dedicated to local market, but not the cargo dedicated to both local and international 
markets. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the efficiency of seven Libyan ports compared to 18 
container ports and terminals related to Libya’s trading partners. Six variables have 
been used as inputs and one variable has been used as an output. The software DEA-
Solver-Pro 9.0 was employed to solve the input-orientation BCC and CCR returns-
to-scale model. The local measure of the BCC input-oriented showed that only three 
ports are locally efficient, due to using the smallest amount of inputs. These ports are 
Brega, Derna and Tobruk. However, the CCR input-oriented showed that no Libyan 
ports were globally efficient. The overall inefficiency of Qasr Ahmed, Tripoli, 
Benghazi and Khoms was due to inefficient operations, which are associated with 
port capacity. Port capacity is more closely associated with port infrastructure and 
superstructure, rather than with SE. 
The fully efficient BCC Libyan ports of Brega, Derna and Tobruk have low SE. This 
means that the global inefficiency of these ports as given by their CCR scores can be 
attributed to their disadvantageous port infrastructure and superstructure conditions. 
These findings increase the finding validity of the descriptive and one-way ANOVA 
analysis, which illustrated that the number and type of cranes, transport and stacking 
equipment used by Libyan ports are the main influential factors undermining their 
performance. Neither are they able to meet any potential increased demand. 
In addition, in terms of port infrastructure, the water depth and berth length of the 
two comparatively new ports—Qasr Ahmed and Khoms—do not have a significant 
influence on performance. However, these factors do affect the performance of 
Tripoli and Khoms ports. This is due to both the shallow water depth compared to 
the new generation of container ships and the berth design of these ports. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical discussion about the research 
findings regarding port performance and efficiency, within the Libyan context. This 
thesis was developed to provide a comprehensive explanation as to why Libyan ports 
continue to struggle with basic performance problems. It also investigates the direct 
factors that influence port performance, based on the primary data collected for this 
study. It then links these factors to the external influential factors derived from the 
literature. Although much is known from the literature on port performance, most of 
the evidence relates to ports in developed economies. Little analysis has been 
conducted on port performance issues in developing economies, particularly in 
Africa. 
This study was conducted in two phases to achieve the objectives. The first phase 
measured the performance of the four main Libyan ports from the perspective of 
local stakeholders, using quantitative survey data. The second phase evaluated the 
performance of seven Libyan ports against 18 container ports and terminals 
belonging to Libya’s trading partners. The study findings highlight a number of 
issues leading to poor performance at the ports. Port users identified a number of 
factors they considered most important in an efficient world-class port. These 
include: port reliability, flexibility, cargo safety, port accessibility, port throughput 
and operational cost and time. Port reliability is expressed in terms of ships’ 
scheduling, cargo-handling facilities, cargo delivery time and the reliability of 
customs clearance processes. Similarly, the ability of Libyan ports to deliver flexible 
services to the customer was considered very important. Such services include 
providing berthing on arrival for inbound ships at short notice and dealing with 
irregular cargo sizes and weights. Cargo safety was presented in terms of cargo 
damage and loss and was considered a critical factor that undermined user 
confidence. The analysis also found that seaside accessibility, which includes water 
depth and length of berths, constituted a major factor for port users, as these 
determine the size of ships that can be served by Libyan ports. 
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Another major factor affecting Libyan ports’ performance relates to landside 
accessibility: this determines cargo flow and overall dwell time. By extension, these 
factors affect overall port throughput and productivity. Ultimately, the combined 
outcome of these factors is escalating operating costs for all users, including cargo 
owners and ship owners. These expenses incorporate cargo-handling fees, customs 
clearance fees and inland transport costs. The cost component was also expressed in 
terms of time lost in inland cargo transit for cargo owners, and ships’ turnaround 
times for ship owners. Another important factor that influences the performance of 
Libyan ports is the lack of up-to-date technological capability. The literature shows 
that the world’s best-performing ports use advanced managerial technologies when 
organising their work processes (Gekara & Fairbrother 2013; Kia et al. 2004). Such 
technologies could improve customs clearances, cargo tracking, ships’ scheduling 
and cargo delivery scheduling. The streamlining of the cargo-operation process and 
reduction in paperwork through process automation would greatly reduce operation 
time and costs for all stakeholders. In the present situation, in which the operations 
are apparently characterised by heavy bureaucracy, corruption and workforce 
ineptitude, stakeholders see such automations as a way of improving operations. 
Most importantly, the data shows that the real problem lies in a failure to invest in 
port infrastructure, superstructure and hinterland transport infrastructure. This 
includes maritime and land port accessibility, as well as cargo-handling equipment, 
cargo holding yards and workplace technologies. This issue of investment in ports 
seems to underpin the overall situation of underperformance. The DEA analysis in 
the second phase of the study also confirmed that the lack of seaside cranes, 
transport and stacking equipment, as well as maritime accessibility, are the key 
impediments to the efficient performance of Libyan ports. 
The discussion in this chapter seeks to theorise the situation in the Libyan port 
industry and examine the salient reason behind the factors identified in the data. The 




The data have revealed that port performance in Libya is undermined by a number of 
resource-related factors. It is important to understand the root cause of the resource 
problem. The general literature on port performance shows that this issue is multi-
dimensional. In the literature, port performance is assessed by the extent to which it 
meets the expectations of customers and/or by its productivity or efficiency (Liu, 
2009, Haezendonck et al., 2011, Yan et al., 2009, Le-Griffin, 2008, Acosta et al., 
2011, Myung-Shin, 2003, Yap and Lam, 2006, Perez-Labajos and Blanco, 2004, 
David Xiaosong Peng et al., 2011, Wu and Goh, 2010). These aspects of 
performance include port reliability, flexibility, cargo safety, port accessibility, port 
throughput and cargo-handling cost and time. 
Studies also reveal a number of factors that influence port performance and highlight 
some of the key challenges in achieving and maintaining efficient performance. 
Further, they indicate that only a few of these can be controlled directly by port 
operators through their internal management systems (Le-Griffin, 2008). These 
include port infrastructure, the technology used for handling operations, port 
workforce recruitment training and skills development, and internal management. 
However, most of the factors that may enhance or hinder performance lie outside the 
control of individual port authorities and terminal operators. As such, Gekara and 
Chhetri (2013), in their analysis of Mombasa port, conclude that a port is only as 
efficient as the environment within which it operates. Factors such as trade volumes 
and the hinterland trade capacity, shipping patterns, hinterland connectivity and 
access, and the performance of hinterland transportation modes are very influential, 
yet are beyond the control of port operators and port authorities (Le-Griffin, 2008). 
Other political, economic and social factors are also highly influential and also 
beyond the control of port operators; for example, the nature of economic 
governance, regional security and the availability and efficiency of supporting 
industries. Therefore, this analysis takes an internal–external sphere of influence 
approach to determine the most influential factors, which explain the Libyan port 
industry’s continued poor performance. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the relationships between port performance and its internal and 
external environment. This figure is based on the analysis findings and the literature 
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concerning Libya. It is adopted as a framework for grounding the study findings in 
context and developing an understanding of the underlying causes for the poor 
performance of Libyan ports. 
 
Figure 7.1: Framework for Understanding Port Performance in a Developing 
Country Context 
Most ports perform differently, as they operate under different environments. In 
most developing economies, a particular political, economic and social environment 
is created, which influences the performance of economic institutions. Figure 7.1 
illustrates the pressures that bear on ports and suggests that the effectiveness of any 
one port will be determined by whether these pressures are positive or negative. At 
the centre of the framework are the structures and systems directly under the control 
of the terminal/port operator. This is the internal environment. The assumption is 
that the terminal operator is able to control and regulate the internal environment to 
optimise operations and achieve efficiency. This operator should be able to develop 
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management and resource allocation. Another assumption is that the terminal 
operator is able to acquire up-to-date equipment and technologies, and employ the 
most skilled workers. They should also be able to ensure that the port is able to dock 
appropriately sized ships. 
These assumptions are embedded in the various pressures that validate or invalidate 
them. These form the external environment that is often beyond the control of the 
port/terminal operator. The performance of a port terminal will be influenced by a 
number of external pressures, including the region’s trade capacity and the 
accessibility of the port’s economic catchment area, the prevailing political 
environment, the prevailing social and economic environment, and the existing 
system of governance. If the regional trade volumes are low, then the viability of the 
port is undermined. If the hinterland is inaccessible because of poor connectivity, 
this may mean that cargo does not reach or leave the port as scheduled, causing 
delays and port congestion, a situation characterised by long dwell times and lengthy 
ship turnarounds. Poor systems of economic governance combined with political 
instability could undermine the operations of different economic institutions, such as 
ports. For example, the ability of the port operator to invest in appropriate 
equipment, technologies and skills depends on the capacity to attract capital. The 
ability of the port to access private sector capital is important, and is therefore related 
to the level of economic liberalisation in the country. 
With Libyan ports, the findings indicate a situation of continuing underperformance. 
Using the above framework of internal structures and processes versus external 
performance enablers, the next section examines the specific situation in Libya, in an 
attempt to ground the findings contextually. The question is: why have ports failed to 
implement efficient operating environments? The factors identified as hindering 
efficient performance mostly relate to a lack of investment in port infrastructure, 
superstructure, ICT and labour skills. However, improving these internal factors 
without addressing the external factors is a key problem facing Libyan ports. 
Therefore, to understand what these findings mean, we need to look at a broader 
environment and understand the reality concerning how ports perform in a 
developing country with a particular type of economic, social and political 
environment. To develop this understanding with reference to Libyan ports, the 
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following sections will examine the influence of Libya’s local and regional politics, 
and the system of economic regulation and governance, on the performance of 
essential economic institutions; in this case, ports. 
7.2.1 Bad Politics, Poor Economic Governance and the Implications for Port 
Performance 
Libya presents a particular type of environment, shaped by the nature of its politics 
and economic governance. The Libyan economy is influenced by a troubled history 
of internal systems of poor governance and a volatile political environment. In terms 
of internal systems, when Gaddafi began ruling the country in 1969, his regime 
managed to promote some vital sectors such as health, education, agriculture, 
manufacturing, infrastructure and transportation (RABA, 2012, RABA, 2013, Otman 
and Karlberg, 2007). All of these sectors contributed to the Libyan economy. During 
this period, the country was almost self-sufficient, mostly relying on its own 
production. However, all of these sectors, except the oil sector, experienced a decline 
at the end of the 1970s and 1980s, when the Libyan regime became much more 
socialist and introduced the Green Book (Pack, 2013). 
The Green Book was written by Gaddafi to illustrate his philosophy in three parts 
and named it the third universal theory. The first part discussed the problem of 
democracy, which gives authority to the people. This chapter argued that all people 
are equal and have the same political authority (al-Qaddafi, 1975). However, this 
affected the organisational hierarchy in Libya. It was understood that there was no 
difference between the leader or the manager and the low ranks of labourers. This 
led to inefficient performance within organisations due to the lack of adherence to 
organisational procedures. The second part discussed the solutions to economic 
problems. In this part, Gaddafi presented his belief that socialism was the optimal 
solution for economic problems. This part discussed the economic basis of the so-
called ‘third universal theory’: need, ownership of housing, land, means of transport, 
income and domestic servants. However, 42 years of bad politics based on the Green 
Book have undermined economic performance (Obaidi, 2014). The Green Book 
determined economic liberalisation and consequently introduced corruption, 
mismanagement and problems with governance (Obaidi, 2014). These have 
undermined the performance of all economic aspects, not just ports, as an ‘illness’ in 
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local politics cannot be isolated from the economy (as discussed later in detail). The 
third part discussed the social basis of the Green Book. This includes the family, the 
tribe, the nation, women, minorities, education, music, arts and sports. 
The deterioration of these vital sectors was due to the central management, 
mismanagement and the regime focusing more on external involvement rather than 
internal issues. For example, road networks were not paved to prevent increased 
congestion, existing roads were not maintained (RABA, 2012, RABA, 2013) and the 
country is still without any rail network to minimise the pressure on roads (CETMO, 
2010, Gazette, 2010, Gazette, 2008, RPEMB, 2013). Moreover, foreign specialists at 
local hospitals, schools and factories were not paid and so left the country. Many 
staff had already left the country during the conflicts with Egypt and Tunisia. 
Together, these losses of staff reduced the level of health and education services. As 
the quality of health services provided by the local hospitals and local staff was now 
insufficient (WHO, 2012), Libyans were forced to travel to neighbouring countries 
such as Tunisia and Egypt for medical treatment, which is very costly due to the 
modified exchange rate.  
The socialist transformation adopted by the former regime affected the Libyans’ 
welfare and national economy (Obaidi, 2014). The following illustrates the impact of 
local politics on welfare and economic performance. Based on the Green Book 
published by Gaddafi, owning more than one house and car was prohibited. 
Therefore, if a person had two houses and one of them was rented, the tenant had the 
right to own this house. Similarly, no person or authority had the right to own a 
means of transportation for the purpose of renting it. In the same manner, as per the 
Green Book (p. 57), no one could own a piece of land, even if he or she had bought 
it: 
Land is the private property of none. Rather, everyone has the right to beneficially 
utilise it by working, farming or pasturing as long as he and his heirs live on it—to 
satisfy their needs, but without employing others with or without a wage (al-
Qaddafi, 1975). 
The Green Book dictated that savings in excess of one’s needs would be the person’s 
share of society’s wealth (al-Qaddafi, 1975). Therefore, everyone had the right to 
save from his or her wealth the amount that he or she needed, no matter the source of 
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this income. However, this did not apply to the president’s family and loyalists. 
Therefore, Gaddafi was strangling the economy at the same time as he was enriching 
his people, which meant he was activating and sustaining injustice, corruption and 
mismanagement (Pack, 2013). These factors translated into economic 
mismanagement on a large scale (Elbsaikri, 2005). Further, all of these philosophies 
resulted in animosities and led to chronic problems within the Libyan community. 
Many people resorted to the judiciary to regain their property, in a corrupt way. 
Meanwhile, implementing the Green Book philosophy forced the majority of 
Libyans to work for the public sector at low wages. This sector was full of corruption 
and was unproductive. However, if anyone criticised the beliefs enshrined in the 
Green Book, they faced severe punishment from ‘the revolutionary committee 
members’. The regime successfully stifled voices demanding freedom, justice and 
development, not by negotiation, but by execution, arrest or exile. Examples of this 
are that Gaddafi had killed his companions who were involved in the overthrow, and 
had the opposition hanged in town squares and universities. The most horrible 
example was when 1,200 prisoners in Abu Salim prison were killed over the course 
of a few hours in June 1996 (HRW, 2006). 
Regarding the economy, it established a system of economic management, which led 
to many problems, such as weak and inconsistent regulations, centralisation of 
economic power in the hands of the regime, a high number of inefficiencies, a lack 
of diversification and extensive patronage. Political patronage, corruption, nepotism 
and economic mismanagement were major features of the governance system 
(Combaz, 2014). All these problems undermined the performance of all aspects of 
the economy, including ports. 
It is long acknowledged that the model of port administration adopted greatly 
determines ports’ competitiveness and performance. Following extensive port 
reforms around the world in the 1990s, many countries adopted the ‘landlord’ model, 
whereby private operators manage most of the functions of the port. The state, in this 
model, retains only the landowner and regulatory function (Baird A, 1999). The idea 
behind the reforms was to inject private capital and private sector management 
systems into the hitherto publicly owned ports. The wave of economic privatisation 
happening at the time recognised the management issues often associated with public 
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sector bureaucracies (Xiao et al., 2012), as well as the fact that most governments 
could not afford the large amounts of capital required to establish and maintain well-
performing modern ports without the private sector, including multinational terminal 
operators (Xiao et al., 2012). By continuing to implement Gaddafi’s Green Book, 
Libya has done the opposite, seeking to strengthen the state’s hold on economic 
management (Alam et al., 2009). 
Part two of the Green Book dictates the model of business ownership and 
management, including the transference of private ownership to the state. From the 
introduction of this model, the government increased the state’s role in national 
economic management, expropriating all private factories, transportation companies, 
oil companies and other enterprises. One of Gaddafi’s supposed objectives was to 
‘free the wage earners from slavery’ and to make them partners in the productive 
process, by taking over the public and private means of production. However, the 
takeover was mostly done by Gaddafi’s loyalists, who were assigned roles by the 
regime. Additionally, Gaddafi abolished the wage system. Rather than contributing 
to the productive process for the owner’s benefit or profit, the actual producer was to 
be a partner in the process, sharing equally in what was produced, or in the income 
derived from what was produced. However, even where the state owned the 
enterprise and the income derived from it and reverted to the community, the plight 
of the wage earner remained unchanged (Metz, 1987). 
Obviously, ports were not excluded from the Green Book’s philosophy. Laws were 
established to organise the relationship between workers and port management. For 
instance, according to article five of law number 21 of 1985, regarding the SPC’s 
establishment, port workers are considered partners in the port business. Therefore, 
they have the right to share port revenue with the company. The implication for ports 
and their performance is dire and underpins the conclusions in this study. First, 
having taken over the ports, the government has been unable to afford the huge 
amount of capital required to establish and maintain well-performing, world-class 
ports. This leaves the ports struggling with a lack of capital, inadequate port 
equipment and a dilapidated infrastructure. The ports are unable to acquire new 
technologies, which in many ports around the world are the main drivers of 
efficiency. Second, the government is unable to recruit, train and pay workers 
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appropriately to ensure the best management and operation skills are available. Poor 
pay rates also lead to a lack of motivation and people resorting to corruption. Third, 
port management is characterised by political patronage (as most of the top 
management comprises loyalists appointed by the regime), and all the drawbacks 
often associated with public sector bureaucracy, including mismanagement of public 
funds, ineptitude and inefficiency, nepotism and corruption. 
Another important aspect of the Libyan political and economic system, which has 
implications for port performance, concerns trade volumes. Policies regarding public 
ownership and control of all aspects of the economy have led to a decline in Libya’s 
trade output (Metz, 1987). The nationalisation of manufacturing activities has 
reduced Libyan exports. In addition, to protect local products, Libya has placed 
restrictions on a wide range of imports (Combaz, 2014). The problem with cargo 
volumes is also caused by political instability in the region that forms the ports’ 
potential wider hinterland. This includes the surrounding countries such as Egypt, 
Tunisia, Chad and Sudan. 
In more details, in 1977, Libya engaged with Egypt in a short war, which affected 
the political relationship between the two countries. The poor political relations with 
Egypt directly affected regional trade and some other aspects, such as education, 
health care, manufacturing and agriculture (Zaki, 2014). This was because most 
Egyptians were evacuated from Libya for their safety. 
In the case of Tunisia, these conflicts stemmed from Gaddafi’s interference in the 
internal affairs of that country, sometimes using Libya’s wealth and at other times, 
the military. Political ties between these two countries were broken off in 1974, 
when Tunisia rejected Gaddafi’s proposal for unification. Gaddafi reacted by 
expelling 14,000 Tunisians from Libya, which negatively affected Libya’s labour 
force (Noonpost, 2015). The continuing interference of Gaddafi ended with an attack 
on Tunisia in 1979, and the severance of diplomatic relations between the countries 
on 26 September 1985, until 1988 (Noonpost, 2015). 
Another example of the political conflicts with its neighbours, is in 1973, Libya 
attacked the north of Chad and occupied the Aouzou strip. In early September 1987, 
2,000 troops (with the support of French troops) crossed the disputed strip and drove 
184 
into Libya itself. The Chadians claimed they had killed some 1,700 Libyans, taken 
hundreds of others prisoner, and destroyed 26 planes and 70 tanks (Pukrop, 1997 ). 
In 1990, the two countries finally agreed to take their dispute to the International 
Court of Justice, which ruled in early 1994 that the Aouzou strip belonged to Chad. 
By doing this, Libya destroyed a significant part of its army and wealth, instead of 
building political and economic bridges with this land-locked country. In addition, 
Libya supported the rebels of west and south Sudan against the Sudanese regime. 
The above shows that Libya is a state of constant conflict with its neighbours. This 
means that neighbouring countries avoid Libyan ports as gateways to international 
trade. Despite Libya restoring its diplomatic relationships with Chad and Sudan, the 
war between Libya and Chad, and the conflict between Libya and Sudan, were 
obstacles to establishing strategic economic bridges between these countries. This 
ensured that trade between Libya and these countries was virtually non-existent. 
Moreover, the troubled relationships with these countries prevented any potential 
investment, and consequently the potential trade that might be handled by Libyan 
ports. Additionally, the reaction of Gaddafi, when he expelled all Tunisian and 
Egyptian workers, meant that Libya struggled from a lack of labour for several years. 
The consequence of this irresponsible reaction was a decline in Libya’s trade 
productivity and exports other than oil, and an increase in Libya’s imports. Similarly, 
the small volume of trade and the country’s unproductivity caused by external 
political conflicts disconnected Libyan ports from their hinterlands and reduced the 
potential volume of goods that could be handled by them. The cumulative effect for 
ports is that there is not enough cargo volume to attract big ships. Further, and 
perhaps more importantly, the lack of cargo volume has been used to justify not 
investing more in ports, based on the argument that cargo volumes do not justify 
such investment. 
Similarly, the conflicts between Libya and the western country have severely 
affected the overall Libyan economy and therefore, its ports. For more explanation, 
the main drivers of the Libyan economy are oil and gas. Both contribute around 95 
per cent of export earnings (Emporiki Bank, 2012, CIA, 2012), 80 per cent of 
government revenue and 65 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Indexmundi, 
2012). Western countries are the main importers of Libyan oil; Libya imports most 
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of its needs from western countries. Owing to the conflicts between the Gaddafi 
regime and the west, Libya has been considered by much of the western media as a 
source of international terrorism (Davis, 1987). The political relationship between 
Libya and the west worsened at the beginning of the 1980s. Due to nationalising oil 
companies, including those operated by American companies, as well as the hostile 
attitude of Libya towards Israel, the USA banned imports of Libyan oil and some 
exports to Libya in 1982, following deteriorating relations (Indexmundi, 2012). 
Therefore, Libya turned to western European countries for trade. However, hostility 
from these countries started when a London policewoman was shot from the Libyan 
Embassy in 1984 in London, as well as in reaction to Libya’s arming of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and involvement in the Lockerbie airline bombing (Oakes, 
2011). This hostile relationship increased after a bombing at a Berlin night club 
(Schmidt, 1991), after which international sanctions were widened to include a total 
ban on direct export and import trade, commercial contact and travel-related 
activities with Libya (Oakes, 2011). Consequently, all types of investment, and 
international trade with, Libya declined, which negatively affected all port activities 
in Libya. 
Further, investment in Libya is not secure (UNCTAD, 2012). The FDI inflow and 
outflow was increased after political volatility subsided, and some procedures were 
established to secure and ensure the rights of local and foreigner investors. However, 
Libya’s unclear legal structure, arbitrary government decision-making processes and 
over-staffed public sector, alongside various other structural rigidities, have posed 
impediments to foreign investment and economic growth (Mateos, 2005). Moreover, 
the weak banking sector and poor regulatory framework are just two of the problems 
facing foreign investors in Libya (Monitor, 2008). Therefore, since 2008, the FDI 
has experienced a decline, reaching zero in 2011, due to the war (UNCTAD, 2012) 
(see Section 2.4). Despite Libya managing to attract greater foreign investment after 
it reintegrated globally, most of this investment was in the oil sector (Fraenzel, 
2009). Libya failed to promote growth in the non-oil sector and diversify its 
economy (Mateos, 2005), reducing the volume of international trade and thus port 
activities. 
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After restoring diplomatic ties with Chad and granting exemptions of taxes and 
tariffs on Arabic products, Libya was rated the fourth most attractive country in the 
world with which to do business between 2012 and 2014, according to a UK trade 
and investment study (Fraenzel, 2009). However, this did not last long. Due to 
heightened insecurity after the revolution of 17 February 2011 that overthrew 
Gaddafi’s regime, most foreign investors have again tended to avoid Libya. Due to 
the large volume of weapons in the streets, only a few brave foreign investors, such 
as some from Turkey, South Korea and China, established businesses in Libya. 
However, even these have now left Libya, due to the political and tribal wars that 
began in July 2014 (Economist, 2013). 
Another important factor that affects Libyan port performance is the lack of proper 
hinterland connectivity. It is well established that the trade volume between a port 
and its hinterland is largely associated with the capacity of its hinterland 
connectivity. Additionally, successful and efficient ports are often those that are well 
connected to their hinterland by adequate and effective transport corridors (Gekara 
and Chhetri, 2013, Chang et al., 2008). This study has found that the lack of efficient 
roads and the absence of rail networks have undermined the efficiency of cargo flow 
between Libyan ports and their hinterland, and therefore port performance (see 
Sections 5.5.5.4 and 5.5.5.5). These findings support the argument that rail 
connectivity is essential for efficient cargo flow between ports and their hinterland 
(Woodburn, 2013, Transystems, 2011, SCI, 2010, Kozan, 1997, Kozan, 2000, 
Dinwoodie, 2006, Ashar, 1990, Economic research centre, 2000, Reis et al., 2013, 
Gekara and Chhetri, 2013, Niérat, 1997), particularly to transport large volumes of 
goods over long distances (Hansen, 2004, Kia et al., 2003). However, the existing 
road networks in Libya are working beyond their capacity. Congestion on these 
roads is common, which increases the cost of land transport and cargo delivery times 
and reduces the reliability of Libyan ports. In addition, an inefficient cargo flow 
caused by the lack of proper land transport corridors causes constant congestion at 
the ports, which has major implications for ship turnaround times. This study has 
determined this is due to cost, time, reliability and port throughput being important 
performance criteria for all local stakeholders of Libyan ports. These problems have 
enhanced the perception and experience of inefficiency. An important question is: 
what causes the poor hinterland connectivity? 
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The absence of rail networks and inadequate roads is associated with the poor 
governance system and the political environment. Local politics (which created a 
central decision-making process, corruption, mismanagement, the absence of private 
sector investment and some issues related to external politics) have ensured that 
Libya has not invested in developing a road transport sector since 1986 (see Section 
5.5.5.4). Libya’s troubled relations with the international community, particularly 
lending countries and institutions, have also meant that no development aid is 
forthcoming. For these reasons, no rail network exists, the road network is limited, 
and road capacity is mostly inadequate and in a state of disrepair. 
The troubled Libyan governance system has affected decision making, leading to 
economic mismanagement. In 1975, the Libyan government designed railway lines 
and sent 1,026 students overseas for training to assist in the design’s implementation. 
In 2003, 28 years later, the authority commissioned the establishment and 
management of the rail networks. However, the work is yet to begin, and the project 
seems to have stalled completely. Apart from poor management, this situation is also 
a culmination of the nationalisation system, which has starved the economy of 
investment capital for essential infrastructure. 
This section has illustrated how poor economic governance and unstable political 
situations adversely affect the performance of essential economic sectors. The case 
of Libyan ports is characterised by a lack of capital investment in essential 
infrastructure and equipment, mismanagement, poor hinterland connectivity and a 
lack of trade volume. Ultimately, the ports are unable to perform their role 
effectively in the national and regional economy. The issue of nationalisation has 
been highlighted as a key part of the problem. In the next section, this problem is 
examined further in a discussion of the effects of a centralised and state-controlled 
management system. 
7.2.2 Implications of Management Centralisation and State Control on Port 
Performance 
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, introducing part two of the Green Book led to drastic 
changes in business ownership, including the transference of private ownership to 
the state and implementing the social partnership philosophy. Libya had adopted a 
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centralised administration model in most of the public sector, and considering that 
many businesses were state owned or controlled, this centralisation extended to a 
large part of the economy, including the ports industry. Most of Libya’s industry was 
state controlled, largely excluding the private sector and foreign investment. Existing 
firms acquired strong market influence as a result of little or no competition. 
Nonetheless, failure in these industries was clear in the resulting low productivity 
and the reduced quality of products and services. This failure badly affected the 
overall volumes of Libya’s international trade handled by Libyan ports. 
All of Libya’s ports remain state owned and/or controlled, and therefore fall under 
the public service port model above. This arrangement is the major cause of 
sustained poor performance. It is also a direct result of the actions and decisions of 
the former regime’s socialist ideals, which, through instruments such as the Green 
Book, saw the systematic nationalisation of all sectors. In spite, the transport 
ministry and the LMA put in place some measures to involve the private sector in 
port industry after the revolution of February 2011, the loopy of the SPC 
management managed to persuade the company’s employees to strike against the 
involvement of the private sector in port operations (TV, 2013). This strike in six 
vital ports forced the LMA and transport ministry to freeze this decision till further 
notice (Ammar, 2012). 
Ports typically function under a dual administration structure comprising a regulatory 
arm and a management arm. These functions may be shared across private and 
public sectors, depending on the model adopted for ownership and management. As 
such, invariably there will be a port authority (regulatory) and a management arm. 
The port authority is usually formed by the state to provide regulatory oversight and 
secure the operational and technical integrity of the port facilities by implementing 
maritime rules to ensure that navigational safety, security and maritime 
environmental protection are maintained. In contrast, port or terminal operators, 
whether public or private, provide management expertise; in that they administer all 
aspects of port operations (Burns, 2015). However, in the context of Libya’s ports, 
the structure and layers of control and management are highly complex, involving a 
multiplicity of ministries, government departments and agencies. In fact, all Libyan 
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ports are operated by two public companies (see Section 2.6.4). The port of Qasr 
Ahmed in Misurata can be classified as both a state owned and a public service port. 
Qasr Ahmed is the only port operated by MFZ Company, based on resolution 
number 32 of 2006. Despite the fact that ports usually fall under the Ministry of 
Transport, the MFZ belongs to the Ministry of Economy—an arrangement with no 
rational explanation. Figure 7.2 represents the organisational structure within which 
ports are owned and managed. 
In this arrangement, the Ministry of Economy is not directly involved in the 
management and operations at Qasr Ahmed port. Figure 7.2 shows that Qasr Ahmed 
port enjoys a certain amount of autonomy, largely because it is owned separately 
from the mainstream public ownership structure that applies to the other ports, 
although it is still owned by a state ministry. The dotted square suggests a level of 
insulation from the general operating environment. The only connection with the 
main ownership structure is the shared regulatory services offered by the Maritime 
Administration. Decisions regarding investment and other management strategies are 
therefore likely to be quicker. Further, MFZ has its own budget underwritten through 
the revenue it generates and credits allocated in the general Libyan budget and any 
facility loans obtained. This also suggests that Qasr Ahmed port enjoys discretion in 
how it manages its revenues and develops its strategies. Therefore, it is to a lesser 
extent affected by prevailing public service bureaucratic hurdles, including issues of 
political interference, corruption and inefficiency. 
In contrast, and based on law number 21 of 1985, all other ports are operated by the 
central management of the SPC, which belongs to the Ministry of Transport. 
Following the revolution of February 2011 against Gaddafi’s regime, SPC was 
renamed the LPC. Similarly, the port authorities of these ports, including Qasr 
Ahmed, are under the authority of LMA, which is a Ministry of Transport entity (see 
Figure 7.2). The role of the port authority is only statutory and regulatory; it includes 
implementing local laws and legislation, investigating maritime and marine pollution
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Figure 7.2: Decision-Making Processes in MFZ and LPC. 
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incidents, registering ships, and conducting crew sign on and sign off procedures. 
Berthing allocation and planning, tugging and pilotage are conducted by the port 
operator. 
Due to the central management system, no Libyan ports operated by LPC have a free 
hand to invest and develop individual strategies. Therefore, they have to raise any 
relevant strategic issues related to port development and investment with the 
Ministry of Transport, following a long bureaucratic chain through the LPC 
headquarters, maritime authority and finally the Ministry. In many cases, the 
Ministry of Transport needs to discuss these strategies and issues with the General 
Ministry (which oversees all the functions of the ministries) for approval. Matters 
relating to funding new investments at the port—for example, buying new 
equipment, expanding infrastructure and superstructure—must be approved at the 
top level. Due to this state-controlled central command model, management at these 
ports is characterised by corruption, miscommunication and mismanagement, and a 
lack of investment in new equipment, infrastructure and technologies. By extension, 
the situation has hindered any progress in making greater operational efficiencies. 
All these problems are highlighted by stakeholders as the key obstacles to better 
performance. The literature also confirms that monopoly, centralisation of decision 
making and corruption wield the most influence on the development of Libya’s vital 
port sector (outlook, 2012). 
The central management of a firm revolves around where the high-level decision-
making processes and strategic decisions are made. Such decisions include, but are 
not limited to, major agreements, financial monitoring and reporting the firm’s 
overall corporate performance. In central management, all high-level decisions, 
documentation approval and contract signing are executed by a board of directors at 
board meetings (GPG, 2011). Centralised management has some advantages, such as 
clear communication, easy coordination and budget control (Marzec, 2014). 
Centralisation, which is also called ‘command-and-control’, was originally the 
dominant structure for almost all businesses, but has declined in recent years among 
large businesses (Marzec, 2014). Conversely, in decentralised management systems, 
decision-making powers are delegated further down the hierarchy (Marzec, 2014). 
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Decentralised corporate and management structures have become increasingly more 
popular in the global port sectors of many countries (Cheon et al., 2010). 
The advantages and disadvantages of these systems are well illustrated in the ports of 
Libya. Although generally the study has found that Libyan ports are poor performers, 
those ports operated by LPC and managed through the large and unwieldy 
bureaucracy were identified by stakeholders as being the most inefficient. In 
contrast, Qasr Ahmed, which enjoys a level of autonomy, was identified as the best 
performer. This port is also leading the rest in terms of throughput, according to 
cargo data (CETMO, 2010, Maritime-database, 2012, SPC, 2011, Misurata Free 
Zone, 2013, Libyan Maritime Administration, 2013, Libyan ports company, 2013). 
The findings of the study regarding performance must therefore be understood 
against the prevailing context. In the current highly competitive operating 
environment, Libya’s ports must have access to sufficient capital and this can only 
come from the private sector. 
The Libyan social, economic and political environment presents great obstacles to 
economic performance. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the political 
situation deters development and institutional performance due to insecurity, the 
inability to consolidate regional trade, the inability to focus on hinterland access 
infrastructure and poor national economic output generally. When coupled with poor 
economic management and governance structures, the overall situation is one in 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Overview of the Research 
This research was designed to highlight the challenges and key lost opportunities 
regarding port performance and efficiency in Libya, by examining the performance 
of the country’s ports from the perspective of local stakeholders. It has also 
evaluated Libyan ports’ efficiency compared to 18 container ports and terminals 
belonging to Libya’s trading partners. The main contribution of this study has been 
to develop a conceptual framework for measuring port performance using multiple 
criteria. This framework can be used to measure port performance in developing 
economies that are influenced by specific external factors. An important aim of this 
study was to contribute to a greater understanding of the impediments to port 
performance in the context of developing countries, especially in Africa where such 
studies are scarce. 
Libya has 20 ports. Seven of these are purely commercial entities used to handle 
containers and general cargo rather than oil, petrochemicals or ore. The four main 
ports are Tripoli, Khoms and Qasr Ahmed in the west of Libya and Benghazi in the 
east. Benghazi and Tripoli are the oldest ports, while Qasr Ahmed and Khoms are 
relatively new. The other ports are Derna, Berga, Tobruk and Zwara. 
Libyan ports were chosen for this study because they have so far failed to play a 
significant role as efficient gateways to regional trade, despite their strategic location 
on the Asia-Europe international trade route that passes through the Mediterranean 
Sea. They are also located on the north coast of Africa between the European and 
African continents. They can be the main facilitators for the imports and exports of 
the neighbouring land locked countries: Chad and Niger. Another reason for the 
choice is pragmatic. As a Libyan national with many years of maritime experience, 
including in shipping and ports, I have travelled to many ports and experienced how 
varied port performance can be. I was always troubled by the fact that Libyan ports 
were unable to break through the efficiency barrier compared to others around the 
world. For instance, to off-load and load a general cargo ship of 7,000 GT, a ship 
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spends between one and two days at a typical western European port, such as 
Hamburg, Antwerp or Rotterdam. However, to off-load the same volume of cargo, a 
ship can spend around a week or more at a Libyan port. This seriously compromises 
a ship’s turnaround time, its scheduling and therefore the ship’s operational costs and 
the shipping line’s reliability. Additionally, it undermines port throughput and the 
potential role of Libyan ports in the region. In all cases, this has a significant impact 
on doing business in Libya, affecting the national and regional economy. These 
observations led to a desire to understand the main obstacles preventing improved 
port performance in the Libyan context. 
The study was conducted in two phases. The first phase measured the performance 
of Libyan ports from the perspective of local stakeholders. The second phase 
compared the efficiency of Libyan ports against other ports related to Libya’s trading 
partners. Firstly, measuring the performance of the four main Libyan ports was 
conducted to determine the most influential factors on performance using a 
quantitative questionnaire survey. The criteria for measuring performance were 
identified from the literature and classified into port productivity, port efficiency and 
customer service quality. Port productivity consisted of seaside productivity and 
terminal productivity. The criteria of port efficiency focused on time and cost. The 
quality of customer service consisted of port accessibility, port reliability, online 
services, service flexibility and cargo safety. 
All of these factors and their components were used to develop an online quantitative 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed online to 200 local stakeholders of 
Libyan ports. It used the snowball technique, which is assumed to increase the 
response rate, especially when total populations are quite small, as with this study. 
The local stakeholders included LMA, seafarers, freight forwarders, shippers, local 
ship owners, port operators, port authorities and other groups associated with Libyan 
ports. After about four-and-a-half months, 84 valid responses out of 186 responses 
had been received, which represented 45 per cent of the total respondents. These data 
were analysed using SPSS descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA. 
In the second phase, the evaluation of port efficiency was used to compare the 
efficiency of the Libyan ports against the ports of Libya’s trading partners, using 
factors that emerged as influential from the perception of local stakeholders. For this 
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purpose, seven Libyan ports were compared against 18 container ports related to 13 
of Libya’s trading partner countries. DEA was employed for this comparison of 
efficiency. 
The descriptive analysis and one-way ANOVA revealed a set of variables that 
emerged as influential factors on port performance. These variables were closely 
associated with port superstructure and infrastructure. On the port side, these 
variables included water depth, berth length, storage area, number and type of 
cranes, transport equipment and stacking equipment. In addition, most of the 
extremely important service quality variables, which represented some of the 
performance measurement criteria, were associated with the seaside and terminal 
operations. The bottleneck in Libyan port performance began with the issue of 
seaside accessibility. Despite the escalating demand for larger container ships to 
increase throughput and reduce their operational and transport costs, Libyan ports 
can only accommodate container ships smaller than the third generation class. In 
addition, specialised container QCs were absent, except at Qasr Ahmed port, which 
has two. This absence of QCs forced the port operators to use ships’ cranes or other 
mobile cranes for loading and off-loading operations. This led to longer ship 
turnaround times. This has resulted in low throughput and the abandonment of 
Libyan ports due to the increased operational times and cost for ships. Additionally, 
a deficiency in transport and stacking equipment has led to container transport and 
stacking inefficiency. This deficiency has prevented Libyan ports from meeting the 
potential demand and becoming important hub ports. 
On the hinterland side, railway connectivity is essential to enhance cargo flow 
efficiency and connect Libyan ports with their hinterland, including neighbouring 
land-locked countries. The absence of a functional railway system in Libya has 
placed more pressure on road networks. Consequently, the efficiency of cargo flow 
has been low, and the cost of cargo land transport quite high. 
All of the above-mentioned variables under the control of Libyan ports were used as 
inputs in the second phase of the efficiency assessment analysis. Port throughput was 
used as the output variable, as it is the most common measurement for port 
performance. The two most basic DEA models, the DEA-CCR model and the DEA-
BCC under input-oriented approach, were used in this study. CCR was used to 
196 
measure the global TE, while the BCC was used to measure the local PTE. The DEA 
analysis illustrated that all Libyan ports were globally inefficient when assessed on 
the CCR input-oriented CRS. The overall underperformance of Qasr Ahmed, Tripoli, 
Benghazi and Khoms ports was caused by inefficiency in operations, associated with 
port capacity. The global inefficiency of Libyan ports (CCR) was mainly attributed 
to the inefficient operations associated with port infrastructure and superstructure. To 
confirm this, it was noted that the most efficient trading partner ports used unique, 
advanced and efficient cargo-handling equipment different from that used in Libyan 
ports. 
The DEA-BCC illustrated that three of the Libyan ports were locally efficient when 
they were assessed under VRS. These ports were Brega, Tobruk and Derna. This was 
because these ports used the smallest amount of inputs compared to the other most 
efficient ports. The evidence supporting this is that these ports used ships’ cranes for 
cargo loading and off-loading operations and external trucks to transport containers 
from the ship’s side to the final destination, and vice versa. However, despite these 
ports being locally fully efficient, they had a low SE. This may mean that the global 
inefficiency of these ports as given by their CCR score is mainly attributable to 
disadvantageous port infrastructure and superstructure conditions. However, the 
Libyan ports exhibited increasing returns-to-scale. Therefore, these ports could 
expand their output using the same inputs if they establish some efficiency 
enhancing measures. These could include increasing the total working hours and 
using these hours efficiently, and introducing online services to accelerate paper 
work and cargo clearance procedures. It may also include minimising bureaucracy 
and preventing corruption. 
All of the above influential factors might affect the performance of any port. 
However, as Libya is unique in its politics and economy, these two factors contribute 
heavily to ports underperforming. Politics and economy are two different sides of the 
same coin. Politically, Libya has been unstable globally and locally due to the 
aggressive political behaviour of the former leader Gaddafi (See chapter 2). This 
discouraged the creation of corridors between Libyan ports and neighbouring 
countries and prevented them from playing the potential role in the global supply 
chain.   
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Locally, as port activities rely mainly on the volume of trade handled by that port, 
Libyan ports are predominately used to handle import needs. Incorporating socialist 
ideals has led to a low trade capacity and reduction in the volume of cargo handled 
by Libyan ports as discussed in details in Chapter 2). The Libyan government has 
not had much impetus to invest in Libya’s ports, nor to deploy costly equipment and 
develop infrastructure, as not much trade has moved through the ports. However, 
despite the chronic problems with neighbouring countries, Libya can benefit from its 
strategic location and use its ports as hubs for container re-transhipment. 
Mismanagement, over-centralisation in decision making and monopoly practices 
have been the main obstacles. 
In terms of management, most Libyan port managers and the heads of LMA were 
marine engineers or captains. The belief is that these people can operate ports 
efficiently, due to their seafaring experience. However, some of these managers are 
not from the maritime industry at all, and are in their position because they were 
loyalists supporting Gaddafi’s regime. In terms of decision making, most of the 
strategic decisions regarding port development have not been taken by the port 
authority or LMA, or in some cases by the Ministry of Transport. These strategic 
decisions have to be taken, or approved, by the highest authority in the country, 
which was the former president himself. 
In terms of monopoly, the study found it had a negative impact on port performance; 
it also detected similarities between the Libyan ports in terms of performance 
indicators, except that Qasr Ahmed port differed slightly. This is because all Libyan 
ports are state owned, and they are operated by two public companies. In contrast, 
Qasr Ahmed port in Misurata is operated by MFZ Company, which has a level of 
autonomy. This port is relatively new and has some flexibility to purchase required 
equipment and improve its performance. The rest of Libya’s ports are operated by 
LPC. This has undermined competition, as these ports are operated by a centralised 
management with full bureaucracy among which miscommunication is rife. The 
LPC does not have a free hand to invest its capital and improve its ports’ capacities. 
This makes Qasr Ahmed port the top Libyan port in terms of service quality and 
throughput. This study has also confirmed that the existence of a monopoly is a 
major factor that has undermined the ability of Libyan ports to function efficiently. 
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8.2 Recommendations 
One of the aims of this research was to provide recommendations to assist the key 
decision makers in Libya’s port industry to improve port performance. These 
recommendations have only focused on the port side, rather than on economic issues, 
land connectivity and trade productivity. Therefore, the following recommendations 
are: 
1. Due to the growing demand for efficient ports, ports need to enhance their 
capacity to attract more users and increase throughput. From an economic 
perspective, efficient container handling at terminals is important in reducing 
transportation costs and maintaining shipping schedules, as well as 
maximising profits. Therefore, Libyan ports have to employ sophisticated 
and specialised handling equipment to enhance their performance and 
compete against neighbouring ports. 
2. Despite the escalating demand for containerisation, Libyan ports are still 
operating as general cargo ports. Additionally, there is a severe lack of 
specialised container-handling equipment. Therefore, these ports need to 
assign some terminals as specialised container terminals, considering the 
water draft to attract ‘mother’ or mega container ships, storage yard areas and 
specialised and efficient container-handling equipment. 
3. It was proved that centralised management is a vital factor preventing Libyan 
ports from acquiring efficiency. Therefore, giving Libyan ports autonomy 
minimises bureaucracy and gives the ports a free hand to invest, enhancing 
their capacity. 
4. All of Libya’s ports are state owned and operated by the public sector. In 
addition, most Libyan ports are monopolised and operated by one company, 
LPC. The study showed that this public company is not able to operate all of 
these ports. Therefore, liberating these ports is crucial to increase 
competitiveness and performance. 
5. The study has also determined that the domination of the public sector and its 
bureaucracy has created many problems that have undermined port 
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performance. These include corruption, nepotism and mismanagement. 
Without allowing private sector participation, the ports cannot afford 
adequate capital investment, sophisticated technologies and efficient private 
sector management systems. Therefore, the study highly recommends the 
involvement of the private sector to overcome all existing performance 
problems. 
6. The study has also illustrated that the total working hours at Libyan ports are 
not enough to provide the required services to customers. Additionally, this 
time is not used efficiently. Therefore, applying a 24/7 working week 
schedule may improve port performance by minimising ship turnaround 
times and maximising throughput. 
7. Most of the efficient and advanced ports use e-commerce and provide online 
services. However, Libyan ports do not provide such services. This increases 
bureaucracy and complicates business planning related to cargo clearing and 
ship arrivals and departures. Therefore, implementing online services is 
essential for performance optimisation. 
8. This study recommends reviewing all port-related laws and regulations to 
rectify conflicts in the authorities and responsibilities of port authorities. 
Examples of these conflicts include the law number 21 of 1985, regarding the 
establishment of LPC. 
8.3 Study Limitations and Further Research on Port Performance 
It is worth pointing out that data collection generally was rather difficult for this 
study because of the political and civil instability in Libya at the time – a situation 
which continues to date. Although this does not necessarily undermine the findings 
in a significant way, more information could have been generated to make the 
analysis much richer.  
This PhD research was a vertical study and discussed certain independent variables 
of Libyan port performance. However, this research did not cover all aspects of port 
performance, which will require separate analyses. This quantitative study relied on 
the general literature of port performance to extract relevant influential factors. It 
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also relied on the literature on Libya’s politics and economy to interpret the findings 
of this study. However, conducting a qualitative investigation may provide more 
insights and in-depth explanations of these findings. Nevertheless the analysis has 
made use of available general knowledge, in the literature and the author’s personal 
understanding of the prevailing political and socio-economic context to enrich the 
findings and conclusions. Other limitations are of note mainly relate to the  analysis 
of the second phase of this study. Most of these limitations are related to data 
availability and accessibility. As such, these limitations are: 
1. The study used secondary data to measure and compare the efficiency of 
Libyan ports using DEA. Despite the fact that these data were collected from 
credible organisations, the secondary data may not always be as accurate as 
desired. Therefore, the accuracy of efficiency analysis outcomes depends on 
the accuracy of the data used. 
The study used secondary data related to 2010, due to the unavailability of 
current data at the time of the study. This was because of the civil war in the 
country which broke out in 2011. However, including this latter data would 
have led to false conclusions since port performance at this time was greatly 
affected by the abnormal circumstances of the time. Therefore the absence of 
this data does not necessarily undermine the validity of the quality or 
findings. Despite the fact that many emails were sent to the targeted port 
authorities and operators, we had trouble in gathering information regarding 
the output variables, such as the number of ship calls, ship turnaround times, 
the capacity of cargo-handling equipment and cargo loading and off-loading 
rates. Due to these difficulties, only container throughput was considered as 
an output variable to measure the efficiency of Libyan ports. Therefore, this 
study is considered a partial evaluation, due to the unavailability of some 
required data. 
2. Each port uses a different type of handling equipment with different 
specifications. Therefore, the performance of each type of equipment could 
vary compared to others. However, to obtain homogenous data, the handling 
equipment was categorised into three groups. These groups are: seaside 
cranes, transport equipment and stacking equipment. 
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3. The DEA analysis was used to establish ranking relationships and measure 
the efficiency scores of the sample ports, using a number of variables derived 
from the descriptive analysis. These variables were used as one set to 
evaluate efficiency. However, they were not monopolised to determine the 
effect of each individual variable on Libyan port efficiency. 
4. Most Libyan ports use ships’ cranes for cargo-handling operations, which 
contributes to the total throughput. However, the number of ships’ cranes has 
not been included in the DEA analysis, as these cranes do not belong to the 
ports. This may influence the accuracy of the results. 
To enrich the literature on Libyan port performance, the following points can be 
made with reference to further research: 
1. The stakeholders of Libyan ports vary and include local and international 
stakeholders. This study involved only local stakeholders and excluded 
international ones. The latter may have different perceptions of the variables 
included in this study. Therefore, conducting a study involving international 
stakeholders may either support this study or lead to quite different results. 
2. This study included specific variables related to port infrastructure and 
superstructure to measure Libyan port performance and efficiency. This is 
because the new generations of mega container ships are served by a very 
small number of container ports, due to some infrastructure and 
superstructure constraints. However, Libyan port performance is influenced 
by some other factors, such as existing local laws and regulations, human 
resources, congestion, the national economy, external politics and the volume 
of international trade. The effects of all these factors on Libyan ports are not 
well investigated. Therefore, studying all of these factors in the future will 
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Appendix 1: Research Questionnaire 
Dear respondent. This survey is an aid of a study which seeks to examine the 
competitiveness of Libyan ports. The ports industry is critical to efficient trade and 
regional economic development, hence it is important to identify the barriers that 
undermine the competitiveness of Libyan ports from the perspective of local users, 
in order to provide recommendations for LMA and both Libyan ports’ operators and 
authority to enhance ports’ competitiveness. The study consists of two sections 
which are: general information about your experience and your organisation as well 
as your perspective about the determinants of ports’ performance, which are closely 
associated with ports’ competitiveness. The survey should take less than 15 minutes 
to complete. Your assistance in this regard is of great importance and is highly 
appreciated by the researchers. Thank you. 
Q 1. In what type of organisations are you employed? 
o Libyan Maritime Administration (1) 
o Port Authority (2) 
o Port operator (3) 
o Shipping company (4) 
o Freight Forwarder (5) 
o Carrier (6) 
o Sea farer (7) 
o Trade Union (8) 
o Other (Please specify) (9) ____________________ 
Q 2. What is your position in this organisation? 
o Head/ CEO/ Director/ Chairman (1) 
o Department Manager (2) 
o Superintendent (3) 
o Coordinator (4) 
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o Supervisor (5) 
o Pilot (6) 
o Seafarer (7) 
o Harbour Master (8) 
o Port Captain (9) 
o Stevedoring Foreman (10) 
o Other (Please specify) (11) ____________________ 
Q 3. How long have you worked in this position? 
o Less than a year (1) 
o 1 to 5 years (2) 
o 5–10 years (3) 
o 10–15 years (4) 
o 15 years or above (5) 
Q 4. Please specify which sector your organisation falls in? 
o Private sector (1) 
o Public sector (2) 
Q 5. Does the public sector monopoly in Libyan ports undermine service quality? 
Please rank your opinion? 
o Strongly undermine (1) 
o Undermine (2) 
o No influence (3) 
o Strengthen (4) 
o Strongly strengthen (5) 
Ports have to offer a variety of activities aimed at generating value for customers and 
making the customers satisfied in order to win their loyalty. Therefore, meeting 
customer requirements, which are different from one user to another, is an important 
determinant for attracting more users. These requirements could be related to the 




Q 6. Please indicate the importance of the following determinants of ports’ customer 































































































1. Cargo loading and off-
loading to and from the ship  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
2. Cargo delivery  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
3. Ships’ scheduling  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
4. The competency of port 
labours 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
5. Online service  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6. Cargo damage  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
7. Cargo loss  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
8. Sea side accessibility  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
9. Land side accessibility 
(Gate, road & rail transport)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
10. Cargo-handling facilities o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
11. Port efficiency  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
12. Berth availability  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
13. Total cargo-handling time  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
14. Ship’s turnaround time  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
15. Level of services for fresh 
water, bunkering and 
provisions  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
16. Cargo-handling fee  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
17. Free cargo dwell time  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
18. Customs clearance fee  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
19. Customs clearance 
process  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
20. Inland transport cost  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  




Q 7. Would you rank the following Libyan ports based on the level of their services? 
Where 1 illustrates the top port in terms of meeting customer requirements. Choose 
from the list below. 
 The first port The second port  The third port  The fourth port  
Tripoli port  o  o  o  o  
Benghazi port  o  o  o  o  
Qasr Ahmed port  o  o  o  o  
Khoms port  o  o  o  o  
Service port service consists of a number of elements which reflect the level of 
service provided to its users. These include port accessibility from seaside and 
landside, reliability, information and flexibility, all of which influence customer 
preference for a port. Please answer the following questions related to port service 
criteria. 
Q 8. Port accessibility. Port accessibility refers to the ability of a port to be reached 
for efficient cargo movement to and from it. This includes the ability of a port to 
provide sufficient water depth and berths to ensure safe access and docking for the 
inbound and outbound ships. It is also related to port gates, roads and rail networks 
in the landside. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 





















1. Port’s water depth meets the demand of larger ships.  o  o  o  o  
2. Berth length is suitable to accommodate larger ships.  o  o  o  o  
3. The number of lanes of port’s gate undermines the 
cargo flow to and from the port.  
o  o  o  o  
4. The existing road networks are suitable for hinterland 
transport if the demand for Libyan ports increased.  
o  o  o  o  
5. Integrated rail networks are needed to increase cargo 
flow and reduce transport cost. 




Q 9. Port reliability. Briefly, reliability refers to how stable, dependable, trustworthy, 
and consistent the port is. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 





















1. The port can provide some special handling services, such as 
handling heavy weight containers, different container sizes 
etc.?  
o  o  o  o  
2. The quality and quantity of used transport vehicles can meet 
the potential demand for containerisation in Libyan ports.  
o  o  o  o  
3. The used stacking equipment (reach stacker, forklift, SCs, 
gantry crane etc) can meet the potential demand for 
containerisation in Libyan ports.  
o  o  o  o  
4. Cargo clearance process is efficient.  o  o  o  o  
5. Cargo delivery time is reasonable.  o  o  o  o  
6. Ships’ schedules in port are accurate.  o  o  o  o  
7. The quantity and quality of used cranes are optimal to deal 
with the inbound container ships.  
o  o  o  o  
8. The quantity and quality of used cranes are optimal to deal 
with the potential demand for containerisation.  
o  o  o  o  
Q 10. Service quality. Briefly, it shows how well a delivered service conforms to 
the client’s expectations. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? Where 0 means absolutely disagree and 5 means absolutely agree. 
 Tripoli  Benghazi  Misurata  Khoms  
1. Customs service is complicated and corrupted.  o  o  o  o  
2. Settlement of accident claims in port is easy. 
(2) 
o  o  o  o  
3. The quality and quantity of used transport and 
transfer equipment in the port are sufficient and 
efficient for good port performance. (3) 
o  o  o  o  
4. The used stacking equipment provide efficient 
cargo stacking and retrieving service. (4) 
o  o  o  o  
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Q 11. Information system. Please indicate the level of meeting between the following 
online services and customer demand. Where 0 means absolutely does not meet the 
demand and 5 means absolutely meets the demand. 
 Tripoli  Benghazi  Misurata  Khoms  
1. Online customs service.  o  o  o  o  
2. Online information accessibility for port 
users for cargo tracking.  
o  o  o  o  
3. Online information accessibility for port 
users to track ships’ movement.  
o  o  o  o  
4. Online transactions. o  o  o  o  
Q 12. Safety. Please estimate the likelihood of the following safety issues, where 0 
denotes less likely and 5 denotes more likely. 
 Tripoli  Benghazi Misurata  Khoms  
1. Frequency of cargo loss.  o  o  o  o  
2. Frequency of cargo damage.  o  o  o  o  
3. The level of safety awareness for port's 
personnel.  
o  o  o  o  
Flexibility of port operations. A port has to have flexibility to provide a range of 
service ‘products’ for different customers in a reasonable window of time using a 
variety of resources. 
Q 13. Availability. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements related to availability. Where 0 means absolutely disagree and 5 means 
absolutely agree. 
 Tripoli Benghazi  Misurata  Khoms  
1. Availability of berthing on arrival for the 
inbound ships.  
o  o  o  o  
2. Sufficient and effective cargo-handling 
equipment.  




Q 14. Time. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
related to time. Where 0 means absolutely disagree and 5 means absolutely agree. 
 Tripoli  Benghazi  Misurata  Khoms  
1. The available cranes lead to reasonable ship 
turnaround time.  
o  o  o  o  
2. Port working hours are sufficient.  o  o  o  o  
3. The actual working time is efficiently used 
without any idle time.  
o  o  o  o  
Q 15. Product. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements related to the product. Where 0 means absolutely disagree and 5 means 
absolutely agree. 
 Tripoli  Benghazi  Misurata  Khoms  
1. The space of storage yards is enough for the 
volume of cargo/containers that is dedicated to 
the local market.  
o  o  o  o  
2. The space of storage yards is able to absorb 
the cargo/container volume dedicated to 
international transshipment and local market.  
o  o  o  o  
3. The quality and quantity of the transport 
vehicles used is sufficient to deal efficiently 
with the volume of cargo handled by Libyan 
ports.  
o  o  o  o  
4. The quality and quantity of transport 
vehicles used can meet the potential demand 
for containerisation in the Libyan ports.  
o  o  o  o  
5. The available seaside cranes are efficient to 
provide good quality service to the inbound 
ships.  
o  o  o  o  
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Cargo loading and 
off-loading to and 
from the ship 
6.50 .522 5.86 2.19 6.89 .333 6.56 .726 7.00 0.00 6.45 1.293 5.64 2.20 5.70 1.567 6.30 1.40 
Cargo delivery 6.17 .718 6.00 1.82 6.67 .707 6.56 .726 6.78 .441 5.73 1.009 5.29 2.12 5.80 1.814 6.06 1.39 
Ships’ scheduling 6.33 .651 6.71 .488 6.50 .756 6.00 1.225 6.67 .500 6.27 1.421 6.00 1.70 5.70 1.767 6.24 1.20 
The competency 
of port labours 
6.25 .622 6.14 .690 5.89 1.69 6.00 1.118 5.67 .707 5.45 .688 5.00 2.38 5.80 1.814 5.74 1.42 
Online service 6.25 .866 5.50 1.92 5.25 2.188 6.11 .782 6.44 .726 5.36 .924 4.77 2.42 5.10 1.969 5.58 1.65 
Cargo damage 6.25 .622 4.13 2.74 6.00 1.19 5.78 1.481 6.33 .707 5.73 1.009 4.77 2.31 5.50 1.900 5.56 1.72 
Cargo loss 6.25 .622 5.13 2.23 6.22 .972 6.75 .463 6.22 .667 5.45 .934 5.17 2.16 5.60 1.776 5.82 1.44 
Sea side 
accessibility 
6.17 1.03 6.71 .488 5.33 2.06 6.25 1.035 6.89 .333 6.55 1.508 5.92 2.06 5.56 1.590 6.15 1.47 
Land side 
accessibility 
6.25 .866 5.57 2.14 5.89 1.45 6.00 1.069 6.78 .441 5.55 1.128 5.31 2.13 5.40 1.838 5.82 1.50 
Cargo-handling 
facilities 
6.50 .522 6.50 .837 5.89 1.96 6.22 .833 7.00 0.00 6.64 1.206 5.54 2.14 5.40 1.776 6.18 1.44 
Port efficiency 6.58 .515 6.25 1.75 5.56 2.24 6.22 1.093 7.00 0.00 6.36 1.804 5.46 2.18 5.50 1.841 6.10 1.64 
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Berth availability 6.42 .515 6.38 1.40 6.00 1.80 6.33 1.118 6.44 .726 6.45 1.508 5.46 1.85 5.40 1.776 6.09 1.43 
Total cargo-
handling time 
6.67 .492 6.88 .354 5.78 1.64 6.22 1.093 6.89 .333 5.55 2.115 5.29 2.01 5.44 1.740 6.04 1.53 
Ship’s turnaround 
time 
6.33 .778 6.75 .463 5.63 1.99 6.22 .972 6.67 .500 6.27 1.849 5.38 1.89 5.33 1.732 6.05 1.46 
Level of services 
for fresh water, 
bunkering and 
provisions 
5.67 .778 5.00 2.26 4.63 1.68 5.33 1.732 5.22 .441 5.20 2.251 5.29 1.89 4.90 1.969 5.19 1.67 
Cargo-handling 
fee 
6.00 .739 5.25 2.05 5.33 .707 5.78 1.202 5.22 .441 4.91 .831 4.38 2.36 5.78 .667 5.30 1.39 
Free cargo dwell 
time 
5.83 .718 6.13 .835 5.00 1.30 5.67 1.414 5.44 .527 4.73 1.009 4.23 2.12 5.30 1.703 5.24 1.42 
Customs clearance 
fee 
5.83 .718 4.63 2.38 5.44 .726 5.22 1.856 5.78 .972 5.00 .447 4.79 2.15 5.70 .823 5.29 1.44 
Customs clearance 
process 
6.33 .778 4.86 2.03 5.56 1.33 6.13 .641 6.33 .500 4.73 1.348 4.54 2.14 5.40 1.955 5.46 1.59 
Inland transport 
cost 
6.25 .754 5.88 1.12 5.33 .707 5.67 1.225 6.38 .744 4.73 .647 5.15 1.90 5.40 1.430 5.56 1.25 
